THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

MARCH-APRIL, 1940

THE 1940 SPRING MANEUVERS

By Lieutenant Colonel William M. Grimes

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THE 1940 P

Purpose

The purpose of this article is twofold; to discuss the 1940 Spring Maneuvers to be conducted in the Third Army Area, and to analyze the cavalry rôle therein. The War Department's modernization program is discussed from the viewpoint of its influence on the rôle of the division and corps, and its consequent effect on cavalry operating with such echelons. The likely employment of cavalry by the higher echelons (division and corps) is examined and based thereon, an analysis is made of several possible lines of cavalry action.

The Maneuvers

The Maneuvers scheduled for April and May in the Third Army area constitute the greatest troop concentration since the World War. There will be two distinct phases. The IV and IX Army Corps phases are in the Fort Benning, Georgia, area and the Angelina-Sabine area of Louisiana-Texas, respectively. The phase of the IV versus IX Corps likewise will be held in this latter area.

Unit	*Date*	*Remarks*
IV Corps	April 8-13	Concentrated—Ft. Benning
	" 15-27	Maneuvers
	May 6-11	Movement to Army Area
		Approximate Strength IV Corps 34,000
IX Corps	April 25-27	Concentrated
	April 29-May 9	Maneuvers
		Approximate strength IX Corps 20,000
IV vs. IX Corps	May 6-11	Concentration—in Angelina-Sabine Area
	" 13-26	IV vs. IX Maneuvers
	" 27	Movement to Home Stations
		Approximate Strength of Army 68,000

Troops Involved

The troops involved are modernized; they have the latest in organization, armament, equipment and transportation. The basic unit of the combined arms, the infantry division, is represented by four brand new triangular divisions; 1st, 2d, 5th & 6th (See Chart *1*). These units, combined with certain supporting arms and services, will be grouped into the IV and IX Army Corps. The type army corps is indicated in Chart 2. The Army and GHQ units, Chart 3, consist of units not assigned to divisions and corps. Included are combat, service, maintenance, supply, evacuation and hospitalization units. The Third Army concentration comprises approximately 68,000 troops.

The recent reorganization and reëquipment of the infantry divisions, their concentration and training, over a period of approximately seven months, has been highly successful. Probably no single expenditure of War Department funds has produced more tangible results for National Defense. The intensive training program culminates in the corps and corps vs. corps phases of the Maneuvers. These final phases offer a splendid opportunity to test the efficacy of our efforts to produce efficient

The 1940 Spring Maneuvers will be of vast importance to the corps commanders and their staffs and the corps troops, and to the divisions commanders and their staffs. Moreover, the exercises will be of great benefit to every individual involved; the experiences of new terrain, the uncertainty as to enemy strength, the operations with all the new types of combat units, the try-out of horse cavalry divisions and mechanized cavalry units in connection with large bodies of troops, and possibly in opposition at times to each other—all these phases will make the maneuvers of tremendous benefit to all concerned.

We have never had any real maneuvers of large bodies of troops in our army in time of peace. The few tactical divisions of the regular establishment that we have maintained have not been complete, have been distant from each other, and so scattered about among themselves that lack of funds has usually made it impossible to assemble more than one division.

Another deficiency has been the almost complete lack of corps troops, and the fact that we had no corps commanders, and no corps staffs and headquarters. As a result, we have been forced to build up our technique of command and control and even our development of leadership, largely on a theoretical basis. Therefore, it is important that we make every effort to learn the practical business of troop leadership and team work, utilizing the field maneuvers for this purpose, and especially to wash out the over-theoretical or academic conceptions.

We must have more simplicity of procedure, and that requires team work, and team work is possible only if we have an opportunity to practice as a team.

George C. Marshall,
General, U.S.A.,
Chief of Staff.

(Extract from statement made by General Marshall before the Military Appropriations Sub-Committee, the House of Representatives, November 30, 1939.)

SPRING MANEUVERS

mobile forces; likewise, they afford an excellent chance for the combined training of divisions, corps and army, and the attendant opportunities offered to commanders and staffs of large units—a phase of training, which unfortunately, seldom is afforded.

The Cavalry—Its Employment

Eight regular army cavalry regiments will participate. These regiments—the bulk of the available cavalry—form the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and two recently organized corps reconnaissance regiments—a new type of unit. This force constitutes the light, fast, mobile ground elements of the Army and reflects, also, the latest developments in organization and equipment. Properly employed and led this cavalry will play an important rôle in the maneuvers.

The maneuvers will be instructive and interesting from a cavalry viewpoint. For the first time in practically a decade this arm will participate in a comparatively large number of echelons in close coöperation with the infantry division, the corps and army echelons—an experience the cavalry woefully lacks and badly needs.

The successful employment of cavalry depends upon several factors; intelligent handling and appropriate missions by higher commanders (division, corps, army); intelligent cavalry leadership in executing assigned missions; and frequent opportunities for combined training with infantry divisions, the corps and army. The importance and necessity for such combined training is obvious.

"Because of the vital relation which the proper employment of the cavalry bears to the success of the plan of operations or scheme of maneuver of the entire force, the responsibility for such employment rests with the commander of that force. To insure that the cavalry missions contribute to the success of the scheme of maneuver, the commander must have a clear understanding of the general characteristics of cavalry and of the missions which it executes. In each situation, he must know the capabilities of his cavalry. He is responsible that the orders to the cavalry definitely and clearly state the mission of that arm." The foregoing is quoted from an excellent C&GSS document dealing with cavalry.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

Unfortunately, our high commanders have had no opportunity to employ modern cavalry. Lack of familiarity with the powers and limitations of an arm or service leads to misunderstanding and prejudice. Paragraphs 29-37 of the new 1939 Tentative FSR (FM 100-5), Operations, presents some pertinent data in this connection.

Our cavalry leaders, too, are seriously handicapped by too infrequent opportunities for combined training with infantry, divisions and higher echelons. Intimate association with other arms and services insures team play. The success of the infantry-artillery team is proof of the pudding. Paragraph 21, 1939 Tentative FSR states: "No one arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms is es-

By Lieutenant Colonel William M. Grimes
(Cavalry) G.S.C.



sential to success. The characteristics of each arm and service adapt it to the performance of its special function. The higher commander coördinates and directs the action of all, exploiting their powers to attain the ends sought."

Analysis of Army Units

Intelligent employment of the Army's cavalry requires an examination of the major elements of that army, the powers and limitations of the triangular division and corps, the manner in which these large echelons will operate and the support they will expect from cavalry. Considering these requirements in connection with cavalry's capabilities, we should be able to deduce reasonable lines of action that will contribute to the success of the corps and army missions. The initial responsibility for the cavalry *mission* is that of corps and army commanders. The cavalry commander is responsible for *execution*. The cavalry is one element of a team of which the corps or army commander is the captain and calls the signals.

Characteristics and an Analysis of the Triangular Division

The triangular division (See Chart *1*) was designed to reduce personnel, eliminate overhead, utilize modern motorization and weapons developments to the utmost, and relegate all non-essentials to rear echelons. It consists of three infantry regiments, proportionate artillery, and minimum service and auxiliary troops. The distinctive characteristics of this organization are:

First, the omission of the brigade echelon; the chain of command passes directly from the division commander to regimental or combat team commanders, thereby eliminating one echelon of command and making for faster reaction to orders.

Second, it has only the minimum essential means to operate as the interior division of a corps. This eliminates the need for special reconnaissance and security units and elements which can, by their nature or mobility, serve more than one division. (Ed. Note: This conception is perhaps true if the reconnaissance and security elements are of proper strength and composition. Ability to move off roads is a prime requisite.) It permits considerable supply, maintenance, evacuation and hospitalization to be relegated to corps or army.

Third, though all its transportation is motor, the division is not motorized in the sense that it has enough transportation to move all elements simultaneously. About half the infantry is still dismounted; if the net rate of march of the division is to be more than 2 to 2½ miles per hour, additional transportation must be provided, or the troops must be moved by shuttling. To move all elements simultaneously requires about 300 additional trucks; if moved in its own trucks by shuttling, the division can move about 75 miles in a day, *assuming no interference.*

Fourth, it is readily divisible into combat teams, each a balanced and effective force. Each combat team normally consists of a regiment of infantry, a battalion of light artillery, a company of engineers and a collecting platoon. (Ed. Note: The organic incorporation of a reconnaissance and security element would appear sound and desirable.) The division usually marches and bivouacs by combat teams. When contact is made, the


INFANTRY DIVISION
PEACE
438-0 3-WO 8,519-EM
INFANTRY SECTION ARTILLERY SECTION
4-0 4-EM 5-0 15-EM
DIVISION COMMANDER AND AIDES
GENERAL STAFF
Chief of Staff
G-2, G-3, Asst.
G-3, G-4.
8-0 12-EM
SPECIAL STAFF
A.G.D. I.G.D. Ord. D.
J.A.G.D. Fin.O. C.W.S.
Chaplain Postal
10-0 2-WO 54-EM
SIGNAL COMPANY
7-0 175-EM
HQRS. PLATOON AND DIV. SIG. OFFICER.
3-0 30-EM
OPERATING PLATOON
3-0 90-EM
CONSTRUCTION PLATOON
1-0 55-EM
MESSAGE CENTER SECTION
1-0 17-E
RADIO SECTION
1-0 30-E
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SEC.
1-0 43-E
ENGINEER BATTALION
13-0 300-EM
HQRS. DETCH.
4-0 30-EM
COMBAT COMPANY
3-0 90-EM
COMBAT COMPANY
3-0 90-EM
COMBAT COMPANY
3-0 90-EM
QUARTER-MASTER BATTALION
11-0 225-EM
BN HQ AND DIV QM
5-0 13-EM
TRUCK COMPANY
3-0 90-EM
HEADQUARTERS CO.
3-0 122-EM
CAR PLATOON
12-EM
SERVICE PLATOON
1-0 49-E
MAINTENANCE PLATOON
1-0 46-EM
HEADQUARTERS AND MILITARY POLICE CO.
4-0 1-WO 134-EM
CO HQ
1-0 15-EM
MESS AND ORDERLY PLATOON
1-0 19-EM
DIVISION BAND
1-WO 50-EM
MILITARY POLICE PLATOON
2-0 50-EM
ATTACHED FROM DIVISION HQRS
27-0 2-WO 81-EM
MEDICAL BATTALION
14-0 220-EM
BN HQ AND DIV SURG
3-0 7-EM
HEADQUARTERS CO.
4-0 48-EM
COMPANY HQRS
1-0 18-EM
CLEARING PLATOON
3-0 30-EM
COLLECTING CO.
7-0 165-EM
COLLECTING PLAT.
2-0 50-EM
COLLECTING PLAT.
2-0 50-EM
COLLECTING PLAT.
2-0 50-EM
ATTACHED MEDICAL
34-0 275-EM
ATTACHED CHAPLAINS
8-0
RIFLE COMPANY
4-0 114-EM
RIFLE COMPANY
4-0 114-EM
RIFLE COMPANY
4-0 114-EM
HEAVY WEAPONS CO.
5-0 123-EM
BATTALION
19-0 491-EM
BATTALION
19-0 491-EM
BATTALION
19-0 491-EM
HQRS. AND HQRS. CO.
7-0 128-EM
SERVICE CO.
5-0 69-EM
INFANTRY REGIMENT
60-0 1670-EM
INFANTRY REGIMENT
69-0 1670-EM
INFANTRY REGIMENT
69-0 1670-EM
HQ BTRY & COMBAT TRAIN
9-0 110-EM
75-MM GUN BATTERY
4-0 99-EM
75-MM GUN BATTERY
4-0 99-EM
75-MM GUN BATTERY
4-0 99-EM
BATTALION
21-0 407-EM
BATTALION
21-0 407-EM
BATTALION
21-0 407-EM
HEADQUARTERS BTRY
10-0 90-EM
75-MM GUN REGIMENT
73-0 1311-EM
HEADQUARTERS BTRY
10-0 80-EM
155-MM HOWITZER REGIMENT
40-0 788-EM
BATTALION
15-0 354-EM
BATTALION
15-0 354-EM
HEADQUARTERS BTRY AND COMBAT TRAIN
7-0 110-EM
155-MM HOWITZER BATTERY
4-0 122-EM
155-MM HOWITZER BATTERY
4-0 122-EM

Chart 1

Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick
Commander, The Third Army

division steps in and controls and coördinates the action.

Finally, the triangular division has a high ratio of fire power. In this respect it is not materially different than the square division now in force, as both use the same infantry organization, and have substantially the same ratio of artillery to infantry.

Analyzing these characteristics from the viewpoint that cavalry will operate both with and against this division leads to several general conclusions:

The triangular division lacks organic means of reconnaissance, hence must be reinforced by cavalry when acting alone or when in any capacity other than that of the interior division of a larger force. Strategic movements of the division habitually will be motorized; such moves when not made in rear of extended defensive systems will require protective security; movements of whatever nature motorized or otherwise will require security. The attachment of suitably organized cavalry elements, such as the new corps regiment, either as a whole or in appropriate combat team subdivisions may be necessary in any move. The motorization of the division has eliminated many requirements for the horse cavalry regiment (T/O 2-11), as division and corps cavalry. The more modern corps reconnaissance regiment is specifically designed for this purpose. (Ed. Note: It should be realized that the new Corps Reconnaissance Regiment has present a squadron of 3 troops, horse-portée, which insures movement across country and affords real protection.) These facts require thoughtful consideration by higher commanders employing cavalry, as well as by cavalry leaders. The complete motorization of division and corps echelons has affected materially every supporting arm; horse-drawn artillery has been replaced by truck-drawn elements, and similarly, horse cavalry is undergoing considerable modification. The new division is marched and fought by strong mobile combat teams; this means dispersed marches in multiple columns on broad frontages, the effect of which increases the security requirements of friendly cavalry. These formations require the opposing cavalry to disperse and operate in small groups against relatively strong mobile opposition. Delaying these new divisions will require an overhaul of our present technique. The successful delay of a combat team will be quite a problem; these units are mobile, strong in small arms infantry fire power, reinforced by a battalion of 75-mm. guns. Motorized echelons are relatively road bound, susceptible to road blocks and consequent delay. Rapid road reconnaissance, all around security, prompt exploration of roads, and quick transmittal of information by the cavalry to the infantry combat teams will be normal. The necessity for a direct communication net to effect this is indicated. The requirements of this net should be carefully studied. Cavalry operating with the triangular division can expect prompt reinforcement by motorized infantry if and when the situation requires; this fact lessens the demands for cavalry to engage in sustained combat, which is as it should be, since division and corps cavalry are specialized units. Paragraph 6 CFM, W.D. 1938, referring to division and corps cavalry, states their "primary functions are reconnaissance and security." These are pertinent and important facts for all commanders, infantry as well as cavalry. (Ed. Note: This is not to say, however, that cavalry en masse is not prepared for combat of a rugged nature.)

The triangular division, due to the elimination of the brigade, the normal use of combat teams, and large degree of motorization, is faster getting in and out of action than is the square division. It will affect cavalry operating with or against the triangular division. It will require prompter support from friendly cavalry; and probably less delay from hostile cavalry can be expected.

Motorization of all trains makes it possible for both the triangular division and the corps to operate with longer lines of communication than can an organization based on animal trains. The smaller reserves carried in the triangular division (as compared with the square) make the retention of the lines of communication more important, while the possibility of extending them makes them more vulnerable. The possibility of longer marches tends to extend the lines of communication. This may call for the use of mechanized cavalry for security purposes, and the reverse conclusion that these lines of communication will be remunerative objectives.

The Characteristics of and an Analysis of the Corps

Analysis of the Corps, Chart 2, indicates it consists of a headquarters, corps troops, and two or more divisions. As

CHART II



Chart 2

previously indicated, the type corps, which is used for planning and instruction purposes, contains one triangular and two square divisions. All divisions in the 1940 Spring Maneuvers will be triangular.

Corps troops provide the following: combat elements which can support more than one division, or which, because of their power or mission, are not profitably employed in divisions; service elements which are necessary forward of the army, but which can be dispensed with in the divisions.

The principal combat elements in corps troops are: a field artillery brigade of two 155-mm. howitzer and one 155-mm. gun regiments which has the primary purpose of counterbattery and long-range interdiction; an antiaircraft regiment to protect important corps installations; a reconnaissance regiment with one horse and one mechanized squadron, to provide reconnaissance and security for the whole corps; an antitank battalion, which is a compact and mobile unit, able to move quickly to any part of the corps zone to stop mass attacks by tanks or mechanized vehicles; and an observation group and a balloon group to perform air missions for the corps.

The principal service elements are: two engineer regiments, to support the divisional engineers, to maintain routes in the corps area, and to perform usual engineer tasks; an ordnance battalion, which provides a pool of ordnance maintenance needed by the divisions and by corps troops; a medical regiment; and a quartermaster service, which provides car and truck transportation needed by corps troops, and also motor maintenance facilities for all units of the corps.

The corps is the smallest tactical unit to which cavalry is organically assigned. This is a departure from the former organization policy, wherein the army with two cavalry divisions, was the smallest unit with organic cavalry. The corps cavalry regiment is therefore, something new. Experience with the P1D and P2D tests of the provisional infantry division, indicated the necessity of a motorized or mechanized reconnaissance unit. However, one only was deemed necessary for the front of several divisions, hence a corps reconnaissance unit. (Ed. Note: It would seem that the existing road net, the degree of opposition and the nature of the intervening terrain would govern the capacity of a single regiment for this purpose.) The regiment thus provided is intended for both close and distant reconnaissance. It consists of two squadrons, one mechanized and one portée-horse, combining the two cavalry means of transport. The mechanized squadron has two scout car troops and one motorcycle troop and is designed for distant missions; the horse squadron has three troops. To save horse flesh and to have horses available in time, the regiment is provided with horse van trailers sufficient in number to move all the horses in the squadron. The headquarters troop includes, among other sections, pioneer, communications and antitank platoons. This regiment is unique; provision is made to overcome any deficiencies of the horse by transporting him by motor; also the reverse is true, any deficiencies of the mechanized vehicle is met by the immediate availability of the horse. This unit enables reconnaissance to be habitually performed—irrespective of terrain, weather or fuel conditions. So far as is known, this unit is the only one of its kind in any army; certainly it is a most highly modernized cavalry regiment, and its operations will be followed with the keenest interest.

The predominant characteristic of the new corps is motorization and the great flexibility resulting therefrom. The corps is a large, powerful unit; its component divisions are mobile, self-trained combat teams; and the combat elements of its corps troops, particularly the corps artillery, constitute a powerful auxiliary means to influence the action of the divisions. Within the corps the divisions operate as units. Considering its organization, the corps is a unit of great versatility and power, and its operations are characterized by greater variety, power and continuity than those of the division. The corps carries no reserve of supplies or transportation for its divisions or corps troops. When detached from the army, the corps will require at least logistic support. Its lack of reserves, greater mobility, and exploitation of motors will tend to both make its communications highly important as well as to lengthen them.

Motorization of the corps has affected tremendously march technique, control and security. This in turn presents many new problems for corps cavalry; to date one can merely hazard a guess as to their solution. However, the problem is a live issue and requires and will receive prompt and continuous study. Fortunately, as an initial step in the solution, provision was made for a modernized reconnaissance unit; further study is indicated as to the adequacy of this unit, and the future effect of its employment on the cavalry division, the mechanized brigade and the T/O 2-11, cavalry regiment, horse. Indicative of the present trend of thought is paragraph 146, 1939 Tentative FSR:

> "The indiscriminate mixing of horse and mechanized cavalry units results in a reduction in the efficiency of both. To each is assigned the reconnaissance mission for which it is best suited according to its characteristics.
>
> Reconnaissance units of horse cavalry have the advantage of greater mobility across country and freedom of conditions of weather, terrain, and supply. Their speed and range of action are, however, limited. The great value of horse cavalry on reconnaissance missions lies in its ability to determine details of information, to observe the enemy where secrecy is essential, and to establish a closely knit reconnaissance screen.
>
> Mechanized reconnaissance units, because of their road speed, are useful for quickly seizing widely separated and distant localities. Their mobility is comparatively sensitive to terrain and weather. They are dependent upon conditions of roads and weather and the replenishment of gasoline and oil. The great value of mechanized cavalry lies in its ability to execute a distant reconnaissance mission when time is a vital factor, and to establish an extensive reconnaissance screen over a wide area."

Since reconnaissance is the primary mission of corps cavalry, obviously its training must be directed with this in view. It must train with all other agencies concerned, including reconnaissance aviation. Unquestionably, the Cavalry School has conducted thorough studies of the problems involved in the communications between the air and the ground reconnaissance, and between the latter and the infantry combat teams. Reconnaissance involves another phase of cavalry training, essential to every cavalry commander, viz., that the S-2 and G-2 of all echelons —squadron, regiment, brigade and division—be thoroughly familiar with the preparation of the G-2 Plan and the various phases necessary to secure the essential items of information desired by the commander, and also the relative importance of these items in all instructions for reconnaissance. Cavalry commanders must constantly supervise and check the adequacy and efficiency of their signal communications so as to insure the prompt and reliable transmission of the results of reconnaissance.

Chart 2 indicates the type corps. Charts 4 and 5 show the units assigned to the IV and IX Corps, respectively. The IX Corps (Chart 5) contains the 2d Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and the 4th Cavalry (corps reconnaissance regiment). This corps will be a highly mobile unit of great strategic and tactical power. Many problems will arise in this corps over the missions assigned to the main combat elements and particularly the three cavalry components. The possibilities are numerous. What cavalry agency will perform the reconnaissance for this corps? Will it be horse or mechanized? If mechanized, will it be by the 7th Cavalry Brigade or the 4th Cavalry? If a strategic reserve is employed, will it be the 1st Cavalry Division or the Mechanized Brigade? The IX Corps will be confronted by a less mobile but more powerful IV Corps—probably reinforced by a mass of tanks from the 66th, 67th and 68th Infantry light and medium tank regiments. A splendid opportunity will exist in this corps (IX) for a comparative test of the three types of cavalry. The command and staff of the IX Corps have a problem as to how best to utilize its extremely divergent components—a powerful infantry division, a mobile horse division, and armored elements of great fire and striking power. Will the 2d Division and the 1st Cavalry Division compose the basic fighting elements of the Corps? Without doubt the IX Army Corps, the cavalry division, and the mechanized brigade have explored the possibilities of the situation. Certainly this is fodder for these commanders and their staffs. The cavalry problems involved are worthy of the best efforts of the tactical sections of Riley and Leavenworth. Here, in one corps, is represented every type of cavalry—horse, mechanized, and a combination of the two. It is hoped that each will be given a mission in accordance with its capabilities. With bold, energetic leadership, the outcome will be most interesting and instructive.

Examining the IV Corps (Chart 4), we find its main combat echelon will consist of the 1st, 5th and 6th Divisions and normal corps troops. During the Benning phase



Major General Kenyon A. Joyce, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division

of the IV Corps Maneuvers, this Corps may employ the six battalions of infantry tanks now concentrated at the Infantry School; during the IV versus the IX Corps maneuvers in the Sabine area, these infantry tanks may again be attached to the IV Corps. The corps strength and composition will be practically that prescribed for the type corps except that there will be no square divisions. Therefore, from a corps cavalry viewpoint the IV Corps will be a more normal unit, and hence a better yardstick for cavalry requirements. However, in operations against the IX Corps, the 6th Cavalry will be handicapped by the tremendous superiority of the IX Corps' mobile forces. (Ed. Note: Particularly, from the fact that the 6th Cavalry will enter the maneuvers without its allotted vans for transporting its horse squadron.) The operations of the 6th Cavalry, organically a part of this corps, should be observed carefully. Several points arise with respect to this regiment. Is the organization sound? Do we require both horse and mechanized cavalry organically with the corps? If not, what type is needed? If both, in what proportion? Is the strength of the regiment adequate or is it excessive? How will the regiment handle requests for attachments to the divisions of the corps? How will the IV Corps utilize the commander of the 6th Cavalry? Will he be in a comparable status to the corps chief of artillery, who in peace also commands the corps artillery brigade?

Possible Trend and Development of the Corps and Corps vs. Corps Maneuvers

Naturally the exact trend and development of the Corps and the Corps vs. Corps Maneuvers will not be announced in advance. However, it is possible to "G-2" the enemy capabilities. The maneuver areas of both corps are known.



Chart 3

Note: The 7th Cavalry Brigade, 6th Infantry attached, will be a part of the IX Corps. The Infantry tank units will be a part of the IV Corps. The 6th Infantry will be attached to the 7th Cavalry Brigade during Sabine Area Maneuvers.

Terrain is a potential weapon. Certainly a terrain study of these two localities is in order. Critical areas should be spotted. Even a casual study of the available road and communications net will disclose pertinent factors to those cavalry echelons which may be called upon to support these two corps.

One can not help but notice the dominant influence that rivers may play in both maneuver areas. All of these terrain features have a direct influence on the course of the maneuvers and the manner in which the cavalry will be employed by corps and army as well as the type of cavalry required. Of the three types available in these maneuvers horse cavalry is less tied to and affected by the terrain.

Let us assume both corps will operate against one another in the Sabine River area. Following the concentration in all probability one of the corps will be given an offensive mission, the other logically a defensive one. In order to bring about contact, the corps with the offensive mission might advance and attack the defending corps. Thus, it follows that two more operations may be executed, viz., the corps in the attack and the corps in defense. If both corps are to be given offensive missions at one time or another, a situation must be created whereby the corps initially on the defense passes to the offensive and the other corps defends, this situation might continue with the defending corps retiring and the offensive force pursuing. We thus have one corps, concentrating, advancing, attacking, defending and retiring; the other concentrating, defending, passing to the offensive and pursuit.

Let us now proceed with an analysis of these several operations and determine what conclusions may be reached.

Corps Concentration

In assembling the IV Corps in the Benning area and the IX Corps in the Sabine area the initial problem is the concentration phase. It can be assumed that the first exercise will involve a strategic or tactical concentration. The corps is concentrated when all of its elements are in such positions that they can participate in a single battle. The concept of concentration of forces is modified somewhat by the newly organized corps. The power of modern weapons provides security forces with greater resistance; modern means of transportation provide for the rapid assembly of forces at the time and place desired. These considerations will permit greater echelonment of forces in time, space and concentration, hence the security demands on cavalry will increase. During the period of concentration it may be necessary for the corps to commit a part of its force to a defensive position to provide security for the concentration. In this case the critical areas to be held must be determined and the method of occupation adopted to the force available and to the terrain. Prior to concentrating it is normal for the commander of the force to decide on his scheme of maneuver for carrying out the mission assigned. The foregoing largely involve command functions and decisions. However, cavalry commanders must consider these factors since they give a clue as to the manner in which their units may be employed—or may lead to a recommendation for such employment.

Proper security for the corps is the responsibility of the corps commander. He must insure that proper measures are taken to coördinate all security. Cavalry commanders must have a clear concept of the principles underlying the security of large echelons; the meaning and intent of the corps reconnaissance and security line; that the corps rarely establishes a corps outpost; that the major combat elements provide their own local security and that the arrangement of the major combat elements in proper relation to each other normally provides adequate protection for the area occupied by the corps; that depth of security is essential to the corps—with the cavalry well in advance of

the area occupied by the troops so that timely warning promptly alerts the corps and if necessary motorized infantry is dispatched to the threatened point.

The principal cavalry mission other than those incident to the march and assembly in the plan of concentration, will be in connection with the security of the concentration area. If the area is not adequately protected, reconnaissance and security elements will be among the first troops to arrive; this usually involves the early arrival of cavalry, antiaircraft artillery, and air service, and later infantry units to support the cavalry.

The distance at which security elements are posted to secure the concentration will vary with many factors such as: the situation, terrain, nature of hostile threat, the range of modern artillery, and the speed and rapidity of modern troop transportation. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the cavalry will establish its security forces disposed to cover hostile approaches at distances varying from 10 to 25 miles from the concentration area. Corps cavalry will be employed primarily for reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance purposes. Mechanized reconnaissance vehicles radio-equipped will be very essential for reconnaissance missions; whereas horse elements will be useful in the counterreconnaissance activities, depending on the situation they will be reinforced by motorized infantry.

The IV Corps may utilize its 6th Cavalry as indicated above. The IX Corps may have the choice of covering its concentration with either the 1st Cavalry Division or the mechanized brigade. The situation will determine which is employed. Protecting its concentration from a threat by the IV Corps, a powerful means is available in the mechanized brigade; strong in reconnaissance, fire power and mobility—useful characteristics in reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance.

The Corps Advances

Upon completion of the concentration phase it is reasonable to assume that the next phase insofar as one or both of the corps is concerned will involve an advance. The movement of a corps is, from the corps viewpoint, a coördinated movement of large combat groups, the divisions and corps troops. While the advance of the large elements is coördinated, it does not follow that they always move simultaneously in a fixed relation to each other—it may be simultaneous or by successive movements of large groups. Depending on the situation the modern corps might be expected to advance up to 150 miles in a day.

The formation adopted for the advance will depend on many factors, mission, terrain, road net, whether combat is remote or imminent. Motorization of the corps has emphasized more than ever the importance of the road net, it is a prime factor in the movement of large echelons. As to formations any one of a number may be adopted. In a corps motor movement the formations are almost unlimited. The formation above all must facilitate maneuver, change of direction, flank protection and maximum use of roads.

The advance of the modern corps is an interesting operation, especially with the bulk of the divisions motorized and shuttling essential and normal. The security problem will be complex, requiring considerable dispersion of forces. The necessity for three security detachments, in as many different places may arise; one advancing with the initial infantry elements to the new area; another force protecting the old area; with still a third unit operating in between with shuttling. The tendency to disperse must be carefully watched in order that sufficient weight may be placed at a critical point. Our Command and General Staff School has undoubtedly exploited the problem tactically and logistically; similarly, the Cavalry School undoubtedly has examined the many new angles presented to cavalry. It is a live and difficult problem, the solution of which confronts the corps commander and his staff. It involves the employment of motorized and mechanized security detachments to a marked degree. Cavalry commanders should study the principles involved in the corps in the advance and be familiar with march formations, distribution of elements, march tables, control and coördination during the advance, zones, axes of advance, routes, reconnaissance and security, and the corps reconnaissance and security line.

Major General Walter C. Short, Commander, The IV Corps

Recent Leavenworth instructional matter speaking of corps cavalry states:

> "The corps cavalry is usually employed under corps control by sending it out well in advance of the divisions. It may be employed on missions of reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance. . . . Mechanized elements of


IV CORPS
FA BRIG
13
FA REGT
17
FA REGT
36
OBSN BN
1
CORPS SP TRS
HQ CO
IV
SIG BN
51
ORD SERV
CA AA REGT
62
AT BN
4
CAV REGT (CORPS RCN)
6
INF REGT
8
CORPS AVN
OBSN GP
OBSN SQ
3
OBSN SQ
15
OBSN SQ
97
OBSN SQ
2
CORPS ENGR
ENGR REGT (C)
18
ENGR REGT (GS)
21
ENGR CO (TOP)
64
MED REGT
16
QM SERV
XX
1
XX
5
XX
6
INF REGT (L TK)
66
BN (MEDIUM TKS)
67
INF REGT (L TK)
68
INF TK ELEMENTS

Chart 4

the corps cavalry should be employed to push out well ahead and gain early contact with, and information of, the enemy. The presence of corps cavalry in front of the divisions will provide additional security for the corps, regardless of the nature of the mission assigned to the cavalry. . . . It is frequently desirable and necessary that one or all of the divisions of the corps be furnished with cavalry to meet their responsibilities with regard to reconnaissance to and within the corps reconnaissance and security line. It is desirable that this cavalry be provided by special assignment of cavalry units, . . . in addition to the units of strictly corps cavalry. In the absence of such division cavalry, it may be essential in some cases to attach small elements of the corps cavalry to the divisions."

If the IX Corps advances, the movement and employment of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the 4th Cavalry will present many interesting angles. One point that will arise at the start is when and where will the 1st Cavalry Division march? This unit does not have the march mobility of the motorized elements of either the 2d Division or the corps troops. Can the 4th Cavalry provide adequate reconnaissance? Should the mechanized brigade be employed on security missions in the advance? If the march objective of the corps requires prompt seizure and occupation prior to the arrival of the mass of the corps—the employment of the mechanized brigade is indicated.

The Corps in Attack

The following discussion is based upon Leavenworth instructional matter. It is condensed to present a brief picture, from which certain conclusions have been made.

In mobile situations, the advance to the probable zone of contact and the attack by a force as large as a corps requires maneuver, regardless of the form of attack. Decentralization is the keynote. The maneuver (divisions and corps tactical units) is directed by the corps commander.

In an offensive situation, the corps commander controls the action mainly by directing the action of his divisions. The corps action is a coördinated series of division engagements. Divisions are assigned a direction of advance or a zone of action, and an objective, or their advance is directed on successive lines. Throughout the march toward the enemy and the establishment of contact and engagement, and during the actual attack, the corps commander requires each division to maintain its direction and causes lateral contact between units to be maintained.

The plan of attack envisages the engagement of the hostile front with minimum forces and with the mass reserved for the main action against a vital objective. The attack thus develops into a main attack and a holding attack.

The movement of large forces takes time and early decisions are essential; hence prompt information should be given to the commanders of the major elements for the formulation of plans.



Major General Walter Krueger, Commander, The IX Corps

The corps commander indicates the scheme of maneuver of the corps by designating the directions or frontages of his main and holding attacks. In an envelopment the main attack is given the means necessary to insure sucess. It should be assisted by a holding attack strong enough to fix the enemy. The envelopment seeks to strike the defender's flank well to his rear. The independent corps operating against an alert enemy of considerable strength will find it difficult to maneuver secretly a large force around the hostile flank.

In the attack the immediate objective may be the hostile control system or command system, or an area which controls these systems. In forces the size of a corps, the control center and supply center lie geographically in the same general vicinity; that is, in the rear area of the force. An attack against this hostile rear area takes the maximum advantage of the enemy's weakness, and his difficulties as to security.

Analyzing the foregoing discussion it is reasonable to presume that during the march to battle the corps will be partially deployed, in a wide deep formation that will facilitate coördinated effort in the attack. The purpose of the development of the corps is to place the major combat elements in suitable assembly positions from which the approach march is taken to the lines of departure.

The above indicates that, during the march to contact, corps cavalry will be extensively used on security missions. Especially during the development must it be active, and the development should be covered by a force

of such strength and maneuver power that the movement of other elements will not be interrupted and attack dispositions disclosed. This period is critical; furthermore, the reconnaissance regiment probably will be considerably dispersed. In which event it must be reinforced by motorized infantry detachments varying in strength from a battalion to a reinforced infantry regiment. Such procedure will be quite normal and permits cavalry during the advance and while contact is being made, to be used primarily on missions for which it is best fitted. If a meeting engagement takes place, the corps cavalry endeavors initially to secure favorable terrain for the advanced infantry motorized detachments which are shoved forward promptly. When relieved by these advanced elements, the cavalry will continue its reconnaissance towards the enemy flanks and rear; cover the flanks of the infantry advanced detachments and, depending upon later developments of the situation, may be employed to screen further dispositions and movements or held in mobile reserve. Provided modern reconnaissance (air-mechanized) is properly conducted, it is difficult to visualize sudden collisions in meeting engagements of forces the size of a corps. When the advance elements of the corps gain contact, it will be necessary to detruck infantry elements beyond the range of hostile artillery fire. Long range hostile artillery may effectively interdict daylight movement on roads up to 10 miles and medium range up to 6 miles. Detrucking therefore can be expected to be made at least a half-day's march for foot elements in rear of attack positions. The detrucking points are in effect initial assembly areas. The development of the corps thus may be made mounted (motorized) into an assembly area. Movements forward of the assembly area are habitually made on foot. The foregoing facts indicate that the horse elements of the portée squadron of the corps regiment may be called upon at this time to furnish security for the further advance of the infantry foot elements to attack positions.

During the actual attack the corps cavalry may be employed in a variety of ways. It may: reconnoiter on an exposed flank; maintain contact between divisions of a corps; screen movements of attacking troops; assist a flank unit; operate against the hostile flank or rear; delay the advance of hostile forces; or act as a mobile reserve. The corps will employ motor transportation to get as far forward as possible, so as to increase the operative mobility of foot troops.

In the IV Corps, the 6th Cavalry constitutes the only cavalry. It will be sorely taxed to execute the demands outlined above. It can be expected that this regiment will be reinforced frequently by motorized infantry. Careful consideration must be given to solving the many details incident thereto. In the IX Corps, the corps cavalry requirements concerning reconnaissance and security are similar. However, a far different situation exists regarding the employment of the IX Corps cavalry mass. In the attack of this corps some cavalry may be employed in close contact with the 2d Division. This points to a use for the 1st Cavalry Division, a unit more comparable to the infantry division than the mechanized brigade. This latter unit might be employed in corps strategic reserve, its great mobility and striking power being utilized for operations in hostile rear areas and flanks, well beyond the capabilities of either the 1st Cavalry Division or the 2d Division. It is not impossible to picture a situation in which the IX Corps attacks, with the 2d Division making the secondary attack, and the decisive attack, a double envelopment, utilizing the horse division in a close-in envelopment and the mechanized brigade in a wide one; or perhaps the mechanized brigade in a wide turning movement. A totally different situation would be one in which the 2d Division is closely supported by the mechanized brigade, utilizing the striking effect of the latter's tanks (combat cars); the horse cavalry division being employed in corps reserve. A word as to the 4th Cavalry; will it be used for reconnaissance and security purposes by the IX Corps in offensive operations? It is a smaller unit than the 6th Cavalry. Furthermore, the more mobile a unit—and the IX Corps is highly mobile—the greater the reconnaissance demands. It is possible, of course, to reinforce this regiment by either motorized detachments from the 2d Division or mechanized echelons from either the 1st Cavalry Division or the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The lines of action open to the IX Corps in exploiting the capabilities of its cavalry component in an attack are almost unlimited as are the opportunities afforded the cavalry commanders.

The Corps in Defense

The initial dispositions of the corps normally are on a broad front and in depth. The width and depth of the dispositions should permit the organization of a main defensive effort in a favorable area.

Paragraph 509, Tentative FSR, 1939 states: "the tactics of defensive combat are essentially to develop the maximum fire power against an advancing enemy, reduce our own losses by a better knowledge and utilization of the terrain, and thereby stop the enemy's advance or create a situation which favors a successful counterattack."

The corps commander designates the area in which the defense is to be developed. Orders to divisions occupying a part of the defensive position indicate the area in which each is to defend, and give general instructions for the conduct of the defense.

Details of execution are left to division commanders. The tactical situation determines the number of divisions to be committed initially and the number to be held in the general reserve. Minimum forces are employed for security, for diversions, and for containing enemy strength. Reference to the number of divisions to be initially committed:

> When faced with a vague situation one division is often appropriate. Other divisions and corps troops are held in reserve prepared to extend the flanks or for counteroffensive measures.
>
> With one flank secure, with the enemy advancing on a relatively broad front, or when his direction is


IX CORPS
CORPS SP TRS
HQ CO (PRCV) IX
SIG BN 62
SIG CO (RAD INT) 3
ORD SERV
FA REGT 77
CAC AA 61
CAC AA 69
CAV REGT CORPS RCN 4
BN 17
CORPS AVN
OBSN SQ 1
OBSN SQ 22
BLN SQ 1
ENGR REGT (C) 5
MED REGT 1
QM SERV
XX 2
XX 1
X 7
III 6

Chart 5

Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee, Commander, 7th Cavalry Brigade

fixed by terrain or other circumstances, the corps commander may commit initially two divisions, holding the other in reserve so located as to facilitate its anticipated employment.

In open warfare, the disposition, defensively, of all three divisions abreast is most unusual.

In a defensive situation proper provision for security is a major responsibility of the corps commander. He must provide for the security of the corps as a whole. Local security is a responsibility of subordinate elements.

The corps may need time to complete its defensive dispositions. This time may be obtained by the employment of the corps cavalry to hold the enemy in check; the divisions may be required to establish certain of their elements on covering positions; or it may be necessary for the corps to employ a complete division, in addition to the cavalry, on a covering mission in which by resistance and by delaying action the time needed by the corps is gained.

The flanks of the defensive position are frequently vulnerable. In case of hostile operations against the flanks, time will be needed to move troops to meet the threat. The cavalry is often employed for the security of the flanks and, if necessary, additional elements from the divisions may be used to support the cavalry. The judicious posting of reserves in accordance with the probable developments of the action is another means of insuring the necessary security of the position.

The corps cavalry normally operates under corps control and under one commander.

Within its capabilities the cavalry reconnoiters, interferes with hostile activities, operates with the intent to mystify and deceive the enemy as to the commander's plans, and when opportunity offers, engages in the decisive battle.

Detailed reconnaissance is usually performed by horse cavalry, full use being made of its organic mechanized elements. Special distant reconnaissances in force may be delegated to mechanized cavalry operating independently, if available.

In defense, the mass of the horse cavalry is generally utilized to secure one or both flanks. Mechanized cavalry is usually held initially in general reserve. In the counterattack or counteroffensive, cavalry is particularly valuable. Mechanized cavalry is employed to take full advantage of its strategical and tactical mobility.

When the enemy contemplates an envelopment of one or both flanks of the defensive position, he will endeavor to clear the flanks for the maneuvering of his attacking forces. In such cases the corps cavalry of the defender will frequently have an important delaying or resisting mission to counter such efforts.

In the counterattack cavalry usually is of greatest value for delaying the advance of possible enemy reserves, for reconnaissances, for protecting the exposed flank of a counterattack, and for protecting the advance of the force making the counterattack to the locality from which the attack is to be launched.

In the 1940 Spring Maneuvers, if defensive situations arise, undoubtedly they will be conducted on mobile lines as indicated in Paragraphs 521-522, Tentative FSR 1939. The corps cavalry units will be relied on to insure a highly developed reconnaissance and security system that will insure early information of the hostile mass and block, delay and impede its progress. In other words, operate to prevent surprise and to gain time so that the defense can shift its weight in accordance with hostile moves. To accomplish this, frequent reinforcement of the corps regiment is indicated. In the IV Corps the operations of the 6th Cavalry will be much along the above lines. In the IX Corps the situation is different. If, in addition to the 2d Division, another unit is committed to a defensive position, the 1st Cavalry Division should have priority over the use of the mechanized brigade for obvious reasons. The latter unit constitutes a formidable reserve for the corps commander —especially suitable for counterattacks or distant counterstrokes, ranging from delaying action to offensive thrusts against distant objectives. The IX Corps' cavalry endows this corps defensive capabilities with great offensive power. However, the defensive holding capacity of this corps is less than the IV Corps with its three infantry divisions.

Corps in Retrograde Movements

The principles governing retrograde movements—withdrawals from action and retirements—are covered in Paragraphs 557-572, Tentative FSR, 1939. The application of the principles to the independent corps is the same as to the division except that greater decentralization of execution is indicated for the corps. The general purpose is to regain or preserve freedom for action. They may be

voluntary or forced. Since it is difficult to G-2 the type of retrograde movement that corps may execute in the Third Army Maneuvers, this discussion will be confined briefly to certain factors common to all such movements and indicate wherein cavalry might be used advantageously.

Security is of paramount importance, and especially so if during such movements the enemy energetically presses the corps. In withdrawals, the frequent employment of covering positions is necessary; occupying same with a *mobile covering force* strong in machine guns so as to cover the withdrawal of troops engaged; in retirements *rear-guards* are detailed so as to cover march columns and protect their uninterrupted movement. Likewise, if the enemy is capable of reaching the flanks of the corps in encircling maneuvers, *flank guards* composed of mobile units are detailed. The corps cavalry regiment may constitute the above security detachments, or it may be an organic element thereof. In retrograde movements of the IV Corps, confronted by the potential threat of the IX Corps' highly mobile horse and mechanized echelons, it appears that 6th Cavalry's rôle will be a difficult one and that the IV Corps must insure its security by detailing additional motorized infantry security elements. If, on the other hand, the IX Corps is forced to withdraw or retire, its flanks should be relatively secure, with its mobile cavalry available to protect them, but it probably will be more vulnerable to the direct pressure of the IV Corps' strong infantry divisional mass; it follows that the IX Corps may encounter considerable difficulty in breaking contact. It may have to resort to the counterattack to create a condition assential to a withdrawal. The tank (combat car) power of the mechanized brigade would be most useful in such a counter blow. This comparison of the capabilities of these two corps is quite illuminating, obviously it is due to the basic difference in the organization and composition of the combat elements.

The Pursuit

The discussion of the pursuit has been reserved for the last. There are no definite lines of demarcation between the execution of the attack, the follow-up of a hostile retrograde movement, and pursuit. In formulating plans for an attack a tentative plan of pursuit habitually is developed. When the enemy shows signs of weakening, the advantage gained must be exploited to the fullest extent to bring about his disorganization. Depending upon the relative combat strength of the opposing forces, the exploiting of a success may vary from centralized and coördinated operation—a continuation of the attack—to a decentralized operation—pursuit.

Paragraph 498, Tentative FSR 1939 states: "effective pursuit requires the impulsion of leadership and exercise of initiative to the highest degree in all echelons of command."

If the enemy is forced to withdraw, whether it be to break contact, to retire to a new position, or to fight a delaying action, he will utilize covering detachments, combined with demolitions and obstacles, to cover his retrograde movement. The mission of the exploiter is to get through or around these covering forces and get at the main body in order to strike it with full strength, to harass it, to keep after it until it is disorganized, and to keep it disorganized until it is eliminated. This cannot be accomplished by the straight pushing back of the hostile force on its lines of communication. Direct pressure against the retreating force must be combined with an outflanking or encircling maneuver designed to place a barrier across the enemy's line of retreat.

The defeated enemy will attempt to escape by covering his retreat with covering detachments and demolitions. A follow-up procession behind him will not accomplish his destruction; he must be slowed down in order that his main body may be overtaken and engaged. An encircling force or forces possessing fire power and mobility must be organized to slow down and block the hostile retreat by attacking the heads and flanks of the hostile columns, obstructing lines of retreat by obstacles and demolitions, destroying communications, seizing defiles and other critical points, delaying action, or utilizing some combination of these. The remainder of the corps, the direct pressure force, keeps after the enemy in an effort to keep him on the move, to keep him from reorganizing, to get through or around his covering forces, and to engage the main bodies of the retreating columns.

The encircling force and the divisions in the direct pressure force must take instant advantage of the opportunities offered by the rapidly moving situation. The corps allots the necessary corps troops and means to subordinate units. Encircling forces are provided with transportation and the necessary means for reconnaissance, security, and supply. Divisions in direct pressure are allotted additional artillery, engineers, and other corps troops in accordance with the situation.

Applying the foregoing principles to corps cavalry it is apparent that such cavalry will be employed in the encircling or outflanking maneuver. This being the case an examination of the duties of the encircling force commander should be made.

The encircling force commander is assigned a march objective and is provided with the means of accomplishing his mission. The force is usually composed basically of cavalry, infantry in trucks, light fast tanks, and truck-drawn artillery. In order to reach its objective on time the encircling force avoids, where practicable, hostile covering detachments. En route, the formation of the force is such as to reduce to the minimum the increased danger from hostile mechanized and aircraft attacks which will attempt to interfere with the pursuit. Cavalry should precede the motor columns, reconnoitering well to the front and flanks. On reaching the objective assigned by the corps, the encircling force will interrupt the hostile retreat, defend, delay, or attack in accordance with its mission and the situation.

Probably in no other operation is the necessity for mobility more essential. This mobility should be strategic

and tactical. The 7th Cavalry Brigade is ideally adapted for both the strategic and tactical phases of pursuit; the 1st Cavalry Division for the tactical phases and to a more limited extent in strategic phases as compared to the mechanized brigade. The corps cavalry regiment and motorized infantry are well adapted to encircling echelons directed against distant objectives where speed is essential.

Within the IV Corps we may expect the infantry divisions to participate in the direct pressure with motorized detachments playing an equally important rôle in encircling forces. The 6th Cavalry's horse elements are adapted to support the infantry in the direct pressure, its mechanized elements can furnish security to the encircling maneuver. The IX Corps possesses great potential strength which is ideally suited to the pursuit. The use of the 7th Cavalry Brigade requires little imagination—it is the weapon of opportunity for this operation; we may expect to see the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th Cavalry Brigade operating in conjunction, on distant missions against hostile rear areas or we may see the 1st Cavalry Division extending the direct pressure of the 2d Division by employing harassing action against retreating columns which are withdrawing under the direct pressure of the 2d Division; while the mechanized brigade will be employed on the more distant mission to block the enemy's line of retreat. If the IX Corps pursues, its cavalry should give a good account of itself in the action.

It is hoped that the foregoing discussion of the possible operations of the IV and IX Army Corps in the 1940 Spring Maneuvers has indicated some of the imponderables of the situation and a few possible lines of action. Opportunities are there to be exploited!



37-mm. Antitank Gun of Newly Organized Cavalry Antitank Platoon

The recently organized Corps Reconnaissance Regiments (Cavalry) have a platoon of six of these 37-mm. antitank guns. It will be noted in the picture that the gun is pulled by one of the new Cavalry Scout Cars, which itself mounts .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine guns. The War Department has just authorized similar platoons for test in each of the two Horse Cavalry Brigades of the First Cavalry Division.

Intensive Training of the First Cavalry Division

By Lieutenant Colonel E. E. Schwien, 8th Cavalry

Shortly after the October Balmorhea maneuvers, the First Cavalry Division issued a Training Memorandum designed to correct deficiencies in tactical training noted in these maneuvers. This memorandum was also intended as a basic tactical guide for the three months' intensive training period to end January 31.

Its provisions are so far reaching and important that it should be quoted in full.

* * *

"HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION,

Fort Bliss, Texas, 28 November, 1939.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM)
NO. 52)

EXTRACT FROM MANEUVERS REPORT, 1ST CAV DIV, 1939.

The following extract from the Maneuver Report, 1st Cav Div, 1939 is published for careful study by all concerned:

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TACTICAL LESSONS

1. RECONNAISSANCE

(*a.*) Once contact has been gained it should be maintained *continuously*.

(*b.*) Reconnaissance must be:

(1) Carefully organized by the intelligence officer.

(2) Meticulously executed by the agencies designated.

(3) Continuous on the part of all units and must utilize all means, especially mounted and dismounted patrols where such are appropriate. The employment of scout and armored cars for close in reconnaissance is generally inappropriate; also their use for night reconnaissance should be avoided except when distance precludes mounted patrolling. It is vital in this day of mechanization and motorization that distant reconnaissance be thoroughly pushed and that it be continuous.

(4) Characterized by a constant flow of information from front to rear in order to furnish:

(a) Information on which the respective commanders can base their decisions. In far too many instances commanders engage in headlong actions without adequate information. Before an attack can be executed, careful reconnaissance must be made in order to discover the enemy's dispositions, his flanks, etc.

(b) Security for combat and service units and installations. In order to accomplish these ends patrols, both scout car and horse, must be trained to report promptly the information obtained. There were several instances during the maneuvers when scout cars obviously saw certain movements and failed to report them.

2. SECURITY

(*a.*) Greater attention must be paid to security. Provisions must be made for the constitution and disposal of adequate security detachments under all tactical situations.

(*b.*) The use of cover and concealment in bivouac as well as in the approach march and other battlefield movements must be stressed. In many instances during the maneuvers this essential was neglected.

(*c.*) In all but most exceptional cases, road blocks and demolitions must be covered by fire to be effective security aids.

(*d.*) After the rare mounted attack, units should execute the assembly or rally in a dispersed formation. They should never be caught in close formation and thus be vulnerable to machine gun fire from enemy units still intact.

(*e.*) Under combat conditions, infantry cannot detruck within range of hostile artillery fire. Such action would be costly in the extreme.

(*f.*) On occasions there was failure properly to disperse led horses and motor vehicles when units moved forward into attack or into defensive positions. This was particularly noticeable on reverse slopes where a false sense of security seemed to prevail. It must be borne in mind that reverse slopes are no longer masked from fire when operating against a modern enemy equipped with high angle fire weapons (mortars and howitzers), however, adequate dispersion in bivouac and in combat formations was well exemplified on many occasions. Its efficacy was manifest and would have minimized losses in air or artillery attacks.

(*g.*) Mounted approach formations must be more widely dispersed and consequently less vulnerable to fire from any direction. Often these formations are suitable to minimize casualties from frontal fire but are extremely vulnerable to flanking fires. The answer lies in greater distances and intervals between small units.

(*h.*) A commander must consider every capability of the enemy regardless of the plausibility of any

course of action open to him. He must not only consider it but must take actual physical measures to guard against the unexpected. If he neglects to do either of these things, he is deliberately inviting surprise.

3. OFFENSIVE COMBAT

(*a.*) The prime importance of appreciating the power and effectiveness of modern weapons and the costliness or futility of mounted attacks against dismounted troops in situations in which such troops can effectively employ their fire power against the attackers must be stressed. Mounted attacks should be limited to situations in which the elements of surprise and dismounted fire support are present in such a degree that fractions of the attacking force may be employed mounted against suitable objectives without undue cost and with decisive results.

(*b.*) Training should emphasize the importance of utilizing the superior cross country mobility of mounted units to gain positions on the hostile flanks and rear from which dismounted fire attacks can be employed most effectively and decisively. In gaining such positions the utilization of terrain features for covered approach is all important. In the final phase of placing weapons and riflemen infiltration should be resorted to whenever necessary.

4. DEFENSIVE COMBAT

Machine guns are most effective when employing grazing fire. At the same time they should be in a covered or concealed position. When employed in delaying action they should be so emplaced as to have a covered route of withdrawal. These considerations are often conflicting but can usually be compromised. If, as on the first delaying position against infantry, there exists a slight fold on the ground beyond the main delaying line, this fold can be utilized for site defilade and, at the same time, for grazing effect and covered route of withdrawal. If the terrain does not permit this accomplishment machine guns can often be camouflaged on the flanks of hills near their bases.

5. GENERAL

(*a.*) The position of a commander should be where he can best control the action as a whole. He must be at a critical point or at a point of vantage where he can observe developments. However, if he is too far forward he will obtain only a local picture, and conversely, if he is too far back he can not adequately control the action. In the course of battle a commander must conserve himself physically and mentally so that he may think clearly at all times and if necessary put forth supreme effort. He physically leads fractions of his command only at psychological times and only when such action becomes imperative. To lead successfully in battle the best equipment consists of a few basic principles so ingrained that they remain even under conditions of extreme mental or physical stress, an intimate knowledge of the technique of modern combat and a will to drive and surmount any obstacle. The human element wins in war so an intimate knowledge of the individual and the constant preservation of his morale is a factor ever to be borne in mind.

(*b.*) Commanders should keep their organizations in hand and practice the utmost economy in the assignment of units to tasks. The latter should be limited in number and size to the absolute minimum required by the tactical situation. A reserve should always be held out initially and after it is committed every effort should be made to reconstitute a new one.

(*c.*) Commanders should not advance to contact with a single preconceived plan based on some terrain feature and without knowledge of enemy dispositions. They should have alternatives thought out, and above all they must be flexible.

(*d.*) The wasteful use of the energy of personnel and animals by aimless or unnecessary movements, particularly at rapid gaits, must be avoided. Cavalry is difficult to replace. It must be conserved.

(*e.*) All timely opportunities and every means that the tactical suituation permits for watering, feeding and caring for animals must be utilized.

(*f.*) Officers should make written notes of all instructions received. If they do not understand instructions they should ask questions. Faulty understanding and misinterpretations are ruinous.

(*g.*) The value of camouflage was well demonstrated during various phases of the maneuver. Its intelligent use cannot be too strongly emphasized.

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By command of Major General JOYCE:
DONALD A. ROBINSON,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

C. A. MITCHELL,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General."

UNQUOTE

* * *

During the October maneuvers these principles were violated by different units at one time or another. Beginning the three months' period concluded the latter part of January, every effort was made by all concerned to adhere to the provisions of this memorandum. The advantages of having the division concentrated during this period became quickly apparent in the tactical results attained.

A considerable number of two or three-day tactical



exercises were held by division, brigades and regiments culminating in a three-day division exercise on January 18th, 19th, and 20th. The latter exercise might therefore be considered in the nature of a final tactical test indicating the degree of assimilation of the tactical doctrine prescribed in this same above quoted November memorandum.

We all know how very difficult it has always been to simulate true war conditions in peace time maneuvers. There can be little doubt that the final January divisional exercise approached this ideal as nearly as it has ever been

accomplished in the peace time period subsequent to 1918.

In order to show how completely the division absorbed the doctrine laid down in the November memorandum, we will give a brief account of the final January maneuver with appropriate references to the application by units of the tactical principles stressed by the Division Commander.

Before outlining the problem, it should be brought to the attention of the reader that weather conditions were extremely unfavorable. The philosophic and coöperative attitude of the troops exposed to extreme cold attested to the HIGH state of morale of the division.

GENERAL SITUATION. (January 18, 19, 20, 1940.)

Two Armies are in contact along the International boundary south of El Paso—Blue, north; White, south. Additional White forces are reported in the vicinity of Deming, New Mexico.

SPECIAL SITUATION (Blue).

The 1st Cavalry Division is in Army Reserve in the vicinity of Fort Bliss.

It receives the mission of moving north into the Fort Bliss target Range Area and protecting the right flank and rear of the Army against any threat appearing in the Filmore Pass.

* * *

The Division marched at 8:00 AM, 18th January. Each brigade with its battalion of artillery formed a tactical groupment. Scout cars operating at four or five miles in advance and in rear of the column acted as air scouts in addition to troopers in the same capacity on the flanks. Several attempts by aviation to raid the column proved the efficacy of this system. Ample warning was received in each case. Upon arrival in the Target Range Area the division went into a tactically dispersed night bivouac with security detachments to the northwest, west and southwest. All possible avenues of enemy approach were carefully guarded. Road blocks were all covered by fire. (See paragraph 2 "Security" Division memorandum.)

Early on the morning of the 19th, the 7th Cavalry was pushed west to a general north and south line about two miles west of Booker Hill (encircled on sketch). Its mission was to cover the occupation of the first delaying position by the remainder of the division. The first delaying position extended south from Booker Hill to a distance of approximately two miles. The two flanks of the position were covered by observation. The main east-west trail west of the Target Range formed the boundary between brigades with the 1st Brigade holding the north sector to include this trail. The 2d Brigade (less the 7th Cavalry) occupied the south sector.

With the covering force in place, the two brigades (less 7th Cavalry) moved west to occupy the position. (As the writer is personally familiar with the operations of the 2d Brigade, the remainder of the narrative will deal principally with this unit.)

The Commander of the 2d Brigade decided to hold one troop of the 8th Cavalry in brigade reserve at point (841-987). The 8th Cavalry (less Troop B) then proceeded to the occupation of the position. The Regimental Commander with his S-3, MG Troop Commander and Squadron Commander of the 2d Squadron preceded the regiment on reconnaissance. The regiment was moved forward under the Executive, Troop B being detached in brigade reserve as the regiment moved past the brigade CP. When within approximately four miles of the known position of the covering force, troops took up an approach formation which they maintained as far as the reverse slope of the first delaying position. They were met in this vicinity by the Regimental Commander and his reconnaissance party and brief oral orders were issued covering the occupation of the position by the 2d Squadron and the MG Troop. Further movement to the west was made dismounted using all available cover and concealment. (See paragraph 2*b* November memorandum.)

The Regimental Commander employed his heavy and light machine guns to cover the front, carefully organizing their fire both in depth and width. The rifle elements of the 2d Squadron were pulled back in mobile squadron reserve, prepared to cover the south flank of the position in the direction of the north spur of Franklin Mountains.

The 1st Squadron (less Troop B in brigade reserve) was held in regimental reserve in the draw in the vicinity of point (840.0-986.5).

A regimental observation post with pack radio and a signal lamp was established on the north spur of Franklin Mountains. It was able to maintain lateral observation across the front of the regiment during the remainder of the day.

About 10 AM, the enemy (represented by the 8th Engineer Squadron) gained contact with and forced back the 7th Cavalry. This Squadron of engineers represented a motorized infantry combat team consisting of a regiment with *two* battalions of 75-mm. artillery attached. The latter withdrew around the flanks uncovering the first delaying position. The troops occupying this position became engaged with the advancing enemy around noon.

In the meantime, the 8th Cavalry arranged for a hot noon meal served on the reverse slope behind the position. Because of the lack of marmite cans or other suitable containers to carry food forward into the front line, small details came back from the front (about six hundred yards) to the reverse slope position of the kitchens. Every individual had an adequate hot meal.

Troops went into action with their actual prescribed amount of ammunition (blanks) on both the individual and in the combat train. The Ammunition Supply problem from the railhead to the front line troops was actually carried out during the maneuver and it proved an interesting one. For the distribution of ammunition from the train to the troops various methods were employed including the packing of ammunition on pack animals and the use of carrying parties. In spite of the tactical difficulties all animals of the regiment were sent back to the Target Range and watered by detail during the afternoon. (See

General Instructions paragraph of November memorandum.)

Shortly after noon it was found that the enemy was making his principal effort in a direction coincident with the boundary between brigades and had affected a considerable penetration on this front.

Toward the middle of the afternoon, the 7th Cavalry, which had previously been withdrawn into division reserve, was ordered to move via covered routes around the south flank of the 8th Cavalry and counterattack the exposed flank of the enemy salient created by his penetration.

The 7th Cavalry made its approach quite rapidly, dismounted under cover and launched a well organized dismounted attack resulting in a temporary stabilization of the front. In this attack it was effectively supported by its machine guns as well as those of the 8th Cavalry which utilized the firing through interval method. (See paragraph 3 of November memorandum).

During the night, the division sucessfully withdrew to the southeast. The method of withdrawal included the use of a thin shell or crust of composite small units (squads and machine guns of different organizations) left in the front line. In many maneuvers in the United States, an effort is frequently made to leave complete tactical units in place. This of course necessitates a relief the evening before and is not only tactically unsound but entirely impractical. In this maneuver, the shell or crust was ordered to remain in contact and to withdraw in the event the enemy exerted vigorous pressure. In any case, it was to begin its withdrawal at midnight.

In the meantime the 8th Cavalry (less elements in the shell) was instructed to begin withdrawal shortly after dark and retire to a division covering position astride the Dona Ana road in the area about five miles south of the Target Range buildings. This movement was made cross country by compass bearing. A member of the reconnaissance party which had been sent out before dark to locate the new position was left thereon with a signal lamp. Frequent signal flashes from this lamp assisted the night march of the regiment. On this exercise units of the division displayed considerable ability in night movements. This was the result of a great deal of training along this line during the preceding months.

The division (less the 8th Cavalry) withdrew during the night to a new position about six miles to the south of that of the covering force.

Upon arrival on the new covering position, all units of the 8th Cavalry were fed a hot meal, animals were groomed and fed under most adverse conditions of weather.

On the morning of the 20th, the enemy regained contact with the division and attacked the position of the 8th Cavalry. Again the 8th Cavalry resorted to machine gun defense holding the bulk of the rifle units in mobile reserve. By so doing, it was a comparatively simple matter to delay the enemy advance by holding successive positions in front of the main position permitting the remainder of the division sufficient time to organize its position. At about 9 AM, the 8th Cavalry withdrew wide around the left flank of the main position. Shortly thereafter the maneuver was terminated.

In conclusion it may be stated without reservation that the First Cavalry Division is thoroughly prepared tactically to take the field. All echelons have a complete appreciation of fire and its effect, use of collective cover and concealment and of other factors, a practical knowledge of which is so necessary in active operations. To borrow a summation from the French—

The Division is Aguerrie!

Insignia of Arm or Service

A gold star was adopted for the dragoons when those troops were first organized in 1833 and continued as the dragoon device until 1851 when the present crossed sabers of the cavalry replaced it. The mounted rifle regiment, which was changed to the 3d Cavalry in 1861, had a gold trumpet for its insignia, and the two cavalry regiments organized in 1857, which became the 4th and 5th Cavalry in 1861, used crossed sabers turned the other way, that is with the cutting edge down instead of up as the dragoons had it, and as now used by all the cavalry.

Extracts from *Orders, Decorations, and Insignia,* by Colonel Robert E. Wyllie.

Where Buford held the ridge at Gettysburg

Man on Horseback

By *Fletcher Pratt*

It is in the last degree improbable that any of the officers in Eylau cemetery, peering out into the snow scurries of 1807, as glittering Murat thundered past at the head of 14,000 horsemen, realized they were taking part in the closing event of an era that began with the destruction of the last of the legions at Adrianople, more than fourteen centuries before. They were more concerned about the cold and the Russian infantry; and they were not men given to long-range speculation of any kind. They watched, then; and saw for the last time cavalry armed with cold steel wreck infantry defending itself with hot lead.

Not that there was any cessation of effort on the part of the cavalrymen. They tried the thing again at Wagram, at Leipzig, and notably at Waterloo, but some accident—the slope of the ground, Scharnhorst's batteries, or the

Illustrated by
H. Charles McBarron, Jr.

sunken road of Ohain—seemed always to give the man on foot the advantage during the rest of the Napoleonic struggles. Local accident seemed again to have intervened against the man on horseback, on the battlefields of Latin America, the Crimea, and North Italy, but these were local wars. It was only when the commanders of the American Civil War failed to use their big masses of cavalry as such masses had been used by Ziethen and Murat that the case seemed to call for explanation; and the explanation found was that of a terrain unsuited for cavalry operation, and a people who did not understand it save for the brilliant exceptions of Forrest and Stuart.

It has taken three-quarters of another century to demonstrate that at least three officers on the Northern side understood the uses of cavalry very well; that the true brilliance rested with the men who beat both Stuart and Forrest; and that the Union cavalry technique in its final form was not a mismanaged form of the war that had gone, but a startling anticipation of the war to come. And not merely of the war to come in 1914; for the more attentively one studies the Civil War, the clearer it appears that the Union cavalry movements of 1864 are the perfect pattern for the probable infantry operations of future war.

In a sense this anticipation also was an accident, but only in the very broad sense that after the surge of the French Empire rolled back from la Haye Sainte, chance should order the next major war to be visited on a nation whose only cavalry tradition had been derived from Indian skirmishes; and that it should be opposed by armies whose cavalry was drawn from a landed class that considered mounted action the only chivalric method of making war, the mounted charge the crown of every horseman's existence.

From the start of the war the Confederate cavalry was good in the traditional fashion; from the start it achieved a decisive superiority over the Union horse, which was composed of a few squadrons of Regulars trained in the

scatter tactics of the Indian wars, and a considerable number of farmers on plough-horses. Cavalry contacts in 1861 and the early part of 1862 were so uniformly Confederate victories that when General John Pope came east "Who ever saw a dead Cavalryman?" was already a catchword in the Army of the Potomac.

II

All things considered, Pope was probably the weakest general Lee faced, but there is one thing to be said in his favor. He insisted that combat intelligence was the only kind on which a commander should base his own operations, and that cavalry alone had the mobility to get such information and bring it home while it was still warm. McClellan had relied on spies; they filled his nights with dreadful bugbears about a Confederate army—250,000 strong. At the same time, as the result of several distressing encounters between his own troopers and Jeb Stuart's command, he had given orders that his cavalry should not get out of sight of its supporting foot, which was about like putting it in rocking chairs.

Pope did not regard the early work of Stoneman and Pleasonton as exhilarating examples of cavalry technique, and when he organized the Army of Virginia his first care was to find a new chief for his mounted arm. He discovered the man in one he had known during frontier days—John Buford, then a mere brevet major in the Inspector General's Department, while men in West Point classes junior to his already had their stars. He was a big, blond, slow-moving man with a curly beard, who had been in the West since his graduation in '48, had played quartermaster during a celebrated thousand-mile march to Utah, and had more currently seen one or two of those distressing encounters with the Rebel squadrons.

A man from the Inspector General's Department is in a peculiarly good position to make observations in minor tactics. Except for his subsequent actions we have no clue as to the precise nature of Buford's observations (the only papers he left were reports distinguished for their brevity). But those actions speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and the thing they say is that John Buford found the existing minor tactical doctrine of the United States Cavalry entirely wrong.

It is probable that he explained his views to Pope; he explained something to the General, who jumped his new chief of cavalry through the grades to brigadier and put him in charge of the horse of Banks's II Corps. In theory this made Buford only equal to the cavalry brigadiers of the two other corps, but he had five regiments, and those the largest, while Bayard of the III Corps was given four weak regiments and Beardsley of the I Corps was kept in army reserve with three regiments. Buford had 3,000 of the 5,000 cavalry with the army, and within ten days of his appointment was at the front, testing his ideas in battle.

It seems clear that he thought the horse had no more place on the battlefield than the elephant; rejected utterly the European idea of heavy cavalry delivering a violent shock which was so wholeheartedly adopted south of the Mason-Dixon Line. There were several press artists at the front, good observers. They have given us drawings of cavalry under other officers charging in three or four lines or by checkerboard companies, tightly knotted. On only two occasions are charges under Buford pictured; in both his horsemen are riding forward in a loose, irregular line, for all the world like an assault wave of World War infantry. More remarkable still, only one man in the line has his saber out in either drawing; all the rest grip pistols, and the captions show that these "charges" are pursuits of an enemy already on the reflux.

Nor did Buford (apparently) make any bones about admitting that the Union could never meet the Confederate cavalry on equal terms—as cavalry, in the saddle. His departmental experience assured him that the defect was mainly one promoted by Nature, which had given the Southerners so much the better mounts. He accepted it and turned it into a virtue, and there is a striking passage in the records of August 13, 1862, which shows how he did it. Kilpatrick, with a force of Union cavalry, encountered some Rebel troopers on that date. His report tells how he routed the first detachment he met in a rousing surprise charge, held his own against a second and was only driven from the field when a third fell on his flank. What lies behind this mass of Rebel riders he can only surmise from their number and presence in such a place.

On the same day Buford's brigade was in action. "A strong line of dismounted skirmishers was thrown out," he reports, "who soon drove away the enemy pickets," and goes on to tell how his men took cover, using the support of their artillery. Confederate cavalry swoops down on them and goes back again, with a good many saddles empty. Buford does not retire till two brigades of enemy infantry have come into action, have been identified and are feeling for his wings, when he gets to horse and rides away, with insignificant loss.

The source of this new tactic is evidently the Indian wars, in which the saber had already become vestigial during the early fifties, and where a massed cavalry charge only afforded a good target for Indians who lay on their bellies all over the landscape. The interesting thing—we can see it now—is that contemporaries were right in maintaining that Buford's was not a cavalry technique. It is precisely the method of a modern fast motorized column of infantry, with the difference that the transport runs on oats instead of gasoline.

III

The first clashes of the campaign took place at Cedar Mountain, where General Banks's corps was badly broken in an ill-advised attack on the nearly triply superior force of Stonewall Jackson, and at Madison Court House, out on the right flank toward the mountain corridors, where Buford fought Stuart. Bayard was covering Banks's front that day while Buford was away on his mission for Army HQ to the west; and Bayard failed to break the Rebel screen. Both he and Banks wrongly estimated the enemy

JOHN BUFORD
He found the tactical doctrine of cavalry entirely wrong.

were in no great force, and Pope's orders being ambiguous, there was an attack and disaster.

Stuart attacked Buford from the saddle; Buford defended from the ground. He was heavily inferior in numbers, his men not quite used to the new tactic; but he managed to pull out with the command still in shape to march and fight, and what was more important, a good bag of prisoners, including Stuart's personal adjutant who had in his pocket a letter from Lee clearly outlining the ground plan of the campaign. That letter told Pope what to do and he did it—namely, retired to the angle where the north fork of the Rappahannock meets the Manassas Hills and prepared to hold the line till reinforcements reached him through Washington. Buford covered his right flank, in broken ground.

It was out of this arrangement that Lee drew his wonderful plan for Second Manassas, sending Stuart on a long raid around the Union left to draw their attention thither, then Jackson on an equally long circuit, behind the hills and through Thorofare Gap around the other flank onto Pope's rear. One critic has remarked that the execution of such a plan required a Stonewall Jackson. It required more than that; it required that the Union cavalry should be what it had always been—prone to energetic and futile charges against the first enemy element it encountered or to equally energetic flight. But the



Map 1: Second Manassas.

Union cavalry on the sensitive flank was not what it had been; it was Buford with his "motorized column." He clung to Jackson's skirts like a burr; when he encountered the enemy, spread skirmishers, brought up his guns, and shot it out till the enemy's full strength was developed. Before Jackson had gone two days Buford knew his full strength and purpose; and history has had nothing to add to the reports in which they were described in every detail.

Pope correctly planned to turn and throw his full force on Jackson. The move failed through the fumblings of inefficient corps commanders and the fact that the General simply could not write a clear, definite order, and Lee followed Jackson through Thorofare Gap. Now as Pope wheeled back to deal with Jackson, the Union right had become its left, and Buford on that flank was at Thorofare Gap when Longstreet came through it at the head of Lee's column.

The tragedy of the campaign was that the Union cavalry leader did everything right and the Union high command everything wrong. The Gap, though not a true pass, has fairly good ground for a defense. A whole day before Longstreet began climbing the slope, Buford had correctly identified seventeen regiments of the Confederate infantry, Stuart's horse, and the Rebel reserve artillery, had reported their presence, and asked for support. Pope had only to put in one of the corps which were wandering muzzily about Gainesville; he would have the Confederate wings cut apart and could deal with both at his leisure.

What he actually did was altogether lose sight of Buford in a fog of war, even withdrawing the single division of Ricketts' which was giving the cavalry brigade distant support. Longstreet rushed on; Buford dismounted his men and made a defense truly heroic, holding 27,000 men of the main Rebel army with his little 3,000 for six whole hours, till the Confederates were around both his flanks

and partly in his rear, till they brought up their big guns, sending off appeal after appeal. Pope was beyond paying attention, Longstreet broke through, and Second Manassas followed as inevitably as four follows two plus two.

After the defeat the duty of covering fell on Buford's brigade; both Bayard's and Beardsley's commands were too worn out with mere riding to be of service. In action at Lewis's Ford, Buford took a wound believed for a long time to be mortal, which effectively eliminated him from the campaigns of Antietam and Fredericksburg, though he held a nominal staff position during both.

It is noteworthy that after Second Manassas Stuart reorganized the Confederate cavalry into sharpshooter and saber companies and increased the attached artillery. This was not "proper" cavalry technique either, but at least it furnished a partial reply to the intolerable nuisance of Buford's new method.

IV

Chancellorsville found Buford back in the saddle, now in command of one of the three divisions of the new Cavalry Corps, but bad weather, Hooker's impatience and General Stoneman's case of piles spoiled whatever chances the horse had in that campaign. Brandy Station came next; Pleasonton commanded the corps there, an old-style cavalryman who preferred mounted action and the saber, but the new technique was spreading, and the battle turned into a wild mêlée of charges mounted and dismounted, skirmishers on foot and horseback. Pleasonton accomplished nothing positive and his command was badly mauled; but Stuart was cut up too, and found it quite impossible to clear the Union horsemen from his path for an advance by Lee outside the Blue Ridge, so that the great invasion of Pennsylvania went wide, up the valley of the Shenandoah.

All along the mountain gaps there was fighting through that June—at Aldie's, Upperville, Middleburg, Ashby's. Buford did most of it in person and Buford's new system all. "There was no regular line formation," says one who was there, "but the Indian mode of fighting was adopted on both sides, by taking advantage of every stone, fence, bush or hollow." The index of tactical victory swung to and fro; strategically the gain was all to the Union, for Stuart could get no certain news of Hooker's movements. and the very incidence of the fighting ticked off the steps in Lee's progress. By turning his horse into a flying wing of infantry, Buford had forced his opponent to do likewise, and the great invasion moved half blind.

Stuart fretted; Lee, under the impression the Union main force was south of the Potomac and could be held there, shot him off on a spectacular raid between Hooker and Washington, and marched on. But the day was past when the Northern high command could be disordered by such empty menaces. Hooker, and Meade, who succeeded him about this time, simply fanned out Gregg and Kilpatrick with two small cavalry divisions on Stuart's trail, and kept right after Lee, with Buford hanging to him as he had hung to Jackson before Second Manassas. Stuart was not caught, but neither did Lee learn Meade's whereabouts till the last day of June, when his scouts brought in a German farmer with a Washington newspaper in his pocket, which told of the Army of the Potomac already in Pennsylvania and feeling west toward the Confederate communications. The Rebels could get food from the country, but not bullets; they had to turn back.

Meade had expected Lee to come down on him, and was all ready, with a line of intrenchments along Pipe Creek, but his plan was an engineer's plan, physically perfect but faulty in psychology. His troops were already north of the Pipe Creek line; retreating before battle is probably the world's best way of discouraging your men, and the Pipe Creek position imposed no compulsions on Lee, who had only to drop a containing force and throw the rest of his army toward Philadelphia in order to force a fight on his own terms.

But John Buford had been assigned to scout through Gettysburg on the 30th of June, and in the chain of causations that led through the next three days to the hour when Pickett's high tide ebbed, was to play the first and perhaps the greatest rôle. Late that afternoon he had ridden through the town, driving a Rebel detachment before him to the west (Map 2). The road there runs across a chain of ridges; he took possession of two and flung his pickets far on the heels of the retreating graybacks, both west and north, nearly ten miles beyond headquarters. Before his men bedded down they had been disposed as skirmishers, the horses had been sent to the rear and the artillery posted for a regular infantry battle; couriers were burning up the roads with dispatches to Pleasonton, Reynolds of the I Corps, and Howard of the XI.

The Confederates had been encountering some absurd local militia, armed with nothing more lethal than shotguns. As Heth with the first division of Hill's Confederate corps came along the road from the west in the flat dawn light of July 1, he thought the first elements of Buford's deep defense were more of the same, and did not bother to deploy or report anything unusual. There was a little wood on the first ridge Buford held; as Heth's men came in sight, three cannon-shots came from it and then a storm of rifle fire that surprised and disconcerted the Confederate advance. The Rebels deployed and formed for an attack; and as they were forming Reynolds was rushing in with the I Corps as fast as his men could march.

At 9:30 Buford beat off that first attack. Heth waited for artillery. At 10:00 Reynolds rode forward ahead of his men, and climbed with Buford into a steeple, where the cavalry general pointed out the Confederates advancing west and north, and away behind the huge mass of Cemetery Ridge, an ideal position. "Tell General Howard," said Reynolds as he came down, accepting Buford's suggestion, "to form on that ridge."

It was the crucial order of the battle, and now came the crucial moment. Buford's dismounted horsemen had just retreated from the first hill and were mingling with



Map 2: Buford at Gettysburg.

the first regiments of the I Corps, the black-capped men of the Wisconsin Iron Brigade. Heth charged again at 10:30, under his guns; the Iron Brigade and dismounted cavalry went in together in a counter-charge. "There's those damn black-hatted fellers again! That ain't no milishy, that's the Army of the Potomac!" someone heard the Rebels cry, just before they broke.

Heth's leading brigade was through for the day, nearly all killed or captured. It was noon and afternoon before he could get his front rearranged, his other brigades into line. Meanwhile the I Corps had reached the field complete and Howard's stubborn Germans of the XI Corps were just beginning to file in behind. But Ewell had now appeared on the north road, with a third of Lee's army behind him, and if they got through, it would be onto the rear of the I Corps. Buford had had part of one brigade out that north road since early morning; in the lull between Heth's drives, he got the rest of his men into the saddle, took them to the north and dismounted them again, for an encore of the performance he had just given.

Doubleday, who had succeeded to the command of the I Corps when Reynolds was killed in the morning, complains that this line of Buford's was too far out, leaving his right flank in air. Perhaps so; but Buford showed himself a capital tactician on other occasions, and this time he made his first defense so far to the north that Ewell and Hill were unable to establish communications with each other and coördinate their attacks. Moreover, Ewell, like Heth before him, had to deploy at an unreasonable distance from the line where he was to do his main fighting, in mid-afternoon, with Howard all in line against him. In his advanced position Buford was eventually overwhelmed by main force, but when he was finally driven in, Hancock was already at hand, the XII and part of the III Corps were closing in and it was too late for Lee to win his battle that day—or any other.

During the evening Buford's division was taken out of line and sent back to guard the trains. It was completely shattered, but it had gained two hours—the two hours most needed—for Reynolds; and two hours again for

Howard, each time by standing off a Confederate corps. It was more than any other cavalry leader in the Union army could or would have done. One can imagine an able ordinary Cavalryman—say Kilpatrick or Pleasonton—at the head of Buford's men in the morning, and the result. A brilliant charge on Heth's head of column; a brief showy victory, the division broken by the steady surge of Confederate regiments behind, and Ewell or Hill or both on Cemetery Ridge by noon. And if the picture seems overdrawn, it is only necessary to remember that this is exactly what happened when Kilpatrick did come on the field in the evening, with the difference that Cemetery was already gripped tight.

It was Buford's last service, except for minor bickerings during the retreat from Gettysburg. In December, '63, pneumonia and his old wound brought him to bed, and there in Washington he died what the Vikings called "a straw death."

Troop watering point near Squadron CP in San Luis Obispo Area. Hay was packed up to the defensive positions on the high ridges during Joint Army and Navy Exercises

Cavalry in the Joint Army and Navy Exercise

By Major C. H. Gerhardt, 11th Cavalry

The 11th Cavalry was assigned by Fourth Army orders to the Monterey Subsector of the Pacific Coastal Frontier, other mobile ground units being the 30th Infantry and the 2d Bn., 76th Field Artillery.

The Subsector extended from Half Moon Bay (exclusive) to San Luis Obispo Bay (inclusive), a distance of 300 miles. (See Sketch No. 1.)

The mission of the Subsector command was to prevent BLACK landings and, in the event of a landing, to delay its advance on San Francisco.

Cavalry missions in this exercise were as follows:

To provide Beach patrols and be prepared to defend probable landing places.

To provide protection of the flanks of the defending force opposing the landing at Monterey.

To be prepared to assemble promptly for offensive action against the south flank of the BLACK main effort.

To be prepared to shift one squadron to the north flank for offensive action.

a. For the reconnaissance phase the 2d Squadron (reinforced) was moved south to Avila by commercial buses, and stock trucks and trailers. For details of this move see the article prepared by Captain J. M. Glasgow, 11th Cavalry. The remainder of the regiment covered the Santa Cruz, Point Sur area, where the BLACK main effort was expected.

As may be seen from inspection of the accompanying sketch, this spread the command over a considerable extent of coast line.

b. After the landing at Monterey the 2d Squadron (reinforced) remained at Avila, "B" Troop continued on its mission of patrolling in the Santa Cruz-Salinas River area, and the remainder of the Regiment provided protection to the south flank.

c. As it was seen that the enemy main effort was developing at Monterey, the Regiment was assembled under cover of darkness in the vicinity of Mud Hen Lake. It operated offensively against the exposed enemy south flank in the general area: Wolf Hill-Bombproof. (See Sketch No. 2.)

This offensive action put the elements of the Regiment in the enemy artillery area and presented opportunities for employing fire power against BLACK Infantry moving in column.

Enemy reaction resulted in the employment of the Light Tank Company against the Cavalry, causing the Regiment to withdraw. (See comments by Lieutenant Colonel Martin.)

d. The final operation was the movement of the 1st Squadron, under cover of darkness, to the north flank for offensive action.

Conclusions:

1. The Cavalry again demonstrated its characteristics of battlefield mobility and fire power.

2. The movement of the 2d Squadron to Avila by motor and return, a total distance of 260 miles in less than 16 hours running time, demonstrates the possibility of strategic moves of Cavalry by this means.

3. The action against the Light Tanks brought out the following points:

a. Cavalry should not allow itself to be caught with led horses immobile.

b. When attacked by tanks the Cavalry should maneuver to draw the tanks toward unfavorable terrain and toward prepared fires by antitank weapons.

c. Vigorous flank patrolling should locate the bivouacs of tanks and then they should be attacked at night.

4. On the modern battlefield the usual Cavalry action should be the maneuver of fire power to favorable positions.

The mounted attack will be limited to small units in surprise action. In case mounted action is employed by large units active patrolling must develop enemy fire power that may be used against this attack.


HALF MOON BAY
PESCADERO
PALO ALTO
LOS GATOS
SANTA CRUZ
APTOS
Monterey Bay
MONTEREY
CARMEL
Carmel Valley
Camp Ord Reservation
SALINAS
GONZALES
SOLEDAD
BIG SUR
KING CITY
JOLON
SAN ARDO
SAN SIMEON
BRADLEY
CAMBRIA
PASO ROBLES
ATASCADERO
MORRO
AVILA
SAN LUIS OBISPO
San Luis Obispo Bay
PISMO
OCEAN
PACIFIC
0 5 10 15 60 95
SCALE IN MILES
Subsector Area~ Army-Navy Exercise
SANTA CRUZ
SCOUT CAR
SOQUEL PT.
GILROY
WATSONVILLE
CAMP McQUADE
MOSS LANDING
CASTROVILLE
MOUTH OF SALINAS RIVER
MARINA
CAMP ORD
rhd SALINAS
PT. PINOS
PACIFIC GROVE
MONTEREY
SPRECKELS
BUENA VISTA
CARMEL
CARMEL BAY
PT. LOBOS
CARMEL RIVER
CORRAL de TIERRA
MT TORO
JAMESBURG
PT. SUR
11th CAVALRY'S PARTICIPATION IN JOINT ARMY~NAVY EXERCISE
15-22-JANUARY-1940
A = Beach Patrols.
B = Flank Protection.
C = Action Against Enemy Flank, Rear.
D = Shift of Squadron for Offensive Action.
N
MILES
A CARTOGRAPH BY JACK WACHTEL STAFF SGT. - 11th CAVALRY MARCH - 1940

Cavalry in Beach Defense

By Lieutenant Colonel Thos. L. Martin, Infantry

In recent maneuvers on the West Coast, cavalry participated in beach defense. Several incidents occurred of sufficient interest to risk the telling in these pages. Names and places being unimportant, the following summary of events and comments are submitted for the lessons they teach.

During this particular maneuver, the problem began when two hostile reinforced infantry battalions (constructive) made surprise landings at two points separated about 100 miles. An infantry regiment, less one battalion, with a regiment of cavalry less one squadron, and a battalion of field artillery less one battery, opposed the most important landing (Monterey), and a squadron of cavalry with a battery of field artillery opposed the other hostile landing (San Luis Obispo).

Several days later, the enemy landed in force at Monterey. During the earlier phase, about three days prior to the complete debarkation and the subsequent preparation for a coördinated attack, the most logical use for the cavalry regiment less one squadron appears to have been reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and a very stubborn delaying action. It is not believed that sufficient use was made of cavalry in these most important cavalry missions during this period.

Two days prior to the hostile coördinated attack, the cavalry squadron and battery at San Luis Obispo was entrucked and moved rapidly to Camp Ord about 100 miles to the north where it reverted to regimental control.

On the following day, the cavalry regiment was moved against the right flank of the hostile force which was still moving into position. One squadron eventually occupied a strong position and ambushed an infantry battalion



The mobility of the horse plus

moving forward without adequate local security, believing that its front and right flank were covered by troops already in position. The resulting action wiped out the infantry battalion.

As a result of this action, a hostile tank company was ordered forward to clear the area of cavalry. Moving rapidly down a road with one tank about one-half mile in advance, the tank company ran into the fire of 75's and caliber .50's and was ruled back with some losses.

Having been ruled back, the tank company was placed under cover, local security was provided, and a very efficient reconnaissance organized. With little delay and remarkable speed, the hostile tank company located and in turn surprised the cavalry which not only had failed to provide adequate local security but had insufficient anti-tank guns to repel an attack of seventeen tanks.

The horsemen took to their heels closely pursued by tanks that maintained the chase for a mile or so over very rough going. A number of riderless horses were observed. Several tanks returned with their mounted prisoners.

The other squadron in the meantime had endeavored to work its way still further to the right and rear of the enemy. Its periodic appearance annoyed and confused the enemy, but it is believed that it accomplished little in furtherance of the mission of the defending force.

On the following day, the long awaited hostile attack developed. On the west of the line the attack of the flank regiment moved rapidly through the original defense line (which had been withdrawn during the night) but finally was stopped by fires from a strong position about one-half mile in rear. The ground being favorable, this regiment called for and organized a tank attack to seize this objective. An excellent infantry and artillery supported tank attack was launched.

Immediately after the hostile tanks debouched from their final assembly area, friendly cavalry which had been well posted to the flank of the tank assembly area counter-attacked—mounted! Riding rapidly, they went through a hostile battery in action. It is probable that such a mounted attack on a battery might cause a temporary cessation of fire and some damage. However, unseen by the cavalry was a battalion of dismounted hostile infantry in position covering the forward battalion and on terrain dominating the entire area used by the mounted cavalry attack.

After riding through the hostile battery the cavalry turned and moved again through the area which was being swept by heavy fire. This cavalry was completely ruled out. However, at the time, things were moving too fast and the troops involved could not be told the happy news by the umpires. Neither did the tanks know of this ruling. Hence, having seized their assigned objective, the tanks again took up the pursuit of galloping horsemen. And so endeth another lesson.

Summarizing briefly:

a. Cavalry is highly desirable for beach defense. Its mobility and its primary missions make it invaluable when wide areas are to be covered by an insufficient number of troops.

b. Portée cavalry is not only practicable but highly essential.

c. When operating with other arms, cavalry will do its share of it:

(1) Reports enemy locations and movements.
(2) Prevents enemy patrols from gaining information of our forces.
(3) Stubbornly delays any enemy advance.

d. Cavalry attacks or counterattacks *dismounted* except in exceptional circumstances.

e. Cavalry operating against tanks must be provided with anti-tank weapons and the means to construct anti-tank obstacles.

f. Cavalry (and *all other arms)* when in the area of probable or possible contact should at all times provide *adequate local security.*



Fire-power on the ground

A Cavalry Squadron in the Joint Army and Navy Exercise

By Captain Joseph M. Glasgow, 11th Cavalry

The Joint Army and Navy Exercise, held on the Pacific Coast January 15 to January 22, involved the transportation of the 3d Division (Black Forces) from Washington State to a landing on California shores (Blue territory). After a reconnaissance of the rugged coast line, probabilities pointed to a main landing at Monterey Bay, where deep water and flat beach extend from Monterey forty miles north to Santa Cruz. If a secondary landing or feint were made, it would probably occur a hundred miles south, in either of two adjoining bays, Morro and San Luis Obispo. The latter bay has a deep draft commercial pier at Avila, similar to one in Monterey.

San Luis Obispo Phase

On January 15, the 2d Squadron, 11th Cavalry, with Battery "E," 76th Field Artillery attached, was directed to proceed to the San Luis Obispo area to prevent landing of Black Forces and to delay the enemy advance northward. The travel distance of 130 miles was accomplished mainly by commercial vans and buses, the trip completed by all units in 9 hours.

The order for the movement of the 2d Squadron, reinforced, read as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS 2d SQUADRON, 11th CAVALRY (reinforced)

"Presidio of Monterey, California.
"13 January, 1940—0900.

"FIELD ORDER)
" :
"NO.....1)

"Maps: United States Coast and Geodetic Survey: ARROYO GRANDE, SAN LUIS OBISPO, POINT SAN LUIS and CAYUCOS QUADRANGLES; Auto map of SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY (Auto Club of Southern California); Standard Auto road maps of CALIFORNIA.

"1. *a.* BLACK forces hold the LOS ANGELES and PUGET SOUND areas. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the BLACK 3d Div., estimated strength 7,500 will embark at TACOMA, WASH., about 14 January, to force a landing between SAN FRANCISCO and SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA.

"*b.* The forces of the Monterey subsector (less this command) will defend the subsector from HALF MOON BAY southward to SAN LUIS OBISPO BAY (exclusive).

"2. The 2d Sqdn., 11th Cav., with Battery 'E,' 76th F.A., attached, will move by motor transportation to CALIF. NAT'L GUARD CAMP, 4 mi. west of SAN LUIS OBISPO, via U.S. Route 101 at 0700 on 15 Jan. 1940, to prevent landings by BLACK forces in the vicinity of S.L.O. BAY and to delay the advance overland of BLACK forces to the north.

"3. *a.* Cavalry

"(1) Sqdn. Commander and staff:
Motor Transportation: 1 station wagon
Departure from SOLDIER FIELD at 0730

"(2) 1st Convoy: Troop 'E,' 11th Cav.:
Motor transportation: 2 1½-ton trucks —baggage
2 buses—56 men
4 horse vans—70 horses
Entrucking point SOLDIER FIELD at 0700

"(3) 2d Convoy: Troop 'F,' 11th Cav. (with attached Med. and Vet. detachments)
Motor transportation: 4 1½-ton trucks —baggage and kitchen
2 buses—64 men
4 horse vans—70 horses
1 semi-trailer—forage
Entrucking point TROOP F STABLES at 0700

"*b.* Artillery
3d Convoy: Battery 'E,' 76th F.A.
Motor trans.: 2 station wagons
1 45-passenger bus
6 1½-ton trucks and 1 trailer
1 ¾-ton pick-up truck
Entrucking point BATTERY E GUN PARK at 0700

"X (1) The 24-hour clock system and Pacific Standard Time will be used.

"(2) All units will depart prior to 1000 and arrive at the NAT'L GUARD CAMP, SAN LUIS OBISPO, prior to 1600, 15 January, 1940.

"(3) Cavalry horse equipment (less saddle bags and cantle rolls) will be packed on horse vans.

"(4) Cavalry personnel (and Medical and Veterinary detachment personnel) will carry



Mounted attack, Camp Ord (Photo courtesy Colonel Tr

weapons, saddle bags and cantle rolls on buses.

"(5) Each convoy, in command of senior officer, will proceed independently to NAT'L GUARD CAMP, S.L.O.

"4. *a.* Four days forage for 140 horses will be carried. Additional forage will be obtained from SALINAS railhead.

"*b.* Cavalry personnel (with attached Medical and Veterinary detachment personnel) will be messed by Troop 'F,' 11th Cav.

"*c.* The Artillery will maintain its own mess.

"X (1) Three days rations will be carried. Additional rations to be requisitioned from SALINAS railhead.

"(2) One day's ammunition will be carried for all weapons. Additional ammunition will be requisitioned from SALINAS railhead.

"5. *a.* Command Posts, 2d Sqdn., 11th Cav., and Battery 'E,' 76th F.A., will open at NAT'L GUARD CAMP, SAN LUIS OBISPO, at 1200, 15 January, 1940.

"*b.* Rear echelon will close at PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY at 1000, 15 January, 1940.

"J.M. GLASGOW,
"Capt., 11th Cav.,
"Commanding.

"OFFICIAL:
"J. D. GREEN,
"2d Lt., 11th Cav.
"Adjutant."

The personnel problem of the Squadron was complicated in that the "E" Troop mess personnel and 70 men, the latter to act as noncombatant beach guards in the Monterey area, were ordered left behind. Partial compensation for the loss of these men was the attachment of all regimental recruits to the Squadron, plus using the "F" Troop mess for the entire squadron.

See table below for statistical data:

STATISTICAL DATA 2D SQUADRON, 11TH CAVALRY (REINFORCED)

PERSONNEL

	Officers	Enlisted Men	Civilians	Total
Squadron Headquarters..	3	12	1	16*
Troop "E"	2	62		64
Troop "F"	2	62		64
Total	7	136	1	144
Battery E	3	60	9	72
Aggregate Total	10	196	10	216

*Includ.: 1 Medical Officer, 2 Enlisted Men (Med. Dept.), 1 Enlisted Man (Vet. Ser.), 7 Truck Drivers (Hdqtrs. Tr.).

TRANSPORTATION

	Government				Commercial			
	1½-ton Trucks	Semi-trailer	¾-ton Pick-up	Horses	Horse Vans	Buses	Station Wagon	Gun Trucks
Squadron Headquarters		1		3			1	
Troop "E"	2			69	4	2		
Troop "F"	3			68	4	2		
Total	5	1		140	8	4	1	
Battery E	1		1			1	2	6
Aggregate Total	6	1	1	140	8	5	3	6

The Quartermaster had contracted for the commercial vehicles (listed above), which arrived at 7 AM. Loading of 140 horses commenced immediately at three points: a low bank at a picket line, a high bank where the retaining wall held the ramp level, and from flat ground on Soldier Field.

Experience had been gained a month previous when each troop in the regiment loaded a platoon of horses in a Kenworth Diesel Stock truck-12 and trailer-14, detailed results being ably described by Captain E. Bibb, Cavalry Reserve, on pages 54-56 in the January-February, 1940, CAVALRY JOURNAL. Following this trial loading, a squad-

ron detailed constructed four loading ramps of stronger material and greater length than the ordinary cattle ramps. Specifications were: Floor of ramp 12′ x 3′; material was one-inch hardwood planking with 2″ x 2″ hardwood side pieces and cross braces (2) secured with carriage bolts and 2″ x 2″ hardwood cleats, spaced a foot apart on top of the planking. Sides of ramp 12′ x 4′; material was 1″ x 4″ hardwood siding with 2″ x 2″ hardwood uprights. The uprights engaged in heavy angle irons bolted to the floor. Strap iron hooks bolted to the floor and sides of ramp permitted them to be hung on the truck sides while en route.

The newly-constructed ramps greatly facilitated the loading, but the steep angle from flat ground to high truck bodies continued to scare the majority of horses so loaded. Completion of loading was accomplished in two hours. (EDITOR'S NOTE: See Letters to Editor.)

The composition of the convoys, as directed in the field order, was changed in order to expedite the arrival of each element; this being possible since the move was administrative in that no enemy had been reported off the coast. Battery "E," 76th F.A., normally horsed, acting as portée artillery, departed in one convoy at 7:15 AM (tractors were hired in S.L.O. to move the guns when unloaded). The Cavalry cargo trucks, regular Indiana tactical trucks, left in one convoy at 7:30 AM. Horse vans were released individually, accompanied by one enlisted man in the cab with the driver. One truck and trailer was loaded with saddle equipment and forage. The Squadron personnel departed at 9:15 AM in four Greyhound buses, two to each troop. All weapons, saddle bags and cantle rolls were stowed in baggage compartments under the buses. One hour out of Monterey a "relief" stop was made at one of the many high drainage culverts on the highway, affording complete privacy from passing motorists. The buses arrived at the California National Guard Camp, west of San Luis Obispo, in 3 hours, passing all other convoys en route.

The second convoy to arrive was the squadron cargo trucks, which made the trip in 5 hours. The horse vans, of various makes and ages, had maximum speeds from 30 to 45 m.p.h. and made an average running time of 5½ hours. The artillery convoy, slowed by the low speed of the civilian gun trucks, completed the trip in 7 hours. All horse vans and buses (artillery bus excepted) were released upon arrival in camp, subject to recall on 24 hours notice for return trip. Unloading of each horse van took no longer than 10 minutes. The last van arrived at 4:30 PM, delayed by a breakdown 15 miles from camp and towed in by an unloaded horse van.

At our first and only campsite (National Guard Camp) a very comfortable night was spent, the last one until the end of the joint exercise. Arrangements for the campsite had previously been made during a reconnaissance of the San Luis Obispo area by Colonel R. L. Eichelberger, 30th Infantry (C.O. of the Monterey subsector), members of his staff, and Captain Glasgow, (Squadron Commander).

The following morning, January 16, the officers and key N.C.O's left camp in motor transportation for a reconnaissance of the S.L.O. area. Accompanying the party, was the umpire assigned to the S.L.O. Blue Force, Captain W. L. Burbank, 30th Infantry. Reaching a point northeast of Avila on Highway 101, the umpire stopped the party and handed the Squadron Commander two written messages from the patrol in the Avila area. (Patrols had previously been sent out "constructively" to both S.L.O. Bay and Morro Bay areas.) These messages were to the effect that a Black Force had made a surprise landing at Avila and had dug in along a 2 mile front astride Highway 101, 3,000 yards from the beach. In theory, this put the Blue reconnaissance party within 2,000 yards of the enemy's reported position so that further reconnaissance was impossible and return to camp imperative.

During the 10 mile trip back to camp, a map reconnaissance was made, using a Coast and Geodetic survey map, and detailed orders issued for an immediate movement of the command to, and occupation of, defensive positions opposite the theoretical Black position.

Three hours after arrival in camp, the command had packed up, marched 10 miles and occupied the defensive positions. (See Map No. 1.) No major change was found necessary in the location of any position after reconnaissance on the ground. Movements of the command were limited at all times to the leased ground shown on Map No. 1. This was a critical handicap to a cavalry force, as it prevented the sending out of cavalry patrols, other than "constructive" ones, to the enemy's flanks and rear. (EDITOR'S NOTE: This artificial feature is an invariable factor in our maneuvers.)

In the organization of strong points, fox holes were dug by each man and machine gun tripods firmly embedded in the ground. Lead horses were kept well under cover of trees and shrubs on the reverse slopes of the ridges. Some idea of the rugged terrain can be gained from the map. The only approaches to the positions on the high, steep hills and ridges were narrow trails, winding up precipitous canyon walls. The defensive positions were from 600 to 800 feet above the narrow valley which traversed both the Black and Blue areas and through which ran the S.L.O. creek, the Pacific Coast R.R. (narrow gauge) and U.S. Highway 101. The artillery gun position was so located that fire could be brought to bear, not only on the enemy's positions but also on the beaches and the pier at Avila.

The Squadron CP and the CP of the artillery battery were in a corrugated-iron feeding shed over a pigsty in the bottom of a canyon in the center of the positions. The Telephone Company ran a direct line into the Squadron CP, placing the phone instrument on a bale of hay which served as a desk. (EDITOR'S NOTE: The employment of local facilities and utilities of all types appears to stand out in the enterprise of the 11th Cavalry.)

All important information regarding the enemy, location of the defensive strong points, CP's, artillery gun positions, etc., was immediately reported by telephone to the Monterey Subsector Headquarters at Camp Ord.



Map 1

Telephonic reports were made night and day, whenever the situation warranted it, in addition to periodic reports called for by Subsector Headquarters, including a combined S1-S2-S3- and S4 report as of 6 PM daily.

Through "constructive" messages from the Blue patrols it was determined that the Black Force, already landed, consisted of one battalion of infantry (with two companies in the front line, including machine guns) and a field artillery battery. All members of the Squadron believed that this theoretical force would be followed by an actual landing of the enemy in S.L.O. Bay, various rumors having suggested a reinforced infantry battalion, a regiment of infantry, or a brigade of marines. Morale and enthusiasm were at a high point. Actually, no landing of any troops ever took place in the S.L.O. area; operations were entirely umpire controlled.

An air corps detachment of 4 pilots with 2 planes from the 91st Observation Squadron were attached to the command. They arrived the afternoon of January 16 and established their base at Santa Maria, 25 miles distant, with advance flying base at the S.L.O. airport.

The enemy force dug in, consolidated its position, was very active but did not attempt to advance. The two opposing forces remained in status quo until Battery "E," 76th F.A., was withdrawn during the night of January 19-20 to Camp Ord, followed by the Squadron and the Air Corps detachment on January 20.

The above summary of the tactical situation, however, conveys no idea of the activity of the reinforced squadron. The cavalry conducted almost continuous reconnaissance for additional defensive positions, routes of communication and routes of withdrawal; defensive positions and observation posts were maintained 24 hours each day; many messages were sent via radio and mounted messenger; the supply and messing of troops and feeding and watering of animals in this rugged terrain presented new problems and necessitated much physical effort and endurance on the part of men and animals.

Loading of horses near San Luis Obispo on commercial trucks for 130-mile return trip to Camp Ord

Two trucks were sent on an eight-hour round-trip every other night to the railhead at Salinas (near Camp Ord) for a two days' ration supply. The squadron kitchen, operated by F Troop, was located in a canyon three-quarters of a mile in rear of the nearest Blue position. Meals had to be trucked to the troops on both sides of the valley. The messing point for each troop was in the nearest canyon, in rear of their position, which contained water for animals. To adequately maintain the defensive positions, men had to be fed in relays. Those in flank positions had to travel a mile and a half each way over high, broken terrain. The first night completion of feeding of one troop took six and a half hours. Subsequently, with better organization and system to meet the situation, relay meal time was cut to a three-hour period. During this time, horses were fed and watered in the vicinity of each troop's messing point. Machine gun pack horses, after each noon and evening meal, packed hay up to the positions where it could be used as night feed for the animals.

The highest temperature in the weather reports registered 66 and the lowest 33, with heavy morning frosts. As woodsmen and hunters know, the men in the high positions were warmer at night than the few who were down in the canyons.

Observation posts were maintained by the squadron and the artillery battery on high ground permitting excellent views of enemy positions, part of the beach and the pier at Avila, two miles away, and out to sea. At one time several enemy naval craft were observed.

Communication by mounted messenger between the Squadron CP and the two troop CP's and observation posts was arduous. The artillery, in addition to other radio sets, was equipped with three walkie-talkie sets. The latter were located (1) at the combined squadron and battery CP, (2) at an observation post, and (3) at the gun position. The immediate reports by this means from the artillery OP, confirmed usually a half hour later by mounted messenger from a cavalry OP, emphasized the great value of this type of radio communication in this and similar situations.

The Air Corps personnel flew hourly missions for three days, including general reconnaissance over land and sea and artillery registration. Communication was maintained through artillery radio.

Transportation for the Squadron's return to Camp Ord to join the Regiment was spotted in the rear area of the Blue position at 12:30 PM, January 20. The use of a railroad embankment greatly facilitated the loading of horses, which was completed in 1½ hours. Loading would have been completed in one hour had it not been for one extremely stubborn, though valuable, pack animal. (See photo.)

The movement was made in one convoy leaving at 2:00 PM. Order of march (preserving the integrity of units) was as follows:

1 Bus (Squadron Headquarters; ½ Troop "F")
4 Horse vans (Troop "F")
3 Cargo trucks (Troop "F")
1 Bus (½ Troop "F")
1 Bus (½ Troop "E")
4 Horse vans ("Troop E")
2 Cargo trucks (Troop "E")
1 Bus (½ Troop "E")
1 Semi-trailer (Squadron forage)
1 Station wagon (Squadron Supply Officer and Supply Sergeant)

Rate of march 35 miles per hour. Distance between vehicles: not less than 100 yards.

Just north of S.L.O. the Cuesta Pass was negotiated (elevation 1,500 feet). The head of the convoy stopped for an hour in the outskirts of Atascadero to wait for the rest of the convoy to close up. The speed of the horse vans up the grade of the mountain pass was reduced to four and five miles an hour.

The convoy arrived in the outskirts of Salinas under cover of darkness at 7:30 PM, where it was met by a regimental staff officer with information of the bivouac location for the squadron that night. The trip of 130 miles had taken 6 hours, elapsed time. The convoy unloaded on a bank beside the road in the vicinity of Moore Gate, just outside the Camp Ord Reservation. The unloading and saddling of horses in the darkness took one hour. Buses and vans were released and the squadron marched to its bivouac in Pipe Line Canyon, arriving at 10 PM.

In concluding the description of this phase: although it was disappointing to all that no actual Black landing took place, the training and experience gained in portée movements, in the command, supply, communication and administration of an independent force 130 miles from its

The wily* Anita, *Troop E, 11th Cavalry, pack animal, objects to trucks. It took one-half hour to load her, during which time she smashed a ramp and injured a man, with no injury to herself.



Map 2

base cannot be overestimated and the additional cost involved was more than justified. (Cost: Vans $980; Station Wagon $184; Buses $520; total $1,684; plus cost of artillery makes grand total $3,100.) (EDITOR'S NOTE: Maneuvers cost money. Unless great profit accrues by virtue of widespread experience and lessons learned, they can be wasteful. This one appears to have paid dividends.)

CAMP ORD PHASE

The Squadron rejoined the regiment on the Camp Ord Reservation the night of January 20-21. Early on January 21 the squadrons were assigned zones of advance, 2d Squadron on the right, and directed to act aggressively against the enemy right flank and rear. (The 3d Division had landed at Monterey on January 19.)

Observing a Black Infantry Battalion in column about three-quarters mile distant, the 2d Squadron advanced rapidly at an increased gait from high ground near WOLF HILL and took up a dismounted position on the forward slope of the high ground extending northeast from RUCKER. (See Map No. 2.) On signal, fire from all rifles and machine guns opened simultaneously on the Infantry column at a range of 600-700 yards. Automatic weapons consisted of 4 heavy machine guns (attached from M.G. Troop) and the 12 light machine guns of the two rifle troops. The umpires ruled that the Infantry Battalion suffered 75% casualties (3 out of 4 companies) and declared an armistice for one hour to evacuate the casualties.

The 2d Squadron then moved in rear of BOMBPROOF which had just been occupied by the 1st Squadron. In reply to a message reporting the result of the first engagement, the regimental commander (Colonel Slack) directed that the Squadron return to STURGIS. The Squadron moved out in two columns via different draws, the Squadron (with one M.G. platoon attached) (less Troop "F") in one column, Troop "F" in the other column. The Regimental C.O. as he was moving forward, met the first column and directed the Squadron to harass the enemy rear.

The reinforced 2d Squadron (less Troop "F") then proceeded west with a covering force of one-half squad well to the front; a message was sent to Troop "F" to rejoin, but the messenger did not reach the troop in time for it to rejoin.

During the movement towards the enemy rear areas a light tank came from behind and opened fire. The troop dispersed and took cover. The umpire ruled that three heavy machine guns had been caught in pack and they were declared out of action.

The movement towards the enemy rear areas was continued and considerable time spent in reconnoitering care-

fully to the north, west, and south, during which time an enemy ambulance, containing a corpse and chaplain, was captured (and allowed to continue off the reservation).

At this time the enemy artillery resumed fire after a long silence. The general location of the artillery was determined (by sight and sound) and the Squadron immediately moved in that direction. The covering detachment signalled "enemy in sight" from a rise and took cover beside the trail. The Squadron went into dismounted action under cover of some trees and bushes along the trail. An enemy artillery truck convoy came over the rise. After the leading truck had gone about 100 yards, it and the succeeding trucks were taken under fire and stopped. About 18 enemy trucks were captured and ruled out of the action by the umpire.

The Squadron then resumed its movement towards the gun batteries. All artillery communication wire lines, which were observed on trails, were cut at several different points.

At the junction of the Huffman Road with the trail, east of DONNELLY, the covering detachment moved east and discoverd a gun battery under cover only 100 yards from the Squadron. Machine guns were immediately placed in action and the Squadron moved to the rise in the road where a mounted pistol attack was launched, without pausing. The gun position and personnel were run over only about 30 yards from cover of the rise in the road.

The umpire ruled that the artillery battery was put out of action. The Squadron then proceeded on the Huffman Road. The covering detachment at once discovered another battery in position over the next rise, about 200 yards from the first one.

Machine guns were again placed in position, this time on both sides of the road, under cover of the brush on the rise. The Squadron was led forward at a gallop with raised pistols. After the rise was passed it was discovered that there were two batteries instead of one. There was a gun battery on each side of the road, well concealed under trees and brush from any except close observation.

Troopers on the right were therefore signalled to attack the battery on the right and those on the left the gun battery to the left. This was all done at the gallop with no loss of time. The attack went through both gun positions and the artillery battalion CP and a field kitchen just beyond. The whole action took less than two minutes.

The umpire ruled 6 artillery guns (1½ batteries) and the Battalion CP out of action. The total score, then, in the enemy artillery area was 2½ gun batteries, a battalion CP, 18 trucks and an ambulance. The umpire ruled that 1 lieutenant and 7 men in the Squadron were casualties in the last action. So at this time they, and the 3 heavy machine guns previously put out by the enemy tank, were sent by the shortest route to the bivouac in Pipe Line Canyon.

Two additional gun batteries could be seen about 500 yards ahead but, as they also saw the Squadron and heard the action, no attempt was made at any further attack on artillery positions and the Squadron withdrew to the southwest to reconnoiter a route of withdrawal, again cutting all wire lines encountered.

Enemy Infantry units were discovered to have moved in from the south, in the meantime, and to have deployed on a fire-break, faced southeast, away from the Squadron. This firebreak seemed the only practical route for the Squadron to take in rejoining the regiment.

Therefore, the Squadron (less Troop "F" and the casualties) pushed across country through heavy brush in a small saddle in the terrain. At the edge of the high ground overlooking the fire-break the enemy Infantry line could be observed, the left flank resting straight ahead.

All remaining machine guns (1 heavy and 5 light machine guns) were placed in action and the Squadron went into dismounted action against the enemy Infantry rear and left in an attempt to gain the fire-break. The fire action caused the enemy to turn around and they opened up with rifle and machine gun fire.

The umpire went forward and upon return stated that the opposing force had greatly superior strength and that the Squadron was ruled out of action till 6:00 AM the following day.

It then proceeded to its bivouac which was reached at 3:30 PM. The distance covered since leaving bivouac at 6:00 AM was about 22 miles. (Men and animals had had no time to eat the noon meal which was carried on the saddle.)

The following day the Squadron fought a delaying action in seven successive positions across IMPOSSIBLE, BARLOY and PIPE LINE CANYONS and had occupied a strong position high on SANDSTONE RIDGE where at 12:30 PM "Recall" was sounded and the Squadron proceeded to Camp Ord to establish camp. The Joint Army and Navy Exercise had ended.

Observations

1. Utilization of commercial motor transportation (stock trucks and trailers for horses; buses for men) permits rapid strategic movement of a cavalry force for relatively long distances.

2. Use of commercial communication systems between widely separated elements of a command provides rapid communication not usually possible with organic means.

3. More rapid means of communication are needed by cavalry in such actions as: defense on a wide front, delaying action, reconnaissance detachments, etc. Recommend provision of walkie-talkie radio sets, to be used mounted and dismounted.

4. Mounted attacks are still practicable, especially in hasty actions with surprise effect. (See General Hawkins' "Notes on Mounted and Dismounted Attacks" in CAVALRY JOURNAL for January-February, 1940.)

5. Fortunately, cavalry regiments are so located that combined training of all arms is possible in nearly all Corps Areas, affording an opportunity to demonstrate cavalry capabilities to the infantry and artillery and to high commanders.

Birth of a Division

By Cary Ingram Crockett

(Editor's Note: This article is submitted on the premise that it may serve to emphasize the paramount importance of our post-war measures towards a more assured national defense. Only from a knowledge and appreciation of our wartime deficiencies and chaos may many evaluate the benefits and significant purpose of our current program towards that goal.)

"War with Germany!" "U. S. at War!" The words spread across the page in glaring type. On that memorable date—Friday, April 6, 1917, there were no radio bulletins, at least not at my isolated station on the Rio Grande. News of the declaration of war came in a paper brought by the mail orderly from the railhead ten miles distant.

That evening the three officers present lingered around the mess table until after midnight talking about the situation. We knew that the United States had no forces worth mentioning with which to fight a war and it was difficult to realize that war had actually been declared.

During 1916 practically all mobile troops in the United States, exclusive of the marines, had for a time been scattered along the seventeen hundred mile frontier between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific. We had seen them and knew what they were like. In comparison with the highly trained and completely equipped groups of armies at war in Europe, our own little so-called army seemed pathetically inferior.

Anyone could see that of the seven essential requirements of a modern army, namely: strength; organization; weapons and equipment; reserves in men and munitions; training; morale and leadership, we lacked all but the last two.

It was clear that a million, perhaps several million, soldiers would have to be developed from civilian raw material. But how were recruits to be obtained? Furthermore, the new army could not be mobilized until there were officers to receive, organize and train the men. Many thousands of officers would be needed, but only a few hundred were available. Where were the others to be found?

As a youth of twenty I had seen the concentration camps of 1898. Would the blundering and inefficiency of the Spanish-American War be repeated?

These were some of the problems for which we could not find solutions.

An answer soon came to the question about the officers.

Not long afterwards I found myself a thousand miles distant on the parade ground of a northern post surrounded by 175 civilians most of whom still had the down of adolescence on their cheeks.

They looked at me anxiously and I at them with misgiving. My mission was to transform them into officers competent, presumably, to lead American soldiers into battle against the veteran troops of Germany—and there were but three months in which to do it.

Having seen something of the German army, I thought the task impossible. Nevertheless, we went at it together. On my part I drove them like slaves—and myself twice as hard. As for the young men, they took what I gave them smilingly and asked for more. It was inspiring to handle young Americans of such superb caliber. Before the three months' period was half finished, I had concluded that if it were possible to improvise military officers, the intelligence and fine spirit of those men would enable us jointly to bring about the desired result.

In August about 1,600 graduates were commissioned from this camp. A few were sent over-seas immediately as replacements but the majority were ordered to an encampment in the Mississippi Valley for duty with a National Army division to be created there as soon as the draft was called.

At this time notice came of my appointment as major in the National Army and assignment as inspector for the same division to which the newly commissioned officers were ordered.

Upon arrival at the city nearest the new station I went to the principal hotel for breakfast and information. Several regulars were in the lobby, all senior field officers with line assignments in my division. They informed that the camp was twelve miles distant, only half finished and conditions were chaotic. Since there were neither a regular officer in command nor arrangements for quarters or messing at camp, they intended, they said, to await the arrival either of the division commander who was coming from Panama, or the chief of staff then on the way from Hawaii, before reporting for duty.

Recalling the adage about the value of personal reconnaissance I borrowed a car and proceeded to camp. The national guard colonel in command was preparing to leave with his regiment for a southern camp and referred me to the constructing quartermaster.

That officer, an engineer in civil life, was overwhelmed with work. In one breath he said that the camp was hardly three-fourths completed; the water system was not ready; electric light and telephone connections had not been

established; no transportation was available; no mess equipment was on hand; no instructions about quarters and mess arrangements for officers had been received and he'd be damned if he saw how they could be provided.

Continuing in the next breath the quartermaster said that his job was to build the camp and he was working night and day at it; more than two truck loads of mail addressed to the commanding general had come and he had locked it up in a deserted farmhouse; and he wished to Hell somebody representing the commanding general would show up and take charge.

A decision was called for. I made it. In his gratitude at hearing from me that headquarters would be opened immediately, the quartermaster promised to have a sign put on the farmhouse and markers on the roads, also to get telephone connections installed.

On the way to the farmhouse we picked up a reserve major and a national army captain who were looking for someone to report to. The building was completely bare. Two rooms were filled with mail in sacks and stacks of loose mail and telegrams, many unopened, were piled on the floor. The substance of one message was that approximately 1,400 officers would arrive within three days.

The major was given my car and directed to find buildings where there was water and establish ten messes for 140 officers each. Further instructions given him were to the effect that the mess equipment and food supplies were to be drawn from the depot quartermaster if available; otherwise everything needed was to be bought in the city; cooks were to come from the school for bakers and cooks; the officers themselves were to provide kitchen police and dining room orderlies and all arrangements were to be completed within thirty-six hours.

He was also told to rent a truck and two automobiles. The captain was sent with instructions to buy some filing cases, office desks, tables and chairs, paper and pencils, a card index set, and to rent or buy two typewriters. After getting them started, I proceeded to open the mail, helped by several national army officers who had strayed in ahead of time. Our filing arrangement consisted of stacking documents and forms on the floors of two rooms.

That afternoon a godsend appeared in the form of a fat first lieutenant whom I had known years before as a post commissary sergeant. He was sent to take over commissary arrangements. It was fortunate that he had a car as distances in camp were measured in miles.

The next morning officers began to stream in. As they arrived they were card indexed and sent to the buildings prepared for them. Typists, clerks, guides and messengers were impressed from among the first comers. More typewriters and other office supplies and equipment were bought, all on credit, with a written purchase order and guarantee of payment from me. Since the one thing a regular officer fears is money, this was the most courageous act I ever performed.

The rush of incoming officers lasted several days. Various things ordinarily regarded as essential were lacking; for example, there was a great shortage of chairs. Bathing facilities were limited and did not include warm water. Many amusing incidents occurred. One unmilitary looking individual reported wearing an army shirt, civilian trousers, and a bicycle cap. He didn't know his own rank, what he belonged to, or what his duties were—and had lost his orders. He said that in civil life he had been first a veterinarian, then a chiropractor. Sent to report to the hospital he was never heard of again.

About the third day the division staff began to straggle in. They were all senior to me but no one would take over. The judge advocate was an ex-national guardsman with line experience. He was put to work on administrative regulations for the camp. An engineer colonel and a field artillery lieutenant colonel appeared next and took over preparations for receiving the first increment of the draft. The signal officer came a little later and interested himself helpfully in the telephone, telegraph, and electric current installations.

By the fifth day I had involved the government, and myself personally, to such an extent that when I had time to think of the matter I was appalled. In spare moments I tried to frame a message to the War Department which would tell the whole story, but whenever time was available to think about my guilt with respect to usurpation of power, the conclusion always came that it would be best to trust to luck and say nothing.

At last the general arrived. There was no finer commander in the army. Even so, like all old timers, he had idiosyncrasies. One was a tendency to judge a subordinate irrevocably on first impressions. If he accepted anyone with approval that person could do no wrong—and the converse also obtained. In 1899 during the campaign in Northern Luzon he had once seen fit to put me in arrest. I hoped that during the intervening eighteen years, he had forgotten the incident.

Taking him into his office and closing the door I poured out the story of what had been done and braced for a shock. He looked at me sternly and said nothing. I never learned what his thoughts were. Presently his features relaxed. He patted me on the arm, directed me to carry on as chief of staff, to do whatever was necessary, and not to bother him with details. What more could anyone have wished?

There was plenty to do and the demands increased as the date approached for arrival of the draft. Before, and on that day and for weeks afterwards, headquarters was besieged by all sorts of people. Each visitor had to be received with courtesy and his business dispatched promptly. All clamored to see the general. Under the circumstances it was best for the chief of staff to meet most of the visitors. There was no way of telling at a glance who and what an individual was, as would have been the case had the visitors been in uniform. The civilian awaiting his turn to enter might be either a crank inventor with a homemade device for sinking submarines, or a special emissary of the Secretary of War.

"Keep cool and you command everybody," is a good

maxim. It was not easy to follow at that time. One morning in particular was an acid test of self control.

Half a dozen formidable looking persons dressed in black with square cut beards and no mustaches turned out to be a bishop of a pacifist sect and his retinue, come to enquire what we proposed to do with several hundred co-religionists who had been drafted. The bishop wished us to know that although he had authorized them to receive army pay and family allowances, he would not permit them to perform any military duty—not even to help in the preparation of their own food.

Three buxom females were a delegation of "Camp Mothers." They wanted to tell the general that fifty of them were ready to begin "mothering" the boys; also they wanted to be told where the fifty were to eat and sleep.

Another group was headed by a minister. They were concerned about vice conditions and wished to confer with the general regarding measures to safeguard the purity of the young men taken from the restraining influence of their homes. There was a temptation to inform them of the fact that an astonishingly large proportion of the first twenty-four hundred drafted men received had been found upon arrival to be suffering from venereal diseases. The committee spokesman said that he had heard a story so revolting that it pained him to relate it. According to his information, a young girl had been found dead in some woods near the camp with sixty-four one dollar bills in her handbag and all the circumstances indicated that soldiers were responsible. (The same story was circulated at various camps, the only difference being in the number of dollar bills found.) My comment expressing doubt of the story, because it seemed that, if true, the unfortunate girl would doubtless have taken in some bills of larger denomination in making change, met with a frosty look and the stiff reply, "I fear you are not in sympathy with our aims."

The next visitor introduced himself as an evangelist. He wished the general to tell him what the plans were to make the men Godly. The thought intruded itself that he was interested mainly in holding meetings and taking up collections. When told that efforts at the moment were concentrated on getting the men sheltered, fed, and organized, so that they could be properly cared for, he burst forth with the astonishing statement that regular army officers cared nothing for spiritual things and put the men's bellies before their immortal souls.

Then came an imposing looking gentleman with a letter from the War Department directing that every attention be shown him. He asked for furnished lodgings, suitable offices, an automobile and that a regular colonel with several assistants and clerks be placed at his disposal. The purpose of all this was to fill out a lengthy questionnaire for every man in camp. Glancing at the first page my eye caught these questions:

"Do you like to sing?"

"What dramatic training or experience have you had?"

"Can you recite?"

"Do you play the guitar, mandolin, or banjo?"

Upon my offering him a second lieutenant and an army cot such as I was using, he left threatening to telegraph the Secretary of War.

After him came an excited farmer with his wife to inform of the suspicious actions of a neighbor with a German name. This neighbor was surely a spy, the farmer said, because they had seen him looking at the camp through a spyglass. As further proof that the suspicious character was in the pay of Germany, the farmer affirmed that the man had recently bought a new car.

The sole trouble-maker among the press representatives who frequented headquarters selected this moment to try to break into the general's office. When stopped he demanded vociferously that the general explain two things: first, why the drafted men did not have hot water for bathing and secondly, why the new officers had to peel potatoes and wash dishes.

As if this were not enough, a woman of high social position in the East dropped in from Washington officially to inspect the interior decoration of the Hostess House. My general deemed the inspection of sufficient importance to warrant attendance of the chief of staff. The local decorator and her assistants awaited the party at the main door of the building. The inspector entered and looked, while the other females held their breath in suspense. Then she turned and clasping her hands, ecstatically exclaimed, "Oh, it's so sacredly wistful." . . .

Nerve racking suspense was caused by delay in receiving cots, blankets, and mess kits in time for the first and succeeding increments of the draft. Officers were sent to the various depots with instructions to get shipments loaded in box cars, trucks, or any sort of vehicles which would roll, and ride with them to camp. The articles came in limited numbers just before the first train load of drafted men arrived. It was a close shave then and each time afterwards.

A change in organization during an emergency causes complications. The camp had been built to house the old division of three infantry brigades of three regiments each, two artillery regiments, a regiment of cavalry, etc., therefore, it did not fit the new division organization of two infantry brigades of two regiments and a machine-gun battalion each, no cavalry, three artillery regiments, etc. Although a board of regular officers tried to allot the areas impartially, the problem cropped up again and again. It was always a nuisance.

What made the situation doubly difficult was that although every one was desirous of helping, with few exceptions, all were grossly ignorant of military methods, customs, procedures and terminology. Ignorance caused all sorts of frictions. The following are characteristic instances:

I handed a young officer an important message saying, "Give this to the Surgeon."

The hospital was over a mile distant, no messenger service had been organized and no transportation was available. The officer rushed out and did not return. The

Surgeon never received the message. About a week later I met the young officer accidentally and taxed him with his failure. He answered, "But I did deliver your message, Sir. You said to give it to the Surgint (Sergeant) and I gave it to one I saw in front of headquarters."

Another new lieutenant whom I had left in an automobile with instructions to hold it for my use, came to report that it had been taken by an officer. I asked him (strong language omitted), "Why did you let him have my car?" He answered, "It was a captain, Sir, and I am only a lieutenant and when he told me to give him the car I couldn't refuse to obey the order of a superior officer."

Since there was no one else at headquarters who could write administrative orders, I had to dictate them all. Upon receipt of rush orders from the War Department to transfer some 280 officers to fill vacancies in national guard divisions, there was a day with two reveilles, plus twelve hours more—total thirty-six hours—of unremitting desk work. The officers were assembled in front of headquarters when I finished. I arose stiff and cramped and was collecting the sheaves of travel orders for distribution when a telegram came from the War Department. In effect it announced that officers sent to national guard divisions would be permitted to select units from their home localities. Regard for the military morals of young officers who may read these lines will not permit me to describe the language used at that moment—or the action taken on the message.

One morning two well turned out lieutenants reported for duty wearing the insignia of the adjutant general's department. Thrilled with admiration at the prescience of the A.G.O., I said to myself in a glow of gratitude, "Here is one department that thinks ahead. Realizing the fix we are in here, the Department has commissioned some of its trained civilian clerks and sent them out to help us."

Illusory hope! These two were just as ignorant of army paper work as the rest.

Verification that the country was in a great emergency came in a singular way. Some documents emanating from the ordnance department were brought in for interpretation. All the papers of that most conservative and self-sufficient of our army bureaucracies that I had seen hitherto had been at the pinnacle of perfection with respect to accuracy and finished appearance. Yet these papers were blurred with errors. There was a sense of shocked surprise similar to what would be felt if a woman of high moral reputation were suddenly to show frailty.

Circumstances during this period emphasized the wide dissimilarity ranging among individuals. They also brought into clear relief the beauty and power of superior intellect and character. There were officers who stood out like mountains rising from a plain. And there were others whom no stimulus—not even the intensification of life springing from war— could lift above the dull level of mediocrity.

As a rule the regular officers rose to the occasion. A few, however, had lived too long under discipline of the kind that inculcates acceptance of things as they are, kills enthusiasm and destroys all vestiges of initiative.

Dare one imply that there were brigadiers who failed to respond as they should have? If the truth may be told after twenty years, there were. One or two had a tendency to spend more time driving through the countryside with an A.D.C. and perhaps a wife filling the back seat of the official car and the flag with the lone star flapping gaily at the front, than in attending to prosaic camp duties. Tactful intimations failed to produce results; therefore, an order had to be issued prescribing the establishment of a command post, with a twenty-four hour per day routine for every organization, and enjoining all commanders to get on the job and stay there.

Thanks to the engineer and field artilleryman[1] the arrangements for receiving the draft worked perfectly. *New tables clipped from a service journal were used in organizing the division.*

Training was started as soon as the physical examinations and inoculations were completed. There were no uniforms, weapons or equipment. The men drilled in whatever they possessed. The infantry used sticks and wooden rifles and the artillery various sorts of improvised guns and material.

Mindful of soldiers seen in a previous war who had gone to meet the enemy without having fired their rifles, preparations for target practice were initiated promptly. About this time an excellent officer reported for G-3 assignment and began work on training schedules and programs for divisional schools.

Qualified machine gunners could not be found. There was not an officer in the division with machine-gun experience, or who knew enough about these weapons to act as instructor—this after the World War had been going on over three years.

It is doubtful if the regular army received due credit for what it accomplished in the World War. On the other hand the army does not appear to have been criticized severely for certain defects for which it was largely to blame. Two pronounced defects, I think, were: first, inability on the part of many regulars to get the best results from civilian officers, national guardsmen and drafted men. Evidently they had not given thought to the psychology and sociology of the American people. The second defect was the abysmal ignorance of the army about machine guns.

The lack of close association, tactically and otherwise between infantry and artillery is not animadverted upon, because we were beginning to appreciate the need for this. But for the machine-gun defect there is little if any excuse.

Ever since the Russo-Japanese War far-sighted officers had written and talked about the use of machine guns both defensively in combination with barbed wire and offensively to assist the attack by beating down opposition with automatic fire. Yet when we declared war my regiment had only four Benet-Mercie guns—mere hand weap-

[1]Now a distinguished general officer, God bless him.

ons, or automatic rifles—which no one could use effectively.

About a month after the division was organized, the chief of staff appeared. He came just in time to rank me out of accompanying our general on a tour of the European battle fronts.

The senior brigadier—the one with whom I had tried to be tactful about getting on the job—took command and selected another officer to act as chief of staff. The duties of G-1 then fell to my lot, in addition to those of inspector, so I continued to act as a general work horse; "coördinating officer," was the title then used. On the records, however, I was carried as division inspector, the inspector general having refused to release me. About this time a severe reprimand came from the inspector general for having gone beyond the regular duties of an inspector during the organizational period and thereafter.

Summarizing the situation from the personal viewpoint, I had been left behind by my own general—who incidentally was found physically unfit and did not return—was in bad repute with my bureau chief in Washington, and had the prospect of continued service under another general whose dislike exceeded mere prejudice. All at once the situation had changed for the worse. Nevertheless, familiarity with our traditional practice of swatting the man venturing to show initiative precluded any surprise at the sudden shift from good to bad.

By the end of November the division was actually coming into being. Clothing and equipment were beginning to trickle in and a good spirit was developing among the rank and file. However, orders from the War Department stopped all progress. An ominous portent was discerned in a message which directed us to send a certain number of type-setters, machinists, plumbers, carpenters, harness-makers, and other skilled workers to various destinations.

This marked the inception of measures which eventually stripped the division of all but the barest nuclei for the units. Later on, more drafted men came and we proceeded to build up the division again. A second time the division was stripped; this time some of the permanent cadres being taken. Again men came from the draft and once more we set to work to recreate the division. Finally, when the third building up process was but partially completed, the division was sent abroad.

Meanwhile I had twice been ordered over-seas, but each time the order was revoked and a more fortunate officer substituted. Not until the ship had left the wharf at Quebec did I feel assured of getting away from duty in the United States. Before departure the elderly brigadier who had been in command was relegated to a depot brigade and thus passed out of the picture.

The unwritten history of what took place subsequently could be made into either an interesting book for light reading or a military text. As for this account, it is already too long.

When the division was placed under one of the French armies for tactical operations, I went with the division commander to report at army headquarters. The French general was exquisitely courteous. Although an old man, his profile was like a beautiful cameo. He asked only the one question, "How much individual training have your men had?"

My general had just joined the division. He did not speak French, nor did he know the answer. When he turned to me, I replied for him, "Three-fourths of the men have fired their weapons; the rest are recruits with but a few weeks' service and no field training."

This recital of facts should help anyone without a background of similar experiences to realize the need of the present measures for modernizing the Army.

Is There a Moral Here?

A high ranking field officer, seeing a clean-cut young soldier standing on the highway, stopped to give him a lift towards the nation's capital.

Noticing the evident pride of the uniform which possessed this young soldier, the officer asked after his post, organization, etc. Answers to these questions established the fact that the soldier was a recruit of four months, a member of the medical corps, and assigned to duty with the station hospital at his garrison.

"How do you like the service?" asked the officer.

"Very well, indeed, sir," replied the soldier.

"Do they run a good hospital at your post?"

"An excellent one."

"How do you get along with the medical officers?"

"Very well, indeed," came the answer. "They are excellent doctors. There are two or three, however, who are probably the best doctors, but we don't get along with them so well."

"How is that?" asked the officer.

"Well, because," was the answer, "they don't keep up with their paper work."

SOUTH

By Lieutenan

A Story of the Mackenzie Raid into Mexico

In 1914, when General Pershing marched his columns into Mexico to put an end to Villas' riding, the story of events may have brought to mind another punitive expedition south of the border many years ago. Today, with our cavalry largely concentrated along the Rio Grande for training purposes, dust clouds from many hoofs once more dim southwestern skies. Concentrations in 1873 were for more serious matters, and among the most interesting to a cavalryman was that of the 4th U. S. Cavalry at Fort Clark, Texas, which was followed by its historic raid to Rey Molino, Mexico.

For many years prior to the raid, the 4th Cavalry had been almost constantly in the field. In fact, the Indian campaigns of the regiment against the Comanches and Kiowas played an important part in the opening of the South Plains to settlement. It was equipped with the latest and most efficient weapons and accoutrements available. The rigid discipline and high morale of the regiment was equalled by the excellence of its personnel. These men, largely recruited from veterans of the Civil War, gave ample evidence of their high degree of experience and training. On War Department records of the day, the 4th Cavalry was rated as the best regiment in the mounted service, a reputation largely won for it by its commander, Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie.

Like so many of his contemporaries, Mackenzie was a seasoned professional soldier. "Graduating from West Point as he did," writes General Grant, "during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This he did by his own ability and without influence. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the Army." He was brevetted for gallantry in action through every grade from second lieutenant to major general, being appointed a Corps commander at the age of twenty-four! His reputation for absolute fearlessness swift decision, and for a just, stern, though impartial discipline made him a truly great cavalry leader whose career is worthy of study. After Appomattox, Mackenzie reverted to his rank of colonel in the Regular Army, and in 1869, when twenty-nine years old, was given the command of the 4th Cavalry. Under his forceful leadership, the regiment's established reputation was enhanced. Wherever murder, fire and thievery struck the frontier, there marched Mackenzie's columns in swift, inexorable pursuit and ultimate punishment.

April 1, 1873, wearied by a difficult month's march from Fort Richardson, Texas, the regiment had just arrived at Fort Clark to take over the post from the 9th Cavalry. For eleven pleasant days the troopers and their jaded mounts rested. When the Secretary of War, General Belknap, and General Sheridan arrived for the yearly inspection of the regiment, all had recuperated enough to be in condition for any enterprise—even for such a desperate undertaking as was, unbeknown to them, in store.

HOF THE BORDER

anROY W. COLE, Jr., CAVALRY ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Prior to this time and for several months before the regiment received orders to relieve the 9th Cavalry on the Rio Grande, the Indians and Mexicans had been raiding across the river in ever-increasing bands. Ranchmen and homesteaders alike lost their all to the marauding invaders who crossed the international boundary into Texas with seeming impunity. The settlers, incensed by the depredations, did their utmost to persuade General Merritt, commanding the 9th Cavalry, to stop the outrages. Also, they were endeavoring, by means of a joint commission of representatives of the Mexican Government, to collect damages for the loss of their homes and livestock. The situation was already critical, and the inactivity of General Merritt coupled with the apparent lack of success of the negotiations served to heap fuel on the fire. Therefore, as had been the case for years and was so to be until his retirement in 1884 (physical disability resulting from his arduous life and the effects of his eight wounds), Mackenzie was the man for the task.

At Fort Clark, after the usual compliments and inspections were completed, a mysterious conference was held by the Secretary of War, General Sheridan, and Colonel Mackenzie. According to Lieutenant Robert G. Carter, the Regimental Adjutant of the regiment in whom Mackenzie confided the details of the meeting, General Sheridan came to the point in his customary abrupt manner without further ceremony.

"Mackenzie, you have been ordered down here to relieve Merritt and the 9th because I want something done to stop these conditions of banditry that exist across the river. You can accomplish this in your own manner, but I want you to get the situation under control and then to keep it that way. Only remember this, when you do start to act, let it be a campaign of complete destruction. I believe you understand what I mean."

Mackenzie thought a moment then said, "General Sheridan, under whose orders and upon what authority will I be acting?"

Reading between the general's excited words, he realized that such an expedition as General Sheridan obviously wanted would necessitate his taking his whole command into Mexico. Permission for such an undertaking, though implied, had not been definitely granted.

Pounding on the table, and gesticulating in his most decisive manner, Sheridan roared, "Damn the orders, damn the authority! Go ahead on your own initiative and on your own plan, and your authority shall be General Grant and myself. With us behind you in whatever you do to clean up this mess, you can rest assured of the fullest support. You must assume the risk, and we will assume the responsibility, should any result!"

Mackenzie

Here indeed was a peculiar situation, and a less forceful man than Mackenzie might well have had his misgivings. The armed invasion of a friendly country was an event whose political consequences, quite possibly, might mean the end of his military career. However, with President Grant giving the expedition his unofficial blessings, the possible results to be obtained were worth the risk involved—poviding the outcome was successful!

Prior to leaving Fort Clark, General Sheridan once more impressed on Mackenzie the necessity for the com-

plete and unmitigated success of any undertaking, and preparations were initiated with the greatest care.

In his own mind, Mackenzie had long ago decided that to accomplish the desired result, the destruction of the Indian villages along the Rey Molino Creek in Mexico must be his objective. Characteristic thoroughness marked all the preliminary work. Scouts were sent to Howard's Well, the scene of the latest attacks, and the broad trail of the stolen cattle herd was followed to the suspected camps, fifty-eight miles over the border. These camps, all in a close area, were inhabited by bands of Kickapoos, Pottawattomies, and Mescalero and Lipan Apaches who had taken refuge in Mexico and were using the security of their position as a base for raids into Texas.

The terrain between Fort Clark and the Indian settlement southwest of the post was an uninhabited, almost waterless waste of mountains and desert. On the rough maps of the day, it was called the "Terreno Disconocido," and no trails or routes through it were definitely known. Yet to the man who led the first large body of troops across the trackless wastes of the Llano Estacado, this was a small obstacle. A thorough reconnaissance was made by the enlisted scouts and by certain of the settlers. Great cares were taken to have this work done in such a manner as not to arouse the suspicions of the Mexicans in the vicinity, as it was believed that they would convey their knowledge to certain of their compatriots affiliated with the Indians in the disposal of their loot. All information possible was secured which might aid in the success of the expedition.

In brief, as a result of these reconnaissance agencies, Mackenzie planned to make a forced, night march to the main Indian settlement, attack at dawn, destroy the village completely, and march directly back to the United States before any Mexican forces could gather and provoke a clash. Secrecy was of the utmost importance, as once the Indians suspected such an unprecedented invasion, they would scatter to the mountains and nullify any attempt to end decisively their outrages.

Before crossing the border, the object of the expedition was known but to Colonel Mackenzie and to his adjutant, and every effort was made to maintain that secrecy. Supplies of food and ammunition were requisitioned in small quantities and stored against the day of departure, horses were shod, and the saddlery and pack equipment adjusted with the greatest care. To allay suspicions, the several troops of the regiment were sent to their grazing grounds along Turkey Creek and Piedras Pintos for the ostensible purpose of recuperating the horses. Once in their camps, the men were subjected to a rigorous training schedule in which their musketry, mounted and dismounted formations, and their general field technique were reviewed and perfected. Much to the amazement of all, sabres were ground to a razor edge. As the regiment, according to Captain Carter, had never burdened itself with that weapon in an ordinary Indian campaign, this act was the cause of much speculation among officers and men.

The morale of the regiment was at its highest, although the suspense and curiosity of all concerned had become almost unbearable, when at two o'clock on the morning of May 17, 1873, Mackenzie issued orders for the scattered troops to assemble at a designated point on the Las Moras. By two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the entire column, which consisted of six troops ("A," "B," "C," "E," "I," "M") of the Fourth Cavalry plus a detachment of Seminole Indian scouts commanded by Lieutenant John L. Bullis, some four hundred men in all, marched along the Las Moras to its junction with the Rio Grande where the expedition was to cross the river. Just before dark, a halt was made and Mackenzie assembled his command to explain the objects of the raid, its probable results, and the risks to be undergone incident to the invasion of Mexican soil. Capture might well mean the unlucky trooper's being shot against a wall if the Mexican troops caught him, and infinitely worse if the Indians were the captors.

Nothing was said about the authority (or better, the lack of it!) on which the expedition was being conducted. All officers of the command believed implicitly that Mackenzie was acting under the direction of the Secretary of War as his conference with him had left that impression. Mackenzie himself believed that he would be court-martialled for what might prove to be a too free interpretation of General Sheridan's suggestion. Yet feeling certain that General Grant would sustain him, he was willing to assume the risk. Years later, when questioned upon the legality of the matter and of the possibility of any man refusing to obey his command to cross onto Mexican soil, he replied, "Any officer or man who refused to follow me across the river, I would have shot!" Mackenzie's father had hanged the son of the Secretary of the Navy for mutiny on his ship, and there is small reason to believe that the son was any less resolute than the father. Suffice it to say, that at eight-thirty in the evening of May 17th, the regiment to a man followed its intrepid leader across the Rio Grande.

The careful reconnaissance and planning that Mackenzie had made now proved its worth. Led by scouts who had been familiarizing themselves with the terrain for the past month, the column began its fifty-eight mile march to the Indian encampment. It was essential that the regiment be in position to attack at dawn, so no time was wasted once the column had forded the river.

The night was warm and balmy, and a moon half obscured by haze and an ever-rising cloud of dust, dimly lighted the rolling desert. Under the best of conditions a night march is a difficult matter, yet over rough trails and across completely unknown country, such an undertaking assumed tremendous proportions. The ignorance of the troopers of the terrain was such that as far as the rate of march was concerned, march discipline was more of an expression than an actuality. The gait was constantly changing from a fast walk, to a slow trot, to a "pushing trot" and often a slow gallop. The heavy dust so laid upon the column that it was with the greatest difficulty that the rear units could be kept closed up. Every arroya or bend of the trail would string the column out, resulting in a

mad gallop later to maintain contact with the preceding unit. Nobody seemed to want to be left behind.

About midnight, it was realized that the pack train with its rations could not maintain the killing pace. Two alternatives presented themselves—to let the mule train attempt to follow the column under the protection of a small detachment, or to cut the heavy loads loose and thus enable the lightened animals to keep up with the column. The mule train alone would prove to be an easy prey to any roving band of brigands who might discover it, so it was decided to put the men on short rations and to cut the loads. After some delay, occasioned by the men filling their pockets with food, this was accomplished, and the column hurried on into the desert.

The desire for sleep soon became almost overpowering to the weary troopers. Conversation had long since ceased, and only the thud of hoofs and the clanking of accoutrements, punctuated by an infrequent curse, broke the stillness of the seemingly endless night.

Sunrise found the grim column still some few miles from its objective. The delay caused by the pack train added to the difficulties of the march over the unknown country had proved to be the unpredictable element which tempers all operations of war. Yet the high morale of the entire force, brought to peak by the knowledge that the enemy was close by and coupled with relief that the long night was over, prompted suggestions that the raiders push on at a gallop! This Colonel Mackenzie refused to do, as he dared not arrive at the scene of battle with his horses exhausted when the very life of his command depended upon its continued mobility. Neither did he know the exact location of the enemy camp.

"He could see the outlines of the Indian encampments—a mounted attack was clearly indicated."

At four-thirty, the dry creekbed of the Rey Molino[1] crossed the trail, and while the regiment halted and prepared for battle, Colonel Mackenzie made a brief reconnaissance. From his vantage point in the edge of the chapparral, he could see the outlines of the Indian encampments, nearly a mile distant. The intervening terrain was ideal, being a broad open plain, thinly covered with prickly pear bushes and sloping gently into the camps. A mounted attack was clearly indicated, and orders were given to "cut out" the pack animals and for the regiment to tighten cinchas. All extra ammunition was issued to the troopers who carried it in the pockets of their blouses instead of in their saddlebags according to the usual custom (had General Custer followed this example, it would have saved him considerable embarrassment on the Little Big Horn some years later when the Sioux captured all his led horses with the extra ammunition safely packed in the saddlebags!).

On Mackenzie's signal, the regiment debouched from the chapparral in column of troops and advanced down the slope at a rapid trot. The formation of the attack was the charge in column of platoons at one hundred yards with platoons "as foragers." The leading platoon was to deliver its fire by volley as it reached the village, then wheeling to the right, charge back up the village again. Each succeeding platoon, save those designated to pursue and sabre the scattering enemy, was to do likewise, wheeling alternately by platoons to the left and right, and, riding through the village in reverse, rejoin the tail of the column and continue the attack.

Like most surprise attacks against an unprepared enemy, the charge was a complete success. Save for isolated groups who fought fiercely in defense of their families, as the troops came in one end of the village, the hostiles went out the other. Some twenty-five were killed and the village fired. Because of the lateness of the hour, a large number of the warriors had already left the village on their daily hunting trips, so the troops met with less resistance than had been expected. Two hundred horses were rounded up, together with fifty women and children to be held as hostages to induce the Indians to return to their reservations in Texas where they could be kept under proper surveillance.

Rejecting all suggestions to push on and destroy other camps in the vicinity *or to separate* his command to pursue the scattered hostile groups, Mackenzie gave orders to assemble and water. The wounded were cared for, horse litters constructed, and captured ponies assigned to the prisoners to ride. At one o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th of May, under a burning sun, the retrograde movement across the river began.

The trail of the raiding cavalry had long since been discovered, and the news of the raid communicated by swift riding charros from Piedras Niegras to the upper fords of the Rio Grande. Mackenzie's most disturbing thoughts were given form when it was learned while passing through the Mexican village of Rey Molino that volunteers were gathering to intercept the march. Worst of all, the intense heat coupled with the exertions of the past twenty-four hours had rendered the condition of men and horses an extremely precarious one. Only the muddy water holes left by the recent rains made it possible to continue. Small wonder then, that there existed a decided undercurrent of anxiety as the weary command faced the prospects of another night march.

Fearing an ambush at every twist of the interminable trail, the regiment pushed on, advance guards and selected scouts leading the way, Seminoles on the flanks, while the sullen prisoners under heavy guard brought up the rear. A large portion of the men had not slept for three nights, and the task of the officers and file-closers became increasingly difficult as the night wore on. Towards dawn, troopers and prisoners alike began to fall off their horses, and had to be lashed into their saddles in order to keep the column moving. The nerves of all were worn raw from the exertion, the long night, and the danger of a surprise attack. Colonel Mackenzie rode up and down the length of his column exhorting the men to keep their spirits up, and by his unflagging energy and determination, made his men march when all might well have fallen by the roadside. It was a long, long night and only the esprit of a fine regiment made the ordeal bearable.

Morning came, and with it the welcome sight of the turbulent Rio Grande. One can but imagine the emotions the weary troopers experienced as they set foot on American soil.

Camp was pitched at once on the Texas bank close by the river, and the saddles were stripped from the jaded animals for the first time in forty-nine hours! The Regimental Trains as previously arranged, were awaiting with plenty of rations and forage for men and mounts, yet few indeed bothered with food. Sleep was their crying need, and even the appearance of a large and threatening band of Mexicans and Indians on the far bank of the river did not disturb their rest. Outguards protecting the bivouac invited the rabble to come across the river, yet none heeded the invitation.

Summing up, the 4th Cavalry *covered one hundred and sixty miles in just thirty-two marching hours.* In addition to this splendid record, they fought a battle, destroyed a hostile camp that had been a menace to the settlers for years, recovered a large number of stolen animals, and brought back fifty hostages which eventually led to the Indians returning to their reservations in the United States. The concentration for the raid started at 2:30 PM, May 17th, and at four in the morning of the 19th, the troops were back on Texas soil. The governor of the state convened the legislature in special session which voted the "grateful thanks of the people of Texas for the gallant conduct of Colonel Mackenzie and the 4th U. S. Cavalry." General Grant telegraphed his hearty congratulations, and all fears about the legality of the proceedings were forgotten, "Nothing succeeds like success."

[1]The Rio San Roderigo just west of Remolino, Mexico, may have been the stream crossed and erroneously called the Rey Molino.

What Every Reserve Officer Should Know

By Captain Arthur Symons, Coast Artillery Corps Reserve

Well, all right! You're a Reserve officer. And so what? Few people are impressed. Almost any girl would rather look at Gary Taylor Gable before his morning shave than at you in dress blues—if you had dress blues. The Regular Army thinks you're probably a good kid, with possibilities—but just possibilities. The National Guard thinks you're a good idea, like carrots in mulligan stew. Pacifists think you're a misguided sub-moron. And the final bitter pill—a large section of the general public doesn't even think about you at all. It has its own troubles.

Are you properly deflated? Swell. Now we can get down to cases.

As a Reserve officer, you are to be congratulated. You have a better-than-average education, it has never been proved that you're not a gentleman, your physique is such that you probably won't collapse running for a streetcar, and your interest in national defense hints at qualities more noble than those of the herd. But unless you're one of the exceptions, you're far from a soldier, my friend.

It isn't your fault, of course. For fifty weeks of the year, less a few evenings, you are a civilian, with pork chops to earn and a life to live. For the other two weeks—in some years—you wear a uniform and haunt an Army post trying to adjust yourself to a new and different life. Just about the time you can distinguish a warrant officer from a flying cadet, the finance officer hands you your pay, and a line of grim-jawed men, armed with your chits, take it away from you again.

But buck up, old boy, there's hope. You can't be expected to know as much about the military as the professional, but you *can* develop a military frame of mind in one or two easy lessons at home—if you have any real desire to be the soldier your uniform says you are.

Let's start with one of the first attributes of the soldier. *Obedience* is the word. I'll bet that within the past year you have been guilty of at least one act of direct military disobedience. No? How about that letter from unit headquarters you neglected to answer because it didn't seem very important—and besides you couldn't find a penalty envelope without going into your footlocker? Do you always answer your unit instructor's communications promptly? Don't tell me—let me guess. Because if you did answer those communications as military regulations require—within twenty-four hours—the good major, who's a hell of a fine scout and lets himself out on a limb many a time to save your military hide, wouldn't have to write so many indorsements to higher headquarters himself explaining *your* delays, and in many cases taking the rap.

A soldier would keep up on his military correspondence. And in unavoidable delays he would explain those delays to higher headquarters.

Then, there's an item called *coöperation*. The Army, with better than 150 years of experience behind it, seems to think that coöperation is important. There's even an entry in the efficiency report dealing with it. The efficiency report states that coöperation is "acting jointly and effectively with another or others, military or civilian, to attain a designated objective." Well, did you heed the appeals of your unit commander and unit instructor to turn in a fair average of Extension Course work? Did you coperate with those who tried hard to put your unit on top? Did you? I betcha. The statisticians who tsk-tsk-tsk about the uneven distribution of wealth might look into the uneven distribution of Extension Course lessons completed. Boy, would they have figures with which to do some tall viewing-with-alarm!

Now, how is your military frame of mind? Soldiers, being disciplined individuals, show respect and courtesy to their superiors. Do you—all the time? Maybe. Of course it's out of the question, when the gang meets at the Hofbräu after the unit meeting, to stand at attention and use the third-person form of address when you're gassing with the Colonel about the boner you pulled at camp last summer. But even with a beer in the hand and four down the hatch, the word "sir" is in order. If you're a lieutenant and your captain telephones to ask if you'll be at the unit meeting tomorrow night, check the proper answer: (a) Aw hell, Drizzlepuss, I've got a date with a blonde, and besides I've made my five meetings this year. (b) No, Captain, I'm afraid I can't make it. I have a rather important social engagement.

Or suppose you are the lieutenant, and the captain works for you in civil life, and you're very good friends. When would you use the following form of address: (a) in the office with no third party present, or (b) during a unit meeting—"Jones, you're the dumbest man that ever brushed his teeth with shaving soap."

A superior officer is a superior officer in uniform or civvies, on duty or off, and a soldier with a military frame of mind doesn't forget the fact.

Another trait that indicates the soldier is his willingness to get things done. If the colonel appoints you to the chairmanship of the dance committee, he honestly doesn't give a hoot if you don't know Toscanini from Singin' Sam. He



Good Gad, Superman! This is a B. and O. Railroad map.

wants a dance, and a good one. If you don't know how, find out how—and get moving. Don't tell him you're incompetent—go ahead and whip up a dance. You'll never know just what you can do until you go ahead and do it. If the colonel told you that your platoon would take Hill 999⅞, you wouldn't point out the impracticability of the plan—or would you? Come machine guns, come artillery, come bayonets, your platoon would take that hill or die trying, and you along with it. That's the Army; that's the soldier. The principle is the same whether the task is to instruct CMTC's in prophylaxis or force a river crossing in war. Git goin', and to hell with the word "can't." Just another 4 x 8 in the military frame of mind.

A soldier is neat and clean. Are you? Do you shave every morning, whether you need it or not? Is your suit pressed, is your linen clean, are your shoes shined, has your face been washed recently? Elementary stuff, to be sure, but how about it? If you're a sloppy slug in civil life, you'll be no example to a platoon of selective-service men during the hectic mêlée of wartime training. To many men, a taste for military cleanliness and order is something hard to acquire, but once acquired it's hard to eradicate. But it's one of the marks of the soldier.

The next quality, fellow Reserve officers, is something my usually rash character hesitates to put a name to, and it's a negative quality at that. Perhaps a few instances of how *not* to act might explain things. Don't be like the Reserve colonel, famous throughout a corps area as the rich man who runs his business from camp during each fourteen-day tour of active duty, giving enlisted clerks hours of his personal typing to do each day, and who then neglects to press a greenback into their underpaid hands. And don't be one of the barflies who is always marked "present" when somebody else buys the drinks, and who disappears by the time his turn rolls around. Don't be the man who excuses his personal sloppiness by slurs at the noncom in charge of the orderlies. Don't be the bird who gets the extra five-spot at the paytable and neglects to turn it back to the unlucky finance officer. Don't be the drizzle who yips "Who pays for the gasoline?" while the colonel is outlining a tactical problem using privately owned transportation. Don't be the pinchpenny who doesn't subscribe to the publication of his branch, and who doesn't belong to the Reserve Officers' Association.

I have the word I was looking for: Don't be *cheap*. Soldiers aren't.

Another negative quality is *carelessness*. An army is a precision machine, but it's only as precise as its poorest part. Are you the bird who always comes late to formations? Are you the itch who comes through with the wrong map nine weary miles across country from camp? Are you the drip who points his pistol at the firing line when his attention is distracted? If you are, you're probably the sort of mug who'll lead a unit in the presence of the enemy and forget to put out scouts, or who'll forget to make messing arrangements for his troops. The dope who gets as far as the parade ground for retreat without his saber is probably the same numbwit who will find himself on outpost duty without any ammunition. Carelessness has no place in the scheme of the soldier.

And for goodness' sake, learn to use a little *initiative!* If there is something to be done, *do it!* The whined excuse, "But nobody told me to," is out of place in the Army as a step-in on a gun carriage. The best order is the one that doesn't have to be given. My seventeen-year-old secretary says "I've already done that, Mr. Gunner," about ten times during an average day. The officer who can say that is the man I want commanding one of my platoons. Another phrase no junior officer had better use in my hearing is, "What do I do now?" My favorite CCC skipper told me, the second day after he took over the camp from a fussbudget who should have been taking occupational therapy at an institution for feeble-minded, "Lieutenant, when an emergency arises in my absence, take care of it. Do *something!* If you do the wrong thing I'll back you to the hilt, but if you do nothing, Gawd help you when I return!" Don't sit by and let things slide—mould events for the good of the service. That's only one manifestation of initiative, but until you learn initiative in all its ramifications, your uniform will be nothing but expensive wrapping on a low-grade product.

Another mark of the soldier is *loyalty*. Your superiors may be everything your parents taught you never to be—but they're still your superiors, and the representatives of the country you have sworn to uphold. Weaken them, and you weaken your country. When I first went on CCC duty, I couldn't understand the attitude of my captain who charged the men for damage to government property. Surely the government could better afford to pay for a window broken in a scuffle, than an enrollee who sent home all but five dollars of his monthly pay. But the skipper was loyal to his country; I soon learned that part of my job as an officer in the Army was to protect the government "from all enemies, public and private." The person who wantonly or carelessly destroys government property, even twenty-five cents' worth, is an enemy of my country even as a foreign government that sinks one of our ships, but merely to a lesser degree. As an officer, you will protect the government from more than bullets if you are loyal.

Learn the business. Success in civil life is a combination of knowledge, work, and luck. Take away any of these three elements and you have removed 33⅓ of your chance for success. Anybody can work hard, some of us have luck, and all of us in the Reserve have our opportunities to improve our military knowledge. A Reserve officer can't hope to learn everything about the military, not even everything about his branch. But he can take advantage of the myriad opportunities presented to him to increase his knowledge. Extension Courses, unit conferences, social functions, summer camps, service schools—all have their place in the Reserve educational scheme, and the Reserve officer who doesn't take advantage of them to the best of his ability isn't much of an officer. "Impersonating an officer" is a crime in this country—don't be a criminal. Besides, how can you have a military frame of mind if there is little of the military in that mind?

Arrogance has no place in the military frame of mind. It doesn't go in the United States Army. Besides, what have you to be arrogant about? The enlisted man at whom you may sneer is simply yourself, but for a break or two somewhere along the line. Chances are that he knows more about his job as a soldier than you do. Many enlisted men hold commissions in the Reserve. The officer of the Regular establishment doesn't have to throw up a defense of arrogance. He's a leader, he knows his stuff and he knows he knows it. To him, a soldier is a most important part of the Army. The Regular officer respects him and his rights, just as the soldier respects the officer and his rank. Discipline, the separation of officer and man, imposes an obligation on the officer, rather than *vice versa*. Your uniform should never make you forget that you are an American, and that the United States is a democratic country. The officer of the Army of the United States leads, not drives, citizens, not serfs. You can be dignified, even aloof if you care to be (it isn't nearly as much fun), but don't be arrogant.

A few words on the care and feeding of superior officers might not be amiss. Because your CO calls you Joe at 10:30 p.m. at the blackjack table, don't get the idea that he is Herb at 10:30 a.m. on the drillfield. Let him take all the leads when it comes to familiarity. If you don't, he'll regret his first move towards softening, and he'll freeze up worse than a Jawja fiel' han' in an Alaskan blizzard. If the CO borrows your shaving soap, that's no license to use his last clean shirt. Ask his wife for a dance, even if it shreds your heart to tear yourself away from the girl you brought. You might get a break—it's even possible that she's all booked up. Look the CO in the eye when you speak to him, and stand at attention. When he gives you hell, *don't* look either like a whipped puppy or a defiant child. Remember, he made mistakes too, and he probably remembers them. Jump to obey his orders even if they're wrong—he's responsible—and if that's the way he wants it, that's the way he wants it. Maybe he knows something you don't know.

We Reserve officers have a job to do—an important job. In the case of a war, more than half the officers will come from our component. From where I sit, we're doing a fair job right now, but when we become satisfied we might as well devote all our time to digging petunias.

Are you equipped, *right now,* to lead your unit into battle? If the answer is yes, you're either damned good or wofully ignorant of what will be expected of you. If the answer is no, what are you waiting for?

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BACKSTAGE WORK FOR CAVALRY

By Captain C. H. Prunty, (Cavalry) Q.M.C.

As the sun sinks below the yardarm and cavalrymen on many posts gather together in the afternoon at their respective regimental clubs, the talk will turn occasionally to the present day rôles and purposes of the tools of "General Motors" and "General Sheridan." Those who consider the hard earned lessons of Italy in Ethiopia, Franco's creation, organization and successful use of sixty squadrons of horsed cavalry in the Spanish Civil War, Japan's urgent activities in reorganizing her remount service, and also Germany's use of over 200,000 horses in Poland, will continue an interest in those facilities which make possible mobility á la "General Sheridan."

Where does this type mobility originate? The main sources for this supply are to be found in three Quartermaster remount depots, supervised and administered under the assistant to the Quartermaster General Remount Section, who at present is Lieutenant Colonel E. N. Hardy. These depots are located at Fort Reno, Oklahoma, Fort Robinson, Nebraska, and Front Royal, Virginia. They represent concentration points for animals purchased in adjacent "purchasing zones."

In order to coördinate the stimulation of better breeding and the procurement of the best type animals available, the country has been divided into seven so called "purchasing zones." In each zone are to be found two officers; the first either a quartermaster or a line officer of a mounted branch detailed in the Quartermaster Corps, and the second, a member of the Army Veterinary Corps, as an assistant to the former.

The seven "purchasing zones" are located as follows:

East Central Zone, with headquarters at Lexington, Kentucky, comprises the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

South Central Zone, with headquarters at Fort Worth, Texas, comprises the states of Oklahoma and Texas.

The Southwestern Zone, with headquarters at Colorado Springs, Colorado, comprises the states of Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico.

The Northwestern Zone, with headquarters at Fort Douglas, Utah, covers the states of Idaho, Montana, Utah and Wyoming.

The North Central Zone, with headquarters at Kansas City, Missouri, includes the states of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri and North and South Dakota.

The Western Zone, with headquarters at San Mateo, California, takes in the states of California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and the Hawaiian Islands.

The Eastern Zone, with headquarters at Front Royal, Virginia coördinates activities in the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia and Puerto Rico.

It may be visualized that the three remount depots are located ideally for the reception of incoming animals purchased by Army buyers in the field; also, the several purchasing zone headquarters are located in the heart of the horse and mule producing sections of the country.

The remount purchasing officers and their veterinarian assistants are not only buyers, but in another sense are travelling salesmen who place the problems of our mounted branches before the public. These officers are constantly on the lookout not only for cavalry type horses, but also artillery horses suitable for lead, swing and wheel. In addition, they keep spotted the better types of pack and draft mules as well as light riding animals for our forces in the tropics.

In buying, they visit not only the stockyards and premises of the larger dealers, but spend a considerable portion of their time in the ranches and pastures far back in the hills. Many of our best Army mounts have been found in these out of the way areas. The two zone officers constitute a team in which the line officer evaluates the animal considered from the standpoint of usefulness in the military service, while the veterinarian passes on the soundness of the animal. Prior to purchase, the buyers require each horse to be shown mounted at the walk, trot and gallop. In this manner any known outlaws and other animals of mean temper are eliminated. Animals may be purchased either in carload lots or individually at scattered points. On some occasions animals are purchased for delivery to a central shipping point, while others are bought f. o. b. a remount depot. Under these circumstances a large number of animals are delivered direct to the depot by motor trailer.

The officer in charge of a purchasing zone is concerned not only with the purchase of animals, but is charged with the supervision and inspection of all remount stallions allotted to his zone. The distribution of remount stallions throughout the country forms the backbone of our present remount system. These activities, while supported by the Army through the Quartermaster General, receive invaluable support from the American Remount Association whose purpose is to encourage a better type horse for military and sports use within the nation. Approximately 700 stallions are maintained throughout the country. Normally four are assigned to each remount depot, while the remainder are placed in the hands of agents, mainly in the areas devoted to stock raising. The great majority of these stallions are registered thoroughbreds, although a few Arabs, Standard Breds and Saddle Breds may be found. The stallions are in the hands of agents during the breeding season which extends from early spring until early fall, when they are returned to the depot of origin for conditioning. The illustrations will afford some indication of the appearance of these animals after being returned from the hands of the average agent,



HORSES AT A QUARTERMASTER REMOUNT DEPOT

1—Depot raised, 4 years old; 2—Depot foal, first lesson: leading with halter; 3—An issue horse ready for shipment: all horses are ridden, and finally pictured with full pack equipment prior to issue; 4—Depot stallion; 5—Depot foal; 6—Stallion returned to depot from agent to be reconditioned, and 7—The same stallion recondtioned and ready to be issued for further service; 8—Part of mare band with foals; 9—After being branded the remount is entered into the grading paddock and is graded in class A, B, or C, and is noted on record accordingly, which step is important throughout the process stage in preparing him for future assignment to the trooper. (In this case Lieutenant Colonel Grace, Captain Bennett, and Warrant Officer T. J. Walsh are judging a new remount to place him in grade accordingly.)

and how they appear after a short period at a remount depot. Agents handling stallions are furnished with detailed information on their care and upkeep together with type mares needed to raise the standard of horses in the country. They are encouraged to visit the nearest remount depot in order to become familiar with the best method of handling their charges, and to become familiar with type foals which may be expected from a wise choice of proper type mares.

It may be of interest to find what happens to purchased animals on arrival at a depot. Initially, all animals are placed in quarantine in the veterinary section of the post for approximately one month in order to discover and arrest any presence of ringworm, strangles or other diseases incident to shipping. During this period the horse is examined daily in pasture, and fed grain hay when local grass is short. Sick animals are caught up and brought to the hospital for treatment.

After the animal quarantine period is over, the horse (or mule) is turned over to the Animal Issue Section for processing and conditioning. Here the horse spends about three months. He is first graded and branded on the neck by Preston Brand before being accepted by the Animal Issue Officer. Brands for the neck are assigned by the Office of the Quartermaster General. Grading of animals is the responsibility of the officer in charge of the Animal Issue Section (called the "Animal Officer"). In grading, the first consideration is to select the "tops" of each incoming shipment. These are segregated and listed as "School Selection Prospects" and placed in special pastures for issue as training mounts to the students of the Cavalry School and Field Artillery School each year. The remaining horses are graded "A," "B," and "C"—"A" is excellent, "B" average, and "C" as just acceptable. These horses are then segregated in pastures, where they are fed grain daily (and hay if necessary during the winter months) until called in for issue. The "cavalry riders" to one pasture, "artillery riders" to another, "draft" to other pastures, etc., until all of them find their proper niche in the Depot. Each pasture is inspected daily to determine its green feed content and for water. Each animal in pasture is observed daily. The sick and injured ones are immediately detected and brought in to the Veterinary Hospital for treatment.

Let us assume that an issue order from the Office of the Quartermaster General (Remount Section) arrives, directing the Depot Commander to ship 60 cavalry riders to the Xth Cavalry at Ft. Plunk, Idaho. Under present plans, the Depot Commander contacts the C.O. of the Xth Cavalry and ascertains what will be the most agreeable time for him to receive his shipment of remounts. Having agreed upon a date, the Depot Commander directs his Animal Officer to prepare 60 cavalry riders for shipment to the Xth Cavalry by the date agreed upon. The Animal Officer has *all* of his cavalry riders brought in to his selection chute and personally looks at each one. He selects from his entire group 75 to 100 animals, representing a cross-section of his herd and has them brought into the Processing Stable, here this group is "ridden out" by hired civilian bronc-busters, their manes, tails and feet trimmed and then are inspected by the Depot Commander for final judgment as to issue of each particular animal. All animals, upon being approved by the Depot Commander as to tractability, state of health and suitability are inspected by the Depot Veterinarian for defects and blemishes. Any blemishes or defects so noted are carded and go forward with the animal's record to his receiving organization. After selection and shipping approval by the Depot Commander, animals are mallein-tested for glanders, dipped in a lime and sulphur heated mixture to destroy ringworm and lice bacilli, loaded into ordinary stock cars (usually 20 to a car), and shipped to the requisitioning organization. Upon shipment, a memorandum is sent each receiving organization showing the condition, weight, height, degree of training, and any special peculiarities noted about any animal while on the Depot. This is done to assist in the animal's ultimate training in the using arm or service. So much for a brief glimpse of the Animal Issue Section.

The second interest at any Remount Depot is its Breeding Section. This section is usually divided into a Nursery and a branch including One Year, Two Year and Three Year Old Colts. This branch normally employs the services of about sixty broodmares and four stallions especially assigned to the depot as breeding stallions for the current year. These stallions are changed at frequent intervals to prevent inbreeding at depots, and to permit the various depots and agents to have the opportunity of employing their service. These four depot stallions are bred to approximately sixty depot mares. The majority of these mares are registered thoroughbreds, however a few are "grades." The annual colt crop numbers between forty and fifty foals. About six of the best yearling colts are kept "entire" for future use in the Remount Service as breeding stallions. A few of the best fillies of each colt crop are selected as prospective broodmares. The rest of each colt crop is progressively carried on through its Yearling, Two-year-old, and Three-year-old stage until each individual horse is ready for issue to the Cavalry or Field Artillery Schools, or for sale to officers.

A colt's training begins three days after birth, at which time a halter is put on it and the youngster is led for short periods to accustom it to being handled. The period of leading and handling progresses throughout the first year.

During the second year, the young animals are worked with saddle and bridle, are initiated to the weight of a rider, mounting and dismounting and a few simple movements by the mounted horseman. During the yearling year the colt is schooled about twenty-five hours on straight lines, saddled, with a rider on its back. This handling and schooling continues during the two-year and three-year stage. The two-year-olds average about one period per week under the saddle, being worked on straight lines and a few simple turning movements—practically all at the

(Please turn to page 174)

Our Reserves: Prepared or Potential?

By MAJOR M. C. SHEA, *Field Artillery*

During the early '20's, all of us recall, we were swamped with speeches about the three components of the Army of the United States; the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. The Army in all its larger war plans banks heavily on the Officers' Reserve Corps.

Just what are the capabilities and limitations of this much-talked of corps of officers who now number slightly more than 100,000 active members and who need 20,000 more to meet War Department requirements? What kind of officers are they? What training do they have? What can they do? These, and many more questions must be answered by our War Plan Sections in time of peace and by practically all commanders in time of war.

To the mind of many a Regular, whose association with him has been limited to 14 days' acquaintance at summer camps, the reserve officer is, in his present state, not an asset in the sense of being able to perform all the duties of his branch and grade. On the other hand we are accustomed to plan on using reserve officers immediately upon mobilization, for every type of duty from company officers with Regular Army units, to the establishment and running of various Corps Area Service Command installations. In short, he is underrated on the one hand and overrated on the other.

In the establishment of the Officers' Reserve Corps in the early 1920's, units were formed as nearly as practicable in the localities which manned those units during the World War. This system has in general remained unchanged and a degree of esprit has grown up that is not realized by the unacquainted. Your second lieutenant today, although not born in 1917, is proud of his regiment and division and feels that it is a club in which other members are his friends. Although he may appear apathetic he will seldom transfer to another organization — even an illustrious Regular Regiment — voluntarily. This system of organization is satisfactory. Most officers prefer to belong to a tangible regiment rather than to a soulless pool. You can't build up interest in a filler replacement center, and a working interest is the main problem of the Regular officer on duty with the Reserves.

The World War officer now forms a small percentage of the Reserve Corps—about 16 per cent. Though small, this group contains many valuable men—some because of war experience, others as leaders in science, business and the professions. The majority of the Reserves are senior R.O.T.C. graduates of our colleges. Graduates of the C.M.T.C. furnish a very small number annually.

One great trouble with many an R.O.T.C. graduate, has been his seeming lack of interest and consequent dropping out at the end of a few years. Captain E. Y. Blewett, Inf.-Res., in the *Infantry Journal* for November-December, 1938, states that of the 6,000 second lieutenants commissioned annually from R.O.T.C. units, only 50 per cent eventually remain in the Reserve Corps. This is very expensive to say the least. A more careful selection of applicants is one answer. Some students take the military course because they find it easier, others because they need the uniform and financial assistance that go with it. After graduation, these are like the Filipino servant who some years ago persuaded his employer to bring him back to the United States as his cook. Shortly after his arrival he disappeared and left a note saying: "Dear Captain: I have worked you long enough—good-bye."

Another and more important answer is to arouse more interest in the Reserve Corps while these young men are undergraduates and to maintain their interest, especially during the first few years after graduation. If we can do these two things the casualty rate will fall.

The Reserve Corps has been compared by one officer to a church congregation in which can be found all types. We have first the devout, or the zealots, those who have great faith and who put their convictions into practice. Their number is small, but in the Reserve Corps they are often the leaders. Interested in military affairs, they not only believe in the National Defense Act, but try to make it effective. They are often idealists. At the other extreme are those that, to put it in a diplomatic way, are indifferent. They joined and have hung on so far because they vaguely thought it might help them some way or other eventually. Some had hoped it might get them a better job or raise their social standing, but something failed to click. Still, if a cataclysm should befall, wouldn't it be better to be a member than a non-member? So they drift. The experienced pastor is well acquainted with these two groups but they don't worry him much. His attention is directed rather to two other groups which he would like to see more active. Those who are too busy and those who are naturally apathetic. He finds it difficult to catalogue members of these two groups, they are so often a combination of both. He has tried all his ingenuity, but he can't say that he has made any great headway. These

two groups aren't lazy. They comprise the great majority of his charges, but most of them are young, just getting started, busy making a living and with little time for other activities. If he could just keep them interested and get them to participate, even to a small extent during their early years, it would be a great step forward. At last report he hadn't found the answer.

The Reserve Officers' Association at its 1938 convention advocated a uniform clothing allowance of $50.00 per year for the first three years of service and inactive status pay of not over $75.00 per officer annually, dependent on completion of systematic courses of study. Not all Reservists are in agreement with the plan or its details. Some fear the money would be taken from the active duty allotment, others say it would smack of "paid-patriotism." Some would reduce the amount to $50.00, others oppose the clothing allowance. Proponents of the plan argue that it would supply the necessary incentive to a large number of capable officers who are lost every year. They point out that the National Guardsman of all ranks is paid and that the proposed pay is very small compared to that of a National Guard officer while the time devoted is comparable. They believe it would provide the necessary leverage for requiring their members to keep themselves qualified for actual service and that a uniform standard of efficiency would thereby result.

In the past we planned on giving Reserve units—and inferentially their officers—four to six months' training. If that were possible there would be nothing to worry about. But unfortunately we must use a very large number of Reserve officers on M-day. The opportunity for training them will be very small. They must be trained before the call. This is particularly true of the branches which have no parallel in civil life. Doctors, lawyers, road engineers, construction men, motor specialists, etc., may be expected to function in like occupations in war with less military training. We are faced however, with the necessity of training in civil life, 40 per cent of the platoon leaders and company commanders that constitute the combatant forces so that they can compete with the professional soldiers of a military nation.

Our principal agencies for this, after an officer is commissioned, are the Army Extension Courses, which are generally excellent and give a good theoretical grasp of the subjects, and the active duty tours. Neither is being utilized to the extent desirable. The number selected for active duty is limited by Congressional appropriations. Some officers apply every year. Others once in five years. A large number do little studying from one camp to the next. To acquire and maintain knowledge of his mobilization duties a Reserve officer will need to devote a minimum of 50 hours a year, or one hour per week, if he is to maintain a satisfactory standard. This is rarely done. If it were possible to have all Reserve officers follow a systematic course of study and attend active duty as often as appropriations made it possible their efficiency as a whole would be raised. Why they do not is here, in part at least, explained. How they can be gotten to do so is up to the Regular Army.

Let's look at a Reserve regiment and see if it will give a clearer idea of what we may expect. By the law of probabilities it should be typical. This particular regiment has 104 officers. To start with it is short 2 field officers and 6 captains. Twenty-seven have never had active duty, although it has been available; 21 have had one 2-week tour and 16 have had two tours. Seven have had no active duty in over four years. Four lieutenants are 46 years of age or older. One officer is not eligible for active duty because he is drawing disability compensation as a World War veteran. Six had World War experience of one kind or another. Forty-four are studying an Extension Course. Twenty-one first lieutenants are over time in grade, i.e., have not done the courses required for promotion. Seventy-eight are R.O.T.C graduates, four are graduates of the C.M.T.C.

The successful man in civil life is very apt to be your best Reserve officer. Being busy, he consequently gives little time to Extension Courses and finds it hard to go to active duty as often as he should. Perhaps the proposed remuneration for keeping up with the Extension Courses would prove an incentive to some extent. Most Reserve officers get only two weeks leave per year and if they go to active duty must forego any other vacation. A few states —New York is one—and a few large corporations provide for military leave (with or without pay) for their employees in addition to their annual vacation. This is most desirable and if it could be greatly extended throughout the country, would be a great help in training the Reserve officer.

Regulations exist for discharging or transferring to the inactive list, Reserve officers whose services are considered unsatisfactory. This should be supplemented by a maximum age in grade limitation for the combatant branches. Lieutenants 50 years of age and over should not be counted as available for such duty.

There is a great deal of talk about lack of promotion in the higher grades (field officers). There is no objection to the present rate of promotion *provided* the officer is qualified for advancement. This is not always the case. The completion of subcourses and a 2-week active duty tour rated "satisfactory" are generally all that is required. A thorough examination, theoretical and practical, should be required for promotion to the field grades. This would help promotion for the deserving and raise efficiency. To insure uniformity, examinations should be prepared annually by the War Department. Tables of organization for the various Corps Area Service Command Installations would take care of others.

Incidentally, most Reserve officers now assigned to these Zone of the Interior posts such as Mobilization and Reception Centers, Recruiting Service, etc., have no conception of their mobilization duties, although many of them must start to function on M-day. Assignments to these installations are generally made by roster for a detail of

four years. Extension Courses of instruction for such duties are needed and active duty should be along the lines of their M-day duties. Utilization of certain retired Regular officers in these installations would provide a nucleus that would be invaluable. They should be assigned now and advised of their mobilization duties. The creation of a permanent corps for these installations seems advisable. It could be composed of those desiring such an assignment, those too old for combatant duty, limited service men, etc.

Many officers possess qualifications of military value not shown by their 201 file. The Ordnance Department has a qualification card for each Ordnance Reserve officer. This gives a good picture of an officer, showing among other things, his civilian experiences, nature of occupation, salary and specialties of military value. The value of such a record, periodically brought up-to-date, is apparent.

Anyone specializing on a subject or a certain phase of it, is apt to consider his specialty the most important. For example the R.O.T.C. article referred to above, emphasized the necessity for specially qualified Regular officers for R.O.T.C. duty. That is true. On the other hand is anything more important than the training of National Guard units so that they can function creditably on M-day without further training?

Or is it any less important to train and keep interested 100,000 civilians who must function as leaders in all phases of modern war? Certain Regular officers well qualified for work with one civilian component may be entirely unsuited for another. Some determination besides trial and error should be possible from an officer's record. However, an officer having once shown himself well qualified for a particular duty will be more valuable on a similar assignment, when his turn comes again, than with another component. The problem of putting the right instructor on the right job is the War Department's. In this connection one recommendation that would be of great help in the development of the Reserve would be the appointment as commander of the various Reserve divisions an officer with the rank of brigadier general for the four years of such detail. They would be selected as general officers are at present, except the age limit would be between 52 and 56. This would place some of the best brains where development and impetus are needed. The experience would be of great value to them and to the War Department in event of war. The expense would be negligible. Many Regular officers avoid as long as possible any duty with the civilian components. For broadening the perspective and as an antidote for prolonged garrison life it is highly recommended.

The Officers' Reserve Corps at the present time might be compared to a young man, not yet 20 years of age. Well conceived, carefully nutured in infancy, he has come through the various trials of youth, a healthy, growing youngster, still in the formative stage. His parents, teachers and environment during the next few years will have a good deal to do with forming his character. He is not yet developed, but with his native mental and physical qualifications, will, under proper guidance and with a little encouragement, make a fine citizen-soldier.

A Cavalry Tailspin

By MAJOR I. N. STRUCTOR, *Cavalry**

Major I. N. Structor arrived at the Armory of Troop "J," 135th Cavalry, Pennsylvania National Guard, Fitenfort, Pa., at about 7:45 PM on drill night. It was his authorized once-in-three-months visit to an organization to which he had been assigned as Instructor, Inspector, Big-Brother, Advisor and all-around Bag-Holder.

Troop "J" was an excellent Troop with a sincere, hard working and intelligent Troop commander, splendid officers and non-commissioned officers and a high morale. It was a damn good outfit and everybody knew it. Major Structor never worried about it for he knew that "J" Troop's paper work was always accurate and prompt and that its training schedule would be well and properly carried out. So he was in high spirits and enjoying the little fifty-mile trip from his home station. He even hummed a few bars of "Slow promotion and poor pay" as he entered the door.

Captain Riley Grad, the Troop Commander, rose from his desk where he was getting in a few licks at earning his Administrative pay. The Major extended his hand, "Glad to see you Captain Grad, how're things?"

"Fine," said the Captain, "except—"

"Except what, my boy," said the Major in his best instructor tones, always ready and willing to give him the approved solution but at the same time noting the quick shadow that crossed Grad's face.

"Except that you arrived at a bad time."

"Why?"

"Well, Major," admitted Captain Grad," our Training Schedule again calls for a full hour and half's period on this new dismounted drill and we are not doing so well with it, but come on over to the drill floor, the troop is about to "Fall in."

The two officers proceeded to the dismounted drill floor, large, spacious and well lighted. This unit had no Riding Hall and it was cold outside with deep snow covering the ground. Outdoor drill was out of the question. As they arrived on the drill floor, 1st Sergeant Old Timer sounded off with "Fall in," then in a cautionary tone, "New Dismounted Drill Formation."

*With apologies to "What Would You Do?"



At the second command all motion seemed to cease. The N.C.O.'s looked helplessly at the 1st Sergeant and then at each other. The privates huddled in small groups waiting for the Corporals to make up their minds whether to take position in the center of their squads or on the right flank, or some other place. The room was stilled by the absolute lack of motion. One might have thought that the 1st Sergeant had issued a call for voluntary fatigue.

This was more than Captain Grad could stand, especially with an Instructor at his elbow. Muttering an apologetic "They get mixed up between mounted and dismounted drill," he darted off to set the initial formation aright.

With the number of men present, 55 out of a maximum authorized strength of 65, Captain Grad was able, after much personal shoving into place, to form two Rifle Platoons of two Squads each and one Light Machine Gun Platoon of two squads. The Sergeants, apparently having no specified place to go, took position in the file closers. The roll was called and the Troop then formally turned over to the Captain who called 1st Lieutenant Sub Altern and to him issued the following instructions:

"Lt. Altern, while I confer with Major Structor, take charge of the Troop. Have the 12 recruits fall out and receive instruction in Mounted Drill, dismounted, and in the new Dismounted Drill under Sergeant Drill Book. The balance of the Troop will be reformed by you and will receive instruction in the New Dismounted Drill."

The first part of this order sounded a bit cock-eyed but nevertheless Captain Grad meant what he said for it was the only way to give recruits instruction in Mounted Drill during inclement weather.

At the conclusion of the order, Lieutenant Altern faltered a weak "Yes, sir," gave his Troop Commander the look of a faithful but unwilling dog, turned sadly about, narrowly tripping over his new spurs and thought plenty. The Captain returned the Lieutenant's look with one of sympathetic understanding before turning to Major Structor.

"You saw the Troop 'Fall in.' They have been trying it for nearly three months but what with the mounted formation entirely different from the dismounted, they get somewhat confused—and so do I," he owned up.

The Major, who had seen some of this same sort of thing in his other units was not astounded. He was not even surprised, but he countered with:

"Why the Regular army cavalry at Fort Spitenpolish thinks the new drill is swell, so easy—so simple."

This was apparently the wrong thing to say and it was just the opening for which Captain Grad was waiting. He opened up in a very well disciplined and respectful voice, having apparently given much thought to the subject and had practiced his speech for just this occasion.

But listen for yourself and see what *you* think:

"The new Infantry Drill Regulations now prescribed by FM 22-5 for Cavalry Dismounted Drill differ from the

present mounted drill for Cavalry (and the former dismounted drill) in practically every respect, namely, formations, movements, position of leaders and composition of units. Because of this fact, every cavalry troop in the National Guard is required to learn, and perfect, a dismounted drill which is not only completely new in every respect but differs very materially from the present prescribed mounted drill.

"The problems presented to the National Guard cavalry in learning and perfecting this new drill are many, all of which tend to increase the present training difficulties of the largest active cavalry component of the Army by complicating the training to such an extent that drill perfection is seriously affected.

"Three months observation and trial, plus a thorough study have convinced me that the principal difficulties encountered are first, lack of time.

"As you know, our drill periods are of one and one half hour's duration once each week. Many of these periods are consumed in formal inspections, preparations for camp, preliminary target instruction and other more or less mandatory formations. This amount of time is not now adequate for the proper and complete training of a unit to the standard of perfection demanded. Much of our training, such as Target practice, Combat Firing, marches, etc. is done on week-ends outside of drill hours. To add a new drill imposes an additional element which tends further to decrease the ability to produce well trained cavalry soldiers.

"Now take the business of enlisted turnover. We can conservatively place this at 33⅓% per year. This means that recruits are constantly under instruction and must necessarily be taught two drills, the mounted drill and the entirely new and different dismounted drill.

"Many National Guard cavalry organizations, like this one, have no riding halls, hence no facilities exist for mounted instruction during the winter months and inclement weather, such as tonight. Because of this fact, the mechanics of mounted drill must be taught dismounted. You heard me tell Lieutenant Altern to see that the recruits got some mounted drill, dismounted. That sounded a bit haywire, but that is the way we have to do it here, as you know. Now then, if we further add another dismounted drill, which bears no relation to the mounted drill that they have been learning dismounted, it is enough to confuse even the trained soldier, let alone the new and bewildered recruit. (It does sound a bit screwy, doesn't it?)

"You fellows in the regular army have good big troops. Our National Guard troop is limited to 65 men. When the cooks, kitchen police, stable crew, sick, special details, etc. are taken away, the troop turns out with no more than 45 men. The troop then has to form two very small Rifle Platoons and one small Light Machine Gun Platoon. According to the new IDR, the squads in each platoon form in line behind each other at 40 inches with the platoons in line. When marched in column by the command 'Right face, forward march,' the troop will form Column of Twos and never will they form Column of Threes, as contemplated (or Fours as prescribed for mounted drill). This further complicates ceremonies, dismounted action, fight on foot, etc.

"Please don't think that what I am saying is in any way intended as adverse criticism of the new IDR, for I believe it to be a great improvement on the old Infantry drill. It is much more simple, the formations and movements are fewer and therefore it tends to accelerate training for Infantry and other dismounted arms. But for Cavalry, which it peculiarly affects, and particularly National Guard cavalry, which is handicapped by all the things I have mentioned, I do not consider it practical. I might add that this is the consensus of opinion of all the officers of this regiment from the Colonel down.

"One of these days, 'M-day' will come along. Then large numbers of new cavalrymen (and horses) must be trained. This complication of drills will tend to increase the necessary period of training.

"For cavalry of the regular army, much that I have said does not hold good, particularly the time element. Regular cavalry can spend eight hours a day and 365 days a year, if necessary, in the perfection of its drills. Neither does regular cavalry have the additional handicaps of enlisted turnover and lack of facilities. However, as I see it, no training document should be written for one particular component of the army, but should be intended for the largest part which are the civilian components. I believe that that was the intention of this drill, and it works for Infantry, but not for us.

"Now my contention is, that if the new IDR is considered to be the best for Infantry and for dismounted cavalry, due to the simplicity of formations and movements, then why should not the same thing hold good for our mounted drill? In other words, then, if this be true, why shouldn't the mounted drill manual be rewritten, and it seems entirely feasible, to conform as closely as possible to the dismounted drill as now prescribed? If this be done, it would provide the desired uniformity and simplicity, would save time on mobilization and tend to reduce the handicaps of the civilian components. What do you think, Major Structor?"

Major Structor did a bit of thinking. The answer to this one was certainly not in the voluminous mass of Regulations, Circulars, Bulletins and what not that he received almost daily from Corps Area Headquarters. Captain Grad had presented his subject so clearly and logically in his earnest desire to cope with the situation that a spirited defense would be mighty tough for even a Riley Tactics instructor. Here, obviously, was a matter that should be brought to somebody's attention for Captain Grad's argument seemed to be indisputable, but worst of all it demanded some red-hot advice immediately. What to say? What to do?

Well, what would you say and what would you do?

(NOTE: Confucius said (and this is a real one, not a phoney): "Life is really simple, but men insist on making it complicated.")

Major General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr.

The 22d Cavalry Division

By Major General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr.

The 22d Cavalry Division, comprising National Guard Cavalry units of the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky, comes into being during a period of crisis in world affairs, and at a time when no one may with accuracy predict the course of international events, nor the rôle which America and American arms may be destined to play.

After several years of preliminary discussions, during which the question of completing the organization of the four Cavalry Divisions of the National Guard was thoroughly aired, in which discussions the Adjutants General Association and the National Guard Association took an active, effective part, all obstacles were finally overcome, the all-clear signal was given and the 22d Cavalry Division was granted Federal recognition as of January 3, 1940.

The Cavalry Brigades of the Division are the 52d (Pennsylvania), and the 54th (Ohio-Kentucky). The 52d includes the 103d and the 104th Cavalry regiments, the 54th the 107th (Ohio) and the 123d (Kentucky).

The 166th Field Artillery (less 1st Battalion) (Pennsyl-

Military History of
Major General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr.

Appointed second lieutenant, O.R.C., December, 1916. Active duty, First Officers' Training Camp, Madison Barracks, May 8, 1917. Assigned to 28th Division, Camp Hancock, Georgia, September 6, 1917. Division bayonet instructor during period of training of the division. Overseas in command of Company M, 110th Infantry from May to November, 1918. Engagements: Champagne-Marne; Aisne-Marne, Oise-Aisne. Wounded in action August 2 (enemy airplane bomb); August 26 (enemy hand grenade); September 5, 1918 (machine gun bullets). In hospital, France and United States, September 5, 1918 to January, 1921. D.S.C. and Purple Heart. Appointed colonel, 8th Infantry, P.N.G., October 16, 1919; colonel, 104th Cavalry, June 21, 1921; brigadier general, 52d Cavalry Brigade, March 23, 1933; major general, 22d Cavalry Division, February 23, 1940. Private pilot since 1933.

vania) a motorized organization equipped with the 75-mm. gun, was created in the spring of 1939 by a reorganization of the 52d Cavalry Brigade, involving the necessary conversions to artillery, which reduced the regiments of the 52d Cavalry Brigade from three squadrons of three troops to three squadrons of two troops each. The two brigades are now uniform in organization and strength.

During the summer of 1939, by agreement between the Adjutants General of the three states concerned, the allocation of the special units and the division staff officers was completed. As organized, the Division Staff is now made up as follows:

Commanding General:	Major General E. J. Stackpole, Jr. (Pa.)
Chief of Staff:	Colonel B. C. Jones (Pa.)
A. C. of S., G-1:	Captain Wilbar Halbert (Pa.)
A. C. of S., G-2:	Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Richmond (Ohio)
A. C. of S., G-3:	To be assigned (Pa.)
A. C. of S., -G4:	Major Thomas E. Bates (Ky.)
Adjutant General:	Major William B. Higgins (Ohio)
Asst. G-3:	Major George E. Nelson (Ky.)
Inspector General:	Major Robert C. Graham (Ky.)
Quartermaster:	Major Robert S. Cowan (Pa.)
Ordnance Officer:	Captain Gaylord S. Gilbert (Ky.)
Judge Advocate:	Lieutenant Colonel Maurice J. Meyer (Ohio)
Surgeon:	Major Edgar S. Everhart (Pa.)
Signal Officer:	To be assigned (Pa.)
Engineer Officer:	Inactive (Ky.)
Artillery Officer:	Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Stackpole (Pa.)
Aides:	First Lieutenant Robert S. LeRoy (Pa.)
	Second Lieutenant Henry P. Borie (Pa.)

As the successive steps were taken during 1939 and to date in 1940, like a large scale jigsaw puzzle the various pieces fell into place and the Division has at last assumed a recognizable aspect, even though it still has a long arduous task ahead of it before it can hope to take its place in the ranks of the National Guard Divisions as a potentially efficient M-Day battle division.

All component parts of the Division that have been authorized have been or will have been organized by March 31, through conversions or as completely new organizations. These active divisional units include the following:

Division Headquarters Troop (Pa.)
Division Headquarters Detachment (Pa.)
22d Signal Troop (Pa.)
22d Reconnaissance Squadron (Ohio)
122d Quartermaster Squadron (Less Troop A) (Pa.)
Troop A, 122d Quartermaster Squadron (Ky.)
122d Medical Squadron (Less Troop A) (Pa.)
Troop A, 122d Medical Squadron (Ohio)

The inactive units, still to be organized, include:

1st Bn., 166th Field Artillery (Pa.)
Ordnance Company (Ohio)
Tank Company (Ohio)
126th Engineer Squadron (Ky.)

Crossing state, Corps Area, and Army lines as it does, it is expected that there will be a certain amount of lost motion and lack of cohesion, from a training standpoint, but the attitude of harmony and close coöperation that has been evidenced between the Adjutants General of the three states concerned and the higher commanders of the Cavalry units is an indication that such difficulties as may arise will be intelligently dealt with.

It had been hoped that the Division as such might be christened during the 1940 field training period by engaging in the scheduled maneuvers in one of the Army areas, but the War Department has planned otherwise and the Division will probably be split into two parts, with the Pennsylvania elements training with the First Army, and the Ohio-Kentucky elements with the Second Army.

The initial assembly of the 22d Cavalry Division staff took place at Fort Bliss, Texas, where the Division Commander, the General Staff, and four members of the Special Staff spent the period March 10-12 in a brief period of field training with the First Cavalry Division.

General Sir Edmund Ironside As a Prophet

By LIEUTENANT HARVEY S. FORD, *F.A.-Res.*

General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and first soldier of Great Britain, has a brilliant record of more than forty years' service, stretching from South Africa to North Russia. Fifteen years ago he published *Tannenberg*, an extremely able account of that famous campaign which is now largely forgotten except by military historians. This is rather surprising, for in one section near the end of the book—entitled "The Course of Future Wars"—Sir Edmund gives what is probably the only generally available account of his views on the conduct of war, together with some interesting prophecies as to the future. Considering Sir Edmund's present high position, these opinions are certainly worth notice. Below are some pertinent quotations:

> "No nation will risk again going to war without preparing for a long one, but that is by no means to say that future campaigns will be long ones. In fact, with the terrible results of a long war upon both conquerors and conquered alike before them, we may be sure that a nation contemplating war will strain every nerve to insure success in as short a time as possible."

Sir Edmund's ideas on the utilization of the air arm are also of importance. "The object of each side will be to place all its Air Forces on a war footing as quickly as

possible," he wrote, "and to deal its enemy a great blow before he is ready." Sir Edmund also believed that "in cases where there is racial hatred, it is conceivable that the indiscriminate killing of people in industrial areas, such as must occur in air bombing," would take place.

Tannenberg was of course written before the Maginot Line was constructed, but there was a great deal of discussion about the proposed defensive position. Sir Edmund's comment on the suggestion is as follows:

> "One French writer has recommended the commencement of the framework of a defensive line along the whole North-East Front of France. . . . But, quite outside the question of expense, no such linear defense can be effective in reality. It is liable to be broken at any moment by a modern offensive, which has so gained in power through the advent of tanks."

Sir Edmund shared the current skepticism with regard to the use of poison gas, and wrote:

> "The employment of noxious gases has been limited by International Agreement; but apart from the fact that all nations are not parties to the Agreement, it cannot be assumed that nations will not adopt every conceivable measure to maintain their national existence."

To conclude, Sir Edmund predicted that a great blow would be struck at the very beginning of the war, and that, "weighing all these considerations, the chance for success of the nature described appears to be, however, greater than before, and there can be no doubt that nations going to war will attempt to carry them out."

It is not necessary to point out that many of Sir Edmund's predictions have not been born out by the conduct of the present war in France. No great blow was struck at the outset, no battles have been fought, no mass air raids have been directed against cities, and gas has not been used. But Sir Edmund can at least plead that these words were written fifteen years ago, and he stands in a much better light than the news writers and commentators —the so-called "experts" who infest the air waves and the daily papers—who have been steadily prophesying that Paris and London would dissolve into flaming ruins, and that civilization would collapse. It is apparent that both the "experts" and Sir Edmund—though to a lesser extent —failed to take sufficiently into consideration the fact that political factors might seriously influence the conduct of a war. Secondly, they ignored the age-old principle of retaliation: if A bombs the cities of B, then B will bomb the cities of A, an undesirable situation for both parties. Such tactics can only occur where one side is much weaker than the other, or where one side has been driven to desperation by continuous defeat. Where the contending nations are approximately equal in strength it is not likely that the idea of "unrestricted" war will be observed except in theory.

But if Sir Edmund's predictions have not as yet come to pass, *Tannenberg* also contains some general conclusions with which it is difficult to take exception.

> "The campaign of Tannenberg is of peculiar interest to the British Army, because it shows what a small well-trained force can achieve against numbers. Success does not lie in weight of numbers, but in the skilful employment in combination of all available arms. In the next war, success will go to that army which possesses the best mechanical and destructive weapons, such as motor vehicles, aircraft, artillery, and tanks, and which can make the best use of them, thereby economising its manpower.
>
> All the factors for success lie within the reach of the British Army. . . . The more technical become the weapons of war, the more does the scale turn in our favor. We can make our men experts in the handling and employment of their weapons, whereas the short-service conscript will become merely a moderate adept.
>
> The great essential in a modern army is Education. It is the educated mind, contrary to the expectation of many, which adapts itself best to the strain of war. The Russians were largely uneducated, and at a great disadvantage to their opponents, the Germans, and their capacity for fighting was lower in consequence."

And, speaking of the Russians, it will be remembered that Sir Edmund commanded the Allied troops in North Russia after the World War, and thus knows that nation both from personal experience and as a historian. His summary of the World War Russian Army is to the point—"The Russians had been taught to depend on weight of numbers, and were surprised by the effect of modern weapons." May it not logically be asked if this comment is not equally applicable to the present war in Finland?

It is to be hoped that Sir Edmund will see fit to write another book at the conclusion of the present war. It may then be ascertained to what extent, if at all, his ideas have altered since 1925.

What Happened to Custer?

Few features of American lore hold more romance or speculation than does the subject of Custer at the Little Big Horn. New material of an intensely interesting nature has recently been released through the comments of Dr. Charles Kuhlman (see Book Reviews). This material may be secured through the Cavalry Association or directly through Dr. Charles Kuhlman, R. D. No. 2, Billings, Montana. Price $1.00.

General Hawkins' Notes

Conclusions Drawn from First Army Maneuvers

In The Cavalry Journal for November-December, 1939, appears an interesting article on the subject of the operation of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in the First Army Maneuvers near Plattsburg, New York. The author of the article is my old friend General Adna Chaffee, the Brigade Commander. General Chaffee conducted the operations of the 7th Brigade with conspicuous ability. But at the end of his article he draws some "Conclusions" which seem curious to me and with some of which I cannot agree. I have numbered his conclusions in the order in which they are stated by separate paragraphs.

1st. I agree that supporting troops should be familiar with the tactics and technique of mechanized cavalry in order to coöperate with it. But this is true as between all arms of the service. I do not agree that mechanized cavalry is such a highly technical weapon that it requires a more experienced or well trained personnel than is the case with horse cavalry. For one thing, all the recruits assigned to mechanized cavalry are familiar with the operation of a motor vehicle. Every boy eighteen years old in the United States can drive a motor car quite expertly. The same is not true as to riding and caring for horses. The horse cavalry recruit has as much to learn about the small unit tactics involved in fighting both mounted and dismounted as the mechanized cavalry recruit has to learn about fighting in an armored vehicle. Perhaps more. Both forms of cavalry have to train machine gunners. The mechanized maintenance of the armed vehicles is perhaps more technical than the care of horses. But perhaps not.

2nd. I agree, in general, that under proper conditions mechanized cavalry can be a powerful striking force, and that it can operate over country that is difficult for *it*, but not over country that is difficult for horse cavalry.

3rd. I agree that it is a mistake to divide the mechanized cavalry regiment, because it is the combat unit. But it will sometimes have to be done, and this principle is not peculiar to mechanized cavalry alone.

4th. I agree, of course, that mechanized cavalry should be assigned to suitable missions. But the statement that its successes or failures are capable of affecting the operation of the entire Army is somewhat grandiose in its implications. One could find historical incidents where the action of a very small unit of infantry or cavalry could be traced through its effects to influence the action of an army.

5th. This paragraph calls attention to the need for reconnaissance, both ground and air, to precede mechanized cavalry. Also that it needs security detachments. The same holds true for horse cavalry.

6th. I agree that mechanized cavalry must leave roads and move across country when within range of hostile artillery. There is nothing different in this as applied to horse cavalry except that the latter can do it better.

7th. I agree wholly with this paragraph which states that mechanized cavalry should not be assigned to hold sectors during darkness.

8th. This paragraph states that mechanized cavalry gains surprise by secret marches at night without lights, by feints and by rapid movement. Nothing different in this from the action of horse cavalry.

9th. I agree that mechanized cavalry has an adverse effect on the morale of troops not equipped with firearms to resist attack by armored vehicles. Such seems to have been the case in Poland and in the First Army Maneuvers.

10th. The statement that regiments, divisions, corps and armies must have adequate antitank units is absolutely true, as long as the enemy uses mechanized troops.

11th. This paragraph states that, in the First Army Maneuvers, the Black Army was forced to use its organic artillery to repel tank attacks and therefore that this artillery support was lost to the infantry battalions during this attack. This situation will always be true when an army is not properly equipped. But when it *is* properly equipped, there is nothing to show that mechanized troops will be at all effective. Note the difference between the campaign in Poland and the campaign in Finland as to tanks.

12th. This paragraph is important. It states that when infantry or cavalry uses its antitank units in a cordon defense against possible attacks by hostile mechanization it loses its mobility and is in danger of becoming defensive minded. There is no doubt of the truth of this statement. But there is no reason whatever for making such a foolish mistake. Antitank units should be kept in reserve close enough and ready to move when needed. Infantry divisions should have divisional cavalry (horse) for various purposes. One of these purposes is for security. Divisional horse cavalry can guard the flanks and rear, and while delaying the attacks of hostile mechanization it can notify and guide the antitank units to where they are needed to repel such attacks. There is no need whatever for any unit to surround itself with antitank guns and thus become like a porcupine with its quills all out and its legs folded underneath in an attitude of immobility.

13th. This paragraph states that infantry tank units do not possess the auxiliary means of reconnaissance and support to successfully oppose a strong force of mechanized cavalry. But, why should not infantry tank units have

scout cars and other means of guarding against surprise attacks?

14th. This states that reconnaissance from *unarmored* vehicles is of doubtful value and liable to result in costly losses of men and vehicles. But this is a matter of opinion. Armed vehicles, although unarmored, have certain advantages over the heavy half-armored vehicles such as armored cars if used for security alone. Aggressive reconnaissance is not needed by infantry tank units which remain closely tied to large infantry units.

15th. This states in effect that road-blocks should be strongly defended. And also that mobile antitank units should be centrally located and ready to move to previously reconnoitered positions. We have no fault to find with this if it applies to a force halted in a defensive attitude. When moving, these requirements cannot always be carried out.

16th. This is a statement of opinion that the best defense against a *powerful* mechanized cavalry is a similar mechanized unit. Here, we can not agree at all. The best defense in my opinion, is a *powerful* and properly equipped horse cavalry as well as mobile antitank units assigned to infantry divisions.

The number of antitank units in an army depends upon the number of mechanized troops the enemy may possess and other indications of his reliance upon this arm. A powerful cavalry equipped with mobile antitank units should be able to care for itself against light mechanized elements. And this horse cavalry should be free to perform its many missions if the infantry divisions are supported with antitank units so as to permit the cavalry to separate itself from the masses of infantry in order to perform these missions. But, as said before, every infantry division should have a strong reinforced squadron of divisional horse cavalry, not only to protect it against surprise by enemy mechanized or other forces, but also for many duties not discussed in this paper.

17th. This paragraph states that both horse cavalry and motorized infantry are suitable to support mechanized cavalry under different circumstances. It states further that horse cavalry can move more rapidly when the distance is short and motorized infantry when the distance is long.

This is true enough, but there is an implication here that I cannot agree with. Motorized infantry operating for long distances with mechanized cavalry and therefore unsupported by other troops, is sometimes in considerable danger, depending upon the situation. If attacked by superior forces of the enemy, mechanized cavalry cannot give the support to the motorized infantry that it needs under such circumstances. The motorized infantry would probably have to fight a delaying action and then fall back towards the main body. To fight, the infantry must detruck. To fall back and escape, it must have time to entruck again. This time could be gained by using horse cavalry to fight delaying actions against the pursuing enemy. But mechanized cavalry could not gain this time so well. If the combined mechanized cavalry and motorized infantry have fought an action and been defeated, the enemy will probably press hard with mobile forces. The mechanized cavalry will be in no shape to stand between the retreating infantry and the enemy. The infantry will have little time to entruck and straighten out its column on the road leading in the right direction. The supply column of the mechanized cavalry will also wish to use the road. Confusion could easily occur. The infantry may be overtaken. The mechanized cavalry whose combat cars are probably crippled from the results of the unsuccessful action will have all it can do to save itself. Only horse cavalry is capable of handling such a situation without complete self sacrifice.

In the first place, during the advance of the motorized infantry for a long distance beyond support of larger forces it needs horse cavalry to cover its front and explore the areas where ambushes might be laid. Mechanized cavalry cannot do this so well.

In other words, motorized infantry *moving beyond the support of its main forces* should have strong forces of horse cavalry with it unless it is certain that it will not meet superior forces of the enemy. If the horse cavalry is supported by mechanized cavalry, so much the better.

18th. The last paragraph of the "Conclusions" is one with which I cannot agree in any measure. In effect, it states that the overwhelming victories which conquered Poland in two weeks were due principally to the influence of the German mechanized divisions, and therefore that the lessons as announced by mechanized enthusiasts as having been brought out in the First Army Maneuvers and other maneuvers have since been confirmed by war.

The statement is too broad. Obviously it has reference only to the Polish campaign, and that erroneously as I shall attempt to explain. It certainly could not have referred to the Spanish campaign or to the present war on the Western Front, or to the war between Russia and Finland, which, if they indicate anything as yet, would confirm views quite contrary to those of persons who claim so much for mechanization.

The First Army Maneuvers was a "set-up" for the mechanized cavalry. This force was opposed by divisions of infantry that had no weapons to oppose the tanks of the mechanized cavalry except their organic artillery. This inadequately equipped infantry was therefore helpless in the face of this mechanization. At least it was deemed helpless although the effect of their rifle and machine gun fire might have been more important than is generally supposed. No wonder, therefore, that these infantry divisions resorted to "piecemeal demolitions, road blocks and dispersal of antitank means" of defense. False lessons and false conclusions are very liable to be drawn in favor of mechanization after such a demonstration.

The campaign in Poland was similar to the First Army Maneuvers in regard to mechanization. The Poles, infantry and cavalry, were inadequately armed to deal with the Panzer Divisions. But nevertheless, according to the Germans themselves, it was the overwhelming force of marching German infantry in a huge double envelopment

that was so effective. The Panzer Divisions helped, but they advanced no faster than a strong cavalry could have done and rendered no more important service. The Polish cavalry, only twenty thousand strong and without organic artillery, scattered in small brigades and regiments across the entire front, could do nothing; especially as their armament was wholly and completely improper for modern war. Had the Polish cavalry been as strong as the Panzer Divisions and properly equipped and organized into divisions with their own organic artillery and antitank units, they could certainly have checked the German mechanization. But the Polish infantry was so inadequately armed and so overwhelmed by superior force that it could not have profited by such intervention of its cavalry even had it been made. The Polish campaign, therefore, proved nothing as to the value of any arm of the service in a campaign against a properly equipped army. It was the combination of all arms with perfect coördination and great superiority in numbers and equipment that proved so successful.

Mechanized troops acting independently will, in my opinion, never have the success that will come when they are combined with cavalry. They should not be given the rôles of small cavalry units. Their great opportunity comes when they form part of large cavalry commands.

The detailed reports of the Polish Campaign that are coming in now, from time to time, support these views with convincing evidence.

Strategic Map of the United States

The first completed editions of the Strategic Map, which is being prepared by the Chief of Engineers, were used during the Fourth Army Command Post Exercises last summer. As the Command Post Exercise afforded the initial service test of this map, the Commanding General, Fourth Army, was requested by the Adjutant General to submit a report on the suitability of this map for strategic planning purposes and recommendations for its improvement together with such comments as he desired. The following report, dated December 16, 1939, was submitted by the Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"1. Comments on the suitability of this map have been received from Corps Commanders, the Deputy Chief Umpire, and the 4th Army Staff, participants in the recent 4th Army CPX.

"2. It is the consensus of opinion that this map is entirely suitable for strategic planning purposes and needs no change. All essential data for planning purposes have been included, yet the map is uncrowded.

"3. The map is of convenient size and scale and the system of showing elevations by means of hachures and printed critical elevations is ideal for strategic purposes. It is an exceptionally fine job of cartography.

"4. The findings are concurred in."

The compilation and drafting of this map, which is being performed by W.P.A. personnel in Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, will be completed by June 30, 1940. Due to the extensive and immediate demand for this map for the various intensive training activities of the Army, proof editions are being prepared as rapidly as possible. It is not expected that final editions will be completed before the end of this calendar year. As proof editions require generally only minor corrections, principally in registration, they should prove satisfactory for use until final editions can be furnished.

Deadline

The deadline for The CAVALRY JOURNAL is the 10th of the month preceding publication. The deadline for the May-June issue is May 10, 1940. Material received subsequent to that date cannot be considered for appearance in that issue.

Maneuvers

It appears to be evident that a considerable space in The CAVALRY JOURNAL is devoted to comments and reports on maneuvers which are conducted periodically throughout the country. Manifestly, articles dealing with the abstract subject of the operations and purposes of maneuvers make rather dry reading. On the other hand, it is not believed that the average reader of a service journal seeks, always, material of a lighter vein, but may well be interested in the results and military lessons derived from maneuvers. Unless conclusions and lessons are disseminated, it is possible that the benefits of maneuvers might be restricted to those actually participating in them.

Maneuvers actually are expensive, particularly if conducted on any appreciable scale. It seems, therefore, pertinent that the established lessons and benefits accruing therefrom should have as wide a dissemination as may be possible. In the past, much space has been utilized in reporting all maneuvers and exercises in which large elements of cavalry were involved. These have included many of the army maneuvers, as well as those which have taken place at Fort Riley. In this issue there appear several pages given to the participation of cavalry in a Joint Army-Navy Exercise. It is to be hoped that these comments emphasize the importance and usefulness of cavalry in opposing a hostile landing operation.

There lie before us the most significant maneuvers of combined arms which have occurred in this country during the past two decades. These maneuvers are considered of such importance to the Cavalry Arm that there appears in this issue, also, a rather comprehensive dissertation on the military units involved, the general strategical and tactical plan, and the preconceived rôle which the cavalry may assume.

As has been stated, maneuvers are expensive and, accordingly, the utmost preparation and detailed study should preface their final execution. It is not believed that any maneuvers held in this country have been preceded by more careful and painstaking preliminary measures than those which will materialize during the months of April and May.

In accordance with past policy, it is trusted that we will be able to present comprehensive and constructive reports on these maneuvers devoted to features which are of particular interest to cavalrymen.

Roads in War

The freedom and availability of road nets immediately adjacent to modern battle positions are matters of speculation. Many are prone to consider these road nets as available for the free movement of troops and supplies well up to front lines. In the face of modern attack aviation and long range artillery, it is not believed that this conception holds water. Any peace time exercises in which roads are so utilized fail to appreciate this modern axiom. The last six to ten miles of that terrain in rear of front lines will be negotiated only by slow and painful cross country movement.

Cavalry Attack and Supporting Fire

During the past several months there has been much discussion on the subject of attacks by cavalry. Obviously, it is a subject of prime interest and concern. It is necessary, however, when considering cavalry attack, to visualize the essential factor involved in supporting fires. Umpire arrangements in maneuvers do not always provide a note of reality in this respect.

Supplementary to this subject there might be an appropriate note sounded in this regard. In larger cavalry elements the question of supporting fires, particularly that of artillery, is always considered. In smaller units such as the regiment or less, would it not be wise to consider the "constructive" presence of supporting artillery? In campaign the isolated regiment of cavalry undoubtedly would be reinforced by a battery of artillery. Habitual consideration of its "constructive" presence would accustom commanders and staffs to its proper and important employment.

On occasion, regimental commanders, even without artillery at hand, have been noted to forget the necessity of establishing first of all and maintaining throughout an action, the supporting fires available for this disposition. Although it is necessary, ordinarily, to hold out something in reserve, the question arises as to when supporting weapons should be included in that reserve. Cavalry in attack requires the support of every available weapon, and it might be presumed that any weapon held in reserve is not playing its primary rôle. For units of this size, should not reserves consist solely of rifle units?

Combat of today, in reality, is a combination of fire and movement. The death dealing implements of an enemy must be exceeded with the effect of implements of equal lethal capacity. American cavalry possesses in large measures the capacity to exert that pressure. Moreover, it has the advantage of facilities in the horse of moving this supporting fire rapidly from one advantageous point to another. In the face of devastating fire on the modern

battlefield it is not possible for infantry any more than cavalry to advance until the enemy fire has been neutralized. The modern American cavalry division is a formidable combat unit. It carries into battle 24—75-mm. guns; 12—37-mm. guns; 88—.50 caliber antitank guns; 28—60-mm. mortars; 384—.30 caliber machine guns; over 400 semiautomatic rifles; approximately 7,000—.45 caliber automatic pistols. As with the infantry, it can anticipate support from additional artillery and its own combat aviation.

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100% Organizations

There appear on this page the various organizations of the cavalry in the United States whose entire commissioned personnel are enrolled in the Cavalry Association. It is to be hoped that during periods of active training which will occur during the summer months other regiments may be included in this roster.

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Honor Roll

The following organizations occupy a place on the Cavalry Honor Roll by maintaining 100% membership in the Cavalry Association:

National Guard:

103d Cavalry
104th Cavalry
106th Cavalry (Michigan Component)
112th Cavalry
113th Cavalry
114th Cavalry

108th Cavalry (Georgia Component)

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 52d Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 57th Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division

Organized Reserves:

308th Cavalry (72% Membership, highest in that component).

Of the Regular Army commissioned personnel, 98% are members of the Cavalry Association.

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The United States Cavalry Association

Organized November 9, 1885

The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science, to promote the professional improvement of its members, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States.—Article III of the Constitution.

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Change of address: Prompt notification of change of address to the Editorial Office is requested.

Letters to the Editor

DEAR SIR:

Captain Bibb's article "Commercial Truck Portage" in your current issue spread a big sympathetic grin across my Irish mug. Didn't I spend three hours, unaided, one morning on the Monterey Peninsula putting a very small horse with a very large determination into what seemed to be a very small trailer. Just one month later that same horse followed me into trailers, trucks and railway cars and had it not been for vigilance of Pan-American Airway's ground crew I would have gotten him into the China Clipper during a visit to Treasure Island last summer.

Being a civilian I don't have to pull punches and I say that whenever a cavalryman thinks he can load and truck untrained horses with any degree of efficiency then it is time he turned in his spurs and campaign hat for a set of goggles and an overseas cap and went to Ft. Knox. Living in this motorized age we sometimes lose track of fundamentals and in this case it took some sensible old troop horses to bring the boys down to earth again.

I don't say that commercial truck hauling isn't feasible —it most certainly is and I am surprised it hasn't had more publicized thought. I feel that rail transportation is easier on the animals for long hauls but trucks are more mobile for compartively short jumps in inaccessible places.

If it is just a matter of getting a horse from one place to another then a block and tackle and almost any form of stock truck will do the job; if however the idea is to have a mobile unit which is efficient and in shape to march when you reach the destination it is another story.

The same principles cover loading and trucking that cover the making of soldiers, i.e.; experience and training. Horses must become accustomed to this variation just as you and I had to get used to the barber when we still had curls.

A bit of simple construction near the troop stables simulating in appearance and design a truck or trailer with a runway attached not too steep should do the job. Let the horses become accustomed to it and give them a few training periods in loading and unloading each month and very soon they will get the idea and loading from column of troopers will not be impossible.

At the start of this training a certain amount of persuasion will be necessary but it should be of the coaxing rather than the forcing type with plenty of patience. Too much block and tackle will get you a fight every time they see a runway and may result in a bad actor in the truck. Better to let a man stand on the truck with the lead rope and another rope around the horse's front legs with a couple of men behind to keep him moving forward. Sometimes it is necessary to pick up each front foot and place it on the runway letting the animal stand quietly for a few moments before exerting any further pressure on the ropes. The man with the lead ropes should of course avoid blocking up the entrance to the truck. This continual pressure from the front and the urging from behind, plus shoving, plus maybe a good broom handle at the right moment will overcome the animal's disinclination to go up the runway and into the truck. Feed a little grain after they are in the truck.

It gets a little easier each time and soon there is nothing to it and the result is that you can load and unload quickly and without excitement in almost any kind of vehicle. And believe me after a hard day or two in the saddle when patience and tempers are short a horse that is an easy loader is a great comfort.

One phase which the article did not discuss was the effect of a long truck ride on the animals' efficiency after the destination has been reached. Any ride of over four or five hours' duration seems to take something out of the animals. I have seen them come out of a railway car after a two day haul full of life, but after about four hours in a truck or trailer they appear to be dizzy and upset, they won't drink or eat.

So at the destination of a truck haul of any lengthy period of time animals should be "walked out" and then rested for a few hours before putting them to work.

There are certain precautions that can be taken to insure the most comfortable ride and save the animal's efficiency when the destination is reached.

The floor of the truck should be bedded down with straw to absorb the road shock—strips of fire hose cut to the width of the truck floor and nailed down are excellent for this purpose. Horses should be loaded close together to give them support from the sway and jars and this can be enhanced by placing removable 2″ x 4″s laterally across the truck slipping each bar into place after each animal has been loaded. They should be tied close enough to keep them from interfering with other animals and the tie ropes should be so arranged that they may be untied quickly and from the outside if necessary because these rigs sometimes tip over or smash up and then there is hell to pay. I have found the best trucking diet is a feed of grain about an hour and a half before loading but no hay. Unless the weather is hot animals should be blanketed to protect them from colds.

When trailers are hooked on in rear of trucks it is of vital importance that the hitch be inspected before loading and after the first few minutes hauling and then at frequent intervals during the haul. Only good equipment

should be used. Because when a trailer with a load of horses breaks loose it makes a fire in a battle ship gun turret seem mild.

My conclusions are that with proper training of animals and with a few small adjustments of equipment commercial truck portage is an excellent means of increasing mobility over a limited area. Without proper training and equipment the result can only be a mess.

What started out to be short note has turned into a near article and should you get any ideas about using any of it you are of course welcome, only don't use my name because I still like to do a little friendly drinking around Del Monte.

EXPERIENCE.

✓ ✓ ✓

DEAR SIR:

The formula, of Captain Paul D. Harkins 3rd Cavalry in the November-December issue, to determine the number of minutes required at the trot during any marching hour is an accurate one.

May I restate the formula and add another one with example and proof of the formulae.

1. To determine the amount of walk and trot in any marching period at any rate.

Formula: Minutes of trot = 12 × rate − 4/5 of marching period.

Example. Captain A, commanding the maneuvering force, has 40 minutes to reach his initial point over a distance of 4 miles. How many minutes must he trot?

Solution $12 \times 4 - 4/5 \times 40 = 16$ minutes

Reduced to $48 - 32 = 16$ minutes

2. To determine the amount of walk, trot, and gallop in any fixed marching period at any rate.

Formula: 15 × rate − twice the marching period = minutes of gallop.

4/5 of the remaining time = minutes of trot.

Example. Captain A, must make 6 miles in 40 minutes. How can he do it?

Solution $15 \times 6 - 2 \times 40 = 10$ minutes of gallop.

Reduced to $90 - 80 = 10$ minutes of gallop.

$4/5\ (40 - 10) = 20$ minutes of trot.

$40 - (10 + 20) = 10$ minutes of walk.

Proof of formulae:

Let x = minutes of trotting time in march period.
w = minutes of walking time in march period.
r = rate of march in miles per hour.
t = march period in minutes.

The walk = 4 miles per hour = $\frac{4 \times 5280}{60}$ = 352 feet per minute.

The trot = 9 miles per hour = $\frac{9 \times 5280}{60}$ = 792 feet per minute.

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} x + w = t \\ 792 + 352y = 5280r \end{array}\right\} \text{ Equation}$$

Solving for x:

$x = 12r - 8t$, the formula in 1.

Let z = minutes of galloping time in march period.
u = minutes of combined time at walk and trot.
P = average rate at combined walk and trot.
y = minutes of trotting time in march period.
w = minutes of walking time in march period.
t = march period of minutes.

The gallop = 12 miles per hour = $\frac{12 \times 5280}{60}$ = 1056 feet per minute.

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} u = t - z = w\,y \\ 1056z \quad Pu = 5280r \end{array}\right\} \text{ Equation}$$

Reduce to:

$$z = \frac{(5280r)}{(1056 - P)} - \frac{(Pt)}{(1056 - P)}$$

$$\frac{(4 \times 792) + 352}{5} = 704 = P$$

$$z = \frac{5280r}{1056 - 704} - \frac{704t}{1056 - 704} =$$

$15r - 2t$ = formula in 2.

These formulae depend for their practical accuracy only on the ability of the command to maintain the four mile walk, the nine mile trot, and the twelve mile gallop. Since determining the march periods necessary to cover a distance in a given time is a consideration of all cavalry leaders, it is believed to be worth the trouble of memorizing these formulae.

HUGH R. PARKS,
First Lieutenant 308th Cavalry Reserve.

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NOTES from the CHIEF of CAVALRY

What Would You Do?

"Don't say there ain't no justice," sighed Major Jack Spavin, the S-3, from the depths of an overstuffed chair in the mayor's office at Preparta Mount. "The rest of the division is holding down the flank and here we are in reserve, with the best CP we've had yet. Now if they'll just send the mechanized brigade over to this flank they can pull a nice counteroffensive and maybe we can stay here."

"No such luck, Spavin," opined Major Jeeman, the S-2. "Klutch, here, has already taken Colonel Rivers out on reconnaissance. Something's up."

"Now, Jeeman, you know the old man is always reconnoitering. Where did you go, Klutch?"

Lieutenant Klutch, of the Scout Car platoon put down his *Police Gazette*. "It was quite a trip," he said, "we investigated the possibilities of Weeks Ridge and Strong's Ridge. Weeks Ridge is pretty rough country and we got shot at to boot. Strong's Ridge has swell fields of fire and the old man remarked he could defend there all day. But I guess he's pretty tired of this defend and delay business we've been having. . . . Listen!" he interrupted himself, "The radio!"

Over in the corner of the room the communications personnel were piecing together the squawkings which Klutch seemed to consider intelligible. Soon, a decoded field message was borne triumphantly to Major Spavin.

ENEMY CAVALRY BRIGADE MOVING TOWARDS PREPARTA MOUNT NOW ABOUT 15 MILES NORTHEAST THEREOF. YOUR REGIMENT WILL COVER THE CONCENTRATION OF THE 8TH CAVALRY BRIGADE MECZ IN PREPARTA MOUNT TONIGHT AND FACILITATE THE INITIATION OF A COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO THE NORTHWEST BY THAT UNIT AT DAYLIGHT TOMORROW: SIGNED A, MAJ GEN. TIME RECEIVED 1:15 PM.

"Wow!" exclaimed Spavin as he intoned the message. "Am I a prophet? Lucky we're on the alert and ready to move. Where did you leave Colonel Rivers, Klutch?"

"He's in Willy Run investigating the G-4 layout as to why fighting a delaying action should delay the delivery of his tequila," replied the scout car officer as the S-3 dived for the phone. "And he's in a bad humor. We had a strong head wind driving here from Weeks Ridge and the old man couldn't spit out his Honest Scrap very well so he. . . ."

"Hello, Col. Rivers," shouted Spavin into the phone, "here's a rush radio."

"I recommend that we * * *," he added after reading the message. "The troops will be ready to move in 15 minutes. What shall we do?"

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

A SOLUTION

Colonel Rivers told his S-3, in strident tones, that the regiment would hold the enemy cavalry northeast of Weeks Ridge until daylight tomorrow, defending the single position with squadrons abreast.

The old gentleman was probably greatly influenced by his inability to obtain adequate ejection of his mouthful of Honest Scrap in the teeth of a strong southwest wind. He doubtless reflected that this same wind would waft the noise of assembling combat cars clear to Strong's Ridge and beyond, especially on the night air, thereby ruining the surprise and secrecy desired for the morrow's counteroffensive.

Strong's Ridge is of course a far superior position, taking Lieutenant Klutch's word for the character of the fields of fire, and considering the ease with which it could be tied in with the main position. But to defend on Strong's Ridge alone, or to occupy both Ridges simultaneously would risk disclosure of the concentration of the 8th Brigade, which is supposed to be secret, and which must so remain if the counteroffensive is "to be facilitated."

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
Right of Main Position
Held by Cav. Div. (–)
WEEKS
RIDGE
STRONGS RIDGE
Direction of
Mechanized
Counteroffensive
RIVERS
(in Reserve)
PREPARTA
MOUNT
WILLY
RUN
North
0
1
2
3

NOTES FROM THE CAVALRY BOARD

"The Cavalry Board invites any individual, whether or not a cavalryman, to submit for consideration constructive suggestions or ideas relating to new equipment, improvement of standard equipment, or to any problem or project under study by the Board. The Board will also welcome suggestions as to new problems that may properly be considered. Communications should be addressed to the President, Cavalry Board, Fort Riley, Kansas."

Modification of Horse Equipment: The board has started again on the perennial study of modification or improvement of the various articles of horse equipment. Particular items under immediate study are: Bridles, bits, open wooden stirrups, stirrup straps, horse covers, and use of the dismounted canteen cover by the mounted services. Suggestions or recommendations from officers and enlisted men to modify or improve any item of horse equipment will be welcomed by the board.

It might be of interest to all cavalrymen to know that recommendations for the adoption of a Pelham type bit have been considered at various times since, and starting with, the year 1895. There have been many advocates for such a bit in the cavalry service, but the results of former tests have not been favorable towards its adoption. The comment by the Chief of Cavalry, in 1922, after inspection of several regiments is typical: ". . . quite a number of horses were broken gaited, and were otherwise unsteady. The individual cases were noted, and . . . it was found that the Pelham bit was being used. . . . Horses were not steadily gaited; they were not well flexioned or collected; and it is believed that it was due to the Pelham bit."

Recent comments, however, have again brought up the subject of the Pelham bit, and in view of the change in type of horse now generally found in the service, if not improvement in horsemanship and horsemastership, further study of this matter is believed to be justified.

The possible improvement and simplification of the enlisted man's bridle as well as the added comfort to horse and rider in the field are obvious if a suitable type single bit can be found.

As to the open wooden stirrup, the following extract from a letter from the late Henry T. Allen, then Major Eighth Cavalry, to the Adjutant General, Department of Dakota, dated May 8, 1908, is quoted:

". . . I beg also to invite attention to our antiquated hood (tapidero) which is carried 365 days for probably five days' service. With the large stirrups that they cover, nearly as much space is required for them in packing as for the saddles. As the government furnishes excellent warm foot gearing, the tapidero is not required in winter. It would seem to be fully as advisable to cover the knees by a leather appliance belonging to the saddle as to protect the feet. Nothing about the saddle is so unsightly as the large stirrups with their tapideros. Stockmen and cowboys have almost entirely discarded this South American device and in no up to date army can it be found. . . ."

Truly, there is nothing new under the sun!

Machine Gun Mounts for Train Defense: The matter of machine gun mounts for train defense has been a deep concern for a number of years. Pedestal mounts to be secured to the truck, as well as airplane type of mounts by which the guns are operated through a hole cut in the roof of the cab over the space next to the driver's seat, have been devised and tested and discarded because each lacked certain essential characteristics or were impractical. With the improvements made in recent years in the ring type of mount with "skates," the idea of operating the machine gun through a hole in the cab top again seems to offer a good chance of being the solution of the problem. Test model mounts for both the caliber .30 and caliber .50 machine guns are expected in near future. If this method is adopted as standard, it will, of course, require that truck cabs come properly designed and equipped for this type of machine gun mount. Such development projects however take considerable time before the results are realized in the issue of new equipment. To take care of the thousands of trucks now in service (in case of an emergency), the board is also working on devising a suitable machine gun mount which can be constructed locally from salvaged or inexpensive materials.

Horseshoes: Emblazoned in large raised letters on the west wall of the main riding hall at Fort Riley is a quotation that might well have been extracted from a cavalryman's Bible, contributed by our old friend and philosopher, Benjamin Franklin:

"A LITTLE NEGLECT MAY CAUSE A GREAT MISCHIEF: FOR THE WANT OF A NAIL THE SHOE WAS LOST; FOR THE WANT OF A SHOE THE HORSE WAS LOST; FOR THE WANT OF A HORSE THE RIDER WAS LOST."

No matter how much an army travels on its stomach, and notwithstanding the possibility these days of cavalry making the long bounds on wheels, the cavalry horse still must depend on his feet for getting about. And the very condition which makes cavalry-on-wheels practicable is the arch enemy of horseshoes; viz., the modern automobile highway. To get a nonslip, long wearing, light weight practical shoe has been the cavalryman's dream for many years. Having tried almost every conceivable material and type of shoe only to discard one after another and finally fall back on the issue shoe, is the saga of the horseshoe to date. Or rather, until comparatively recently when the scintillating rays reflected from little dabs of borium on the G.I. shoe have given us a new light. Tests conducted at Fort Myer, Virginia, at the Cavalry School, which previously have been reported in the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and more recently, within the First Cavalry Division, seem to offer much promise. It is believed the cost of this

method of shoeing will be about the same as that of present type of shoeing, for, although the original cost of shoeing is about trebled, the shoe will last about three times as long and may be reset a number of times. By following proper technique in applying the borium, its long wearing and nonskid properties are excellent. Recent tests on draft horses and mules working on icy pavements at the Cavalry School have evoked high praise from drivers who claim it to be superior to caulked shoes while maintaining the advantages of the flat shoe. It is hoped this method of shoeing can now be subjected to a more general test throughout the cavalry and thereby determine what its practicability is under war conditions—the ultimate test of all new military ideas and articles of equipment.

Horseshoers' Tool Set: Of further interest to horseshoers will be the current survey of the horseshoers' tool set being conducted by the board with a view to making recommendations for its improvement. It is recognized that certain items are either of the wrong type or of poor quality, while others are excess baggage in the field. A similar study is being started with reference to the saddlers' tool set.

Marching Compasses: We are still on the trail of a practical military compass. Anyone who is familiar with the habits of the sun and stars and knows where the green moss likes to grow can orient himself about as accurately as he can by using the issue watch type of compass. Our objective now is to find a compass accurate enough for use with maps, night marching, orientation, etc., yet simple enough for the average individual to be able to read.

Revision of The Cavalry Field Manual: The Cavalry Board recently completed a revision of Cavalry Field Manual, Volume I, Horse Cavalry. The new pamphlet to the members of the faculty, the Cavalry School, who principal objects of the revision were, to make the manual conform with latest tables of organization, equipment, and weapons; to eliminate from it, matter that appears in basic field manuals; to correct errors or inconsistencies; and to present the subject matter particularly of the chapters on Scouting and Patrolling and the Combat Training of Small Units, in such a manner that it will be more suitable as a text for troop schools, the Cavalry School, and Army Extension Courses. The Cavalry Board is indebted to the members of the faculty, the Cavalry School who assisted in the preparation of the manual and to the commanding officers and officers of all horse cavalry units in the army for valuable comments as to methods of improving the old pamphlet.

The principal changes in Chapter 1, Mounted Drill, are:

a. References throughout the manual to dismounted drill have been eliminated and a statement included that dismounted drill for cavalry will be as prescribed in FM 22-5, Infantry Drill Regulations.

b. The formation dismounted when executing "dismount to fight on foot" has been changed so that the squad forms "column of troopers" to conform to FM 22-5.

c. The drill of the machine gun squad and of the caliber .50 machine gun squad for going into and out of action has been changed so as to make it similar to that which was previously prescribed in Chapter 5, Section VII and Section XIII.

d. The two methods of executing "route order" for machine gun elements have been changed. The drill provides that route order is the same for all units. The old movement to shorten the column has been retained but is called "march column."

e. Caliber .50 machine gun elements have been separated from caliber .30 (heavy) elements.

f. A drill for 60-mm. mortar units has been included.

g. All elementary and advance gun drill for supporting weapons and drill for the M1916 37-mm. gun have been eliminated.

h. Formations and movements of the scout car platoon have been changed to make the drill conform to the new 5 section organization.

i. Intermediate approach formations for the regiment have been included. These are included as suggestions and are called "maneuver formations." In general they conform to the formations devised by General Herr and published in the CAVALRY JOURNAL for May-June, 1936. The formations are given a short descriptive title rather than the designations "Formation A, B, and C."

The principal changes in the chapters on ceremonies include:

a. Dismounted ceremonies are as prescribed in FM 22-5, Infantry Drill Regulations.

b. The sections on ceremonies for the cavalry brigade and division have been amplified.

The chapter on Combat Training of Small Units has been rewritten to present a more comprehensive study of the tactical employment of small units.

Antitank Weapon: The Cavalry Board has recently received one of the new 37-mm. antitank guns for test. The object of the test is to determine a suitable means of transport and methods of employment by cavalry. A limited amount of practice ammunition has been received and firing tests will be begun in the near future.

81-mm. Mortar Pack: The Cavalry Board is investigating the practicability of transporting 81-mm. mortar ammunition in pack. Pack hangers which transport both smoke and high explosive shell on the Phillips Cavalry Pack Saddle are being fabricated by local ordnance personnel. The board recently developed hangers for transporting the 81-mm. mortar on the Phillips pack saddle.

Strip Film: Preparation of subject matter for a strip film on "Animal Management" for use in R.O.T.C. units is nearing completion. This film will consist of about sixty (60) "stills" to accompany and illustrate lectures or conferences which will cover most of the basic phases of the subject. They will include elementary anatomy, feeds and

feeding, conditioning, general care in the field and in garrison, diagnosis of common ailments, nursing of sick animals and emergency treatment of common injuries.

The following are also included in the projects under consideration or test: Mobilization Training Program for Enlisted Replacement Establishments; Small Bore Practice in Caliber .50 Machine Gun Training; Pull-type Single Shot Auto-fire Trigger Mechanism for Machine Gun, Caliber .50, M2, H.B.; Magazines for Automatic Pistol, Caliber .45, M1911; Light Barrel for Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M1919A4; Staff Cleaning M3, for 60-mm. Mortar; Development of New Vehicles for Cavalry; Equipment for Motorcyclists; Antigas Equipment for Horses; First Aid Kits, Aeronautic; Low Quarter Shoes; 1-ton, 2-wheel Cargo Trailer; Permeable Protective Clothing; Training Gas Mask Canisters; Tactical Practicability of Antigas Protection for Horses; Radio Needs for Cavalry.

Backstage Work for Cavalry

(Continued from page 154)

walk. The three-year-olds average about two periods per week under the saddle—their work, while slow, is not all confined to the walk. No attempt is made to turn out a "finished" horse, but merely to accustom the young animal to the weight of a rider and obedience to simple riding movements, personnel for further work is not available.

At most depots, overnight quarters are available for those officers that would like to visit a depot and see its horses, either from curiosity or with an eye to purchasing a mount. All officers are welcome at all times, and every help and courtesy of a depot is extended them on a visit, regardless of rank.

Advice to Young Officers

Look back ten years. Look ahead ten years.

IF YOU ARE GIVEN TIME—you'll cash in on your experience and training. You can't control time, but you can eliminate the hazard of not living long enough to collect your future earnings.

From June to January—Life Insurance is the only investment plan specifically designed to reach from youth to age—and to take care of all financial contingencies in between.

It is our* opinion that every young officer should immediately take advantage of the full $10,000 Government Insurance offered him, and also a minimum of at least one unit of Army Mutual Aid Association protection and service. There is no Insurance Company that can give you the benefits included in the Government Insurance and an honest insurance salesman will tell you so. Nor is there available to you anywhere else the service rendered by the Army Mutual Aid Association.

Again we want to urge that you start your insurance program as above outlined. Hold those two policies sacred and every time you have an increase in income, put a part of it in additional insurance from one of the many commercial companies.

Then your January will be all you now expect.

*President, United Service's Life Ins. Co.



SQUADRON "A." A HISTORY OF ITS FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1889-1939. 389 pages. $2.50.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Herbert H. Frost, 302d Cavalry

Compiled and published by a group of members and ex-members, this story of the first half century of Squadron "A" is a most interesting book. It is more than a record of events and a roll of membership. Starting as a group of civilian Hussars meeting in a riding academy, the founders decided to take a more serious interest in the military without losing any of the social aspects of the organization. Fortunately for them, they attracted the attention and interest of Charles F. Roe, ex-lieutenant of Cavalry, United States Army. Lieutenant Roe (later major general, New York National Guard) was a graduate of West Point with an enviable record of sixteen years in the Cavalry. He resigned from the service in order to look after personal affairs. His acceptance of the offer to become troop commander of the original troop was the decision which started the building of a military organization founded on the basis of a club for young gentlemen. Captain Roe must have had bad moments of regret and feelings of misgiving. His background was not one accustomed to the social equality which existed between officers and men; of election to the ranks rather than enlistment from the sidewalk and of commission by ballot.

The history of these early days proves the often quoted need for military leadership. Captain Roe established a standard of leadership which has been passed through the years and continues to this day. Had this not been so, the organization would never have been more than the "Gallopin Milishee" and would not have survived the many changes and re-organizations within the New York National Guard.

Military students will find a wealth of source record material in the chapters on the Manassas Maneuvers of 1904, the Massachusetts Maneuvers of 1909; the Connecticut Maneuvers of 1912; the Army Maneuvers 1939, and the record of strike duty in Buffalo, 1892; Brooklyn, 1895; Croton, 1900.

First contact with actual warfare came in 1898 when a troop of volunteers from the three troops of the Squadron became Volunteer Troop "A." This troop saw service in Puerto Rico and the recorded experiences give an insight into our National unpreparedness at the time. When the time approached for the troop to return to New York, Senator Platt sent the following to the adjutant general:

"Hon. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant General, U.S.A.,
"Washington.

"Please see that Troops A and C, New York Volunteer Cavalry about to embark on return voyage from Ponce are not overcrowded and are supplied with abundance of water.

"T. C. Platt."

His reply read:

"Adjutant General's Office,
"Washington, August 26

"Hon. T. C. Platt:

"Manhattan Beach Hotel, Long Island.

"Will give instructions that A and C Troops are not crowded on return voyage. Pray tell me when they took to water.

"H. C. Corbin, Adjutant General."

Had the entire Squadron gone to Cuba, as hoped for, one of the troop commanders might have been John J. Pershing, lieutenant of Cavalry, United States Army. General Pershing was stationed at West Point and wrote asking the Squadron Commander, Major Avery D. Andrews (later brigadier general U.S.A.) to consider him an applicant for a captaincy upon the occurrence of a vacancy.

The Mexican Border "incident" found the Squadron ready and eager to take the field. Many pages are filled with interesting narratives of the six months' service in Texas. Returning home, the members had hardly started to get accustomed to civil life again when the call for Plattsburg came. Over two hundred troopers went to Plattsburg and other camps to qualify as officers of the National Army. The Squadron furnished a total of over 750 officers for the World War. The war record of Squadron "A" "graduates" is not surpassed by any other comparable group.

This loss of personnel called for active enlistment in order to carry on. In October of 1917 the newly recruited squadron became the 105th Machine Gun Battalion, 27th Division. A Depot Squadron was immediately organized to keep the organization alive while the 105th Machine Gun Battalion was in France. This Depot Squadron became Squadron "A" in August, 1917, and in this way the life of the organization remained unbroken.

The combat record of the 105th Machine Gun Battalion fills many pages and leaves no doubt as to the devotion to duty of the officers and men under the most trying conditions of war.

Following the War, Squadron "A" passed through several changes of organization and designation, finally be-

coming 2d Squadron, 101st Cavalry, New York National Guard.

The book contains the Honor Roll and the names and date of enlistment of all who have served. The list includes the names of scores of men who have acquired fame and fortune in the financial, industrial, professional, and political fields.

No history of a Cavalry organization is complete without a history of some of the horses that live in the memory of every trooper. Unfortunately little is said about such great jumpers as *Oxford* and *Mimic* and no "action" pictures are included.

The layman will find an excellent treatise on the rôle of modern Cavalry written by the present Squadron Commander.

* * *

MANEUVER IN WAR. By Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Willoughby. Military Service Publishing Company. 285 pages. 181 maps, sketches, and illustrations. Price, $3.00.

This study of maneuver in war by Colonel Willoughby is the result of fifteen years study and research on the subject.

Starting with an able dissertation on the value of military history, the reader is led through the annals of military operations in a spritely and interesting fashion. As one campaign and one leader after another are analyzed there is a close application to the manner in which the principles of war were applied in each case. As a matter of fact, the entire scheme of maneuver in war is predicated upon the sound application of basic principles and a proper regard for the logistics of battle. The author's comments upon the theory of maneuver, incorporating his views on the proposition of the preconceived maneuver, are not the least interesting in the book.

Considerable stress is paid to the Napoleonic campaigns. The manner in which this Master of War designed his structure of battle and his scheme of maneuver in accordance therewith makes a valuable contribution to military literature.

The final portions of this work are devoted to more modern theatres of war; Spanish Civil War, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Italo-Ethiopian War. In each, Colonel Willoughby stresses the importance of maneuver which played a major rôle in the final success of one side or the other. He concludes with reference to the recent Polish Campaign in which the power of maneuver produced astounding results. The thought is left in the reader's mind as to whether the Blitzkrieg has opened new vistas in wars of tomorrow.

* * *

CUSTER AND THE GALL SAGA. By Dr. Charles Kuhlman. Privately published by the author. 46 pages and map. Price $1.00.

The author of this pamphlet, Dr. Charles Kuhlman, a retired university professor, has spent the past fifteen years on a homestead immediately adjacent to the Custer Battlefield. Becoming absorbed with the lore of Custer which permeates that part of the country, Dr. Kuhlman developed an interest in the mental and psychological factors which prompted the final movements and actions of Custer and the five troops which accompanied him to their collective doom.

In order to accommodate his theoretical studies to the field of actual practicabilities the author spent years in a detailed study of the terrain. By transit he analyzed those portions of the battlefield which could have been observed from certain key points of the terrain. This study has permitted the author grounds upon which to draw conclusions not only of exceeding interest in their perception, but adds a note of poetic glamor to this American epic by virtue of permitting the reader a shrewd mental survey of those things which may have passed through Custer's mind as he confronted the unexpected and awe inspiring odds which confronted him.

To those interested in the ever bewitching mystery of Custer's Last Stand, this pamphlet is highly recommended. It may be secured through Dr. Charles Kuhlman, R. D. No. 2, Billings, Montana.

* * *

CHEMICAL WARFARE MISCELLANY. Book Department, The Chemical Warfare School. 146 pages. Price 75c.

Chemical Warfare Miscellany is a compilation of exceptionally valuable and interesting articles dealing with chemical warfare. The support which chemical warfare may render each arm and service is adequately covered. There is included, also, exceptional material in a broader field, such as incendiary smoke screen, gas troops, use of mustard, etc. It would be difficult to find more useful data compiled under one cover than is presented in this compilation. Ownership of this volume would afford the student access to every phase of chemicals in war.

This compilation may be secured through the Book Department, The Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, at 75c per copy.

* * *

TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE. By Lowell M. Limpus. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York. 196 pages. Price $1.75.

Although written primarily for the layman interested in the broader phases of modern warfare the author presents material of equal interest to the professional soldier. His preliminary comments are devoted to the basic principles of war and their tactical application. Brief historical examples demonstrating past application of these principles lend reader interest. Such minor items as the difference between leadership and generalship are ably covered. The laws of war, the problems of military government in occupied areas, the tremendous problems of supply and

logistics, all are presented in readable fashion. The difficulties and problems of offensive action under modern conditions are discussed, and the results to be expected from each form of the offense are covered. Similarly, the powers and capabilities of modern defense are presented.

Succeeding chapters of the book are devoted to the basic combat branches in an effective manner, followed by comments on the non-combatant services.

The final chapter devoted to an insight into the future, concerned principally with the cost of modern war, is exceptionally interesting.

* * *

JENGHIZ KHAN. By C. C. Walker. Luzac and Company, London. 206 pages. Price $4.25.

The author, in this able account of the campaigns of Jenghiz Khan, emphasizes the effect on the civilization of eastern Europe of that period by the threat which hung over it from the dark area of the northeast.

Excellent maps dispersed throughout the volume, add much to its interest and value. These illustrations enable the average reader to grasp the tremendous power of organization and the aggressive will to combat which existed in the legions of this Asiatic chieftain. These campaigns were made possible by virtue of the very characteristic which made them formidable in the battles of that day—*mobility*.

One is apt to appreciate from the operations of Jenghiz Khan that current affairs in China are but a fleeting phase in the life of that serene people. Northern China particularly, was laid waste by the depredations of these roving warriors, but soon thereafter China had rebuilt her cities and returned to the normal pursuits of life. In southeastern Europe, where the pot may boil within the near future, mankind in that area certainly can suffer no worse punishment than did the peoples there under the blows the Mongol legions.

While not an outstanding presentation of Jenghiz Khan, the leader, this volume affords an excellent appreciation of that period of the world's history.

* * *

THE CONDUCT OF A CONTACT SQUADRON. By Captain R. de Biensan, French 3d Cuirassiers (translated by Major C. W. Bowdler Bell, English 8th Hussars). Military Service Publishing Co. Price $1.00.

Though published in 1883, *The Conduct of a Contact Squadron* has much interest and a great amount of instruction useful to the cavalry officer of today. A French officer tells how a German squadron (our troop) did things in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

The story tells of horses not unsaddled for five days. With modern weapons an enemy can be held far enough away from the bivouac to permit unsaddling. The commander's communications problems are interesting by comparison with ours. With only mounted messengers to



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(Books on horsemanship by The Cavalry School are listed with the Departmental Texts on inside of back cover.)

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

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send, and being on the move himself, for three days he did not know whether his reports had reached their destination.

His methods of living off the country are something in which few officers gain any experience and our regulations leave vast gaps unfilled.

The various bits of information he gained, his addition of the bits, his deductions and his reconnaissances for confirmation make a most enticing play of combat intelligence.

While the story is of a reconnaissance detachment, avoiding combat, it has so much interest and so many little points of care of cavalrymen and animals that every officer should read it.

* * *

LITTLE MAC (The Life of General George B. McClellan). By Dr. Clarence Edward Macartney. Dorance and Company, Philadelphia. 363 pages. Price $3.00.

Dr. Macartney's study of the life and career of George B. McClellan is based on thirty years' research and a thorough examination of the McClellan papers in the Library of Congress. While no new material of a significant character is presented this book is written in such fluid and interesting style that the reader is afforded a renewed estimate of the conflicting currents in American life of that day. The analyses of those events and of the character of McClellan made by the author are most satisfactory.

Graphic description of the prevailing political situation which existed within the Union throws much light upon the associated military operations. Perhaps no commanding general could have wholly succeeded during the early years of the war when faced as was McClellan by a policy of vacillation within the White House and the petty connivance which existed within the Cabinet.

The conflicting mental and spiritual traits of McClellan have been amply developed. No military leader ever won the more loyal affection of his troops than did George B. McClellan. None was more gifted in the powers of organization. It was unfortunate that these outstanding features were neutralized in large measure by a transcendent lack of tact with superiors both political and military and an exalted sense of self-importance.

Whatever the failures of the Union leader, his aggressive attitude and initiative in the early phases of the Antietam Campaign should have won for him the thanks of the nation. His partial success in this affair provided Lincoln with the opportunity of issuing the preliminary proclamation of emancipation, which in turn made it difficult for any foreign government to interfere in the struggle.

In the final chapter covering McClellan's political campaign for the presidency in 1864 the author has introduced material of considerable interest.

The entire book presents an unusual insight into the history of the United States of that period.

ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1st Cavalry—Fort Knox, Kentucky

COLONEL HENRY BAIRD, *Commanding*

During the winter the Regiment has concentrated on target practice interspersed with tactical training and exercises.

The small bore rifle matches were completed early in February, Captain Greiner's Machine Gun Troop coming out ahead with a score of 1,023. Private Harry F. Boughton, Jr., Machine Gun Troop, with a score of 264, was the high individual. Small bore pistol matches are still in progress.

Regular target season was started on February 12th in an effort to complete that important phase of training prior to the maneuvers. In order to be sure that the season would not be delayed due to high water, an entire new 1,000-inch range was constructed in the old First Cavalry Test Range Canyon. In spite of the handicaps of extreme weather and mud, the Regiment has completed all phases of firing except that from moving vehicles. The moving vehicular fire is well under way and, if the runways remain dry, will be completed by March 15th.

At Fort Knox, other training progresses concurrently with target practice. The Regiment has continued its work with radio operators and has furnished its quota of students at the motor school and motorcyclists school. The 6th Infantry has arrived from Jefferson Barracks.

The 1st Cavalry is training its quota of infantrymen in truck driving, first echelon maintenance, and convoy work. After March 15th, Brigade plans contemplate intensive tactical work with this additional component prior to its departure for the IV Corps maneuvers at Fort Benning.

Tactical exercises included an operation with camouflaged vehicles against the 13th Cavalry and a Brigade problem for Major General Andrews on January 11th.

On January 30th the post commander completed his annual administrative inspection of the Regiment. His remarks, as a result of his inspection, were extremely gratifying to all members of the command.

The 1st Cavalry sent a detachment to participate in National Defense Week at Cincinnati from the 16th to the 19th of February. As usual, the display attracted large crowds and evoked favorable comment for the Detachment and for the Service.

A most interesting basket ball season has just been completed, with Headquarters Troop, Captain Grant Williams commanding, the champions in the Regiment. Their record stands at thirteen wins and no defeats. Troop "F" was the runner up. Minner of Headquarters Troop was the season's high scorer with 239 points for a game average of 18.4.

During the month of February, quarantines for mumps and measles were added to our other complications. When "A" Troop, the quarantine holdout, finally incarcerated itself in self defense against special duty, our Medical friends called the whole thing off. When someone placed the word "working" in front of "quarantine," he removed all the fun of it anyway.

The Regiment received in February a welcome addition of officers from the schools. Captains Barton and Berry came from Leavenworth. The Cavalry School sent us Lieutenants Barnes, Martz, Hurt, Harper, Fiore, Van Nostrand, and Snee. These officers have been of tremendous assistance and the hope of the entire Regiment is that their "temporary" status may soon become "permanent."

It was with deep regret that the Regiment said good-bye to Captain and Mrs. Douglas Cameron who left for Fort Oglethorpe after almost five years with the 1st Cavalry.

* * *

2d Cavalry—Fort Riley, Kansas

COLONEL H. D. CHAMBERLIN, *Commanding*

The 2d Cavalry secured some valuable training in rail movements and loading of animals when it was detailed to assist in the movement of the 1st Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, to Camp Joseph T. Robinson, at Little Rock, Arkansas. The Regiment was charged with the responsibility of loading the animals for shipment, and on their return for the unloading. Both tasks were executed in driving snowstorms and furnished much experience to the officers and men of the Regiment in methods of handling and loading. The loading was witnessed by the students of the Cavalry School and used as a demonstration for their information.

Opportunity for valuable training and experience in handling new equipment and solution of new problems facing the Cavalry arm was afforded a number of officers and men of the Regiment by an order received March 1st requiring the 2d Cavalry to send a detachment of one officer, 69 enlisted men, three M1 Scout Cars, three M3 Scout Cars, and six trucks each to form the Mortar and Antitank Platoons of the Brigade Headquarters Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division. Second Lieutenant Henry L. Crouch, Jr., commanded the 1st Cavalry Brigade Detachment, ordered to Fort Clark, Texas, while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Cleary commanded the 2d Cavalry Brigade Detachment ordered to Fort Bliss. Both detachments left at 7:30 AM, Monday, March 4th, after inspection by

the Commandant and the Regimental Commander. A third detachment under Second Lieutenant Allen D. Hulse, consisting of eight Scout Cars and a detachment of 40 men is due to leave about March 25th for Fort Benning, Georgia, for maneuver net control duty in the Third Army maneuvers this spring. All these detachments are due to return some time in June.

On January 12th the Regiment held its fourth monthly horse show at the West Riding Hall. Five classes were shown, winners in each class being as follows:

CLASS I—EQUITATION FOR PRIVATES
(Team of 4 men each)

1st Place: Won by Special Weapons Troop. Private First Class Mills, riding *Jenny;* Private First Class Mays, riding *Fox;* Private Gilmore, riding *Huckleberry;* Private Hamilton, riding *Ginger.*

CLASS II—MESS SERGEANTS AND COOKS TEAM JUMPING
(1 Mess Sergeant and 2 Cooks)

1st Place: Won by Troop "E." Sergeant Placke, riding *Jasper;* Private First Class Goodin, riding *Mark Robin;* Private First Class Tucker, riding *Renner.*

CLASS III—SHUTTLE RACE
(Team of 5 men each)

1st Place: Won by Troop "B." Private First Class Biggs, riding *Jimmy;* Private First Class Deeds, Private First Class Broddle, Private Buck, Private Wilson.

CLASS IV—TEAM JUMPING
(1 Officer; 1 Sergeant; 1 Corporal; 1 Private)

1st Place: Won by Troop "E." Captain A. A. Frierson, 2d Cavalry, riding *Mad Neill;* Sergeant Null, riding *Emma;* Corporal Craig, riding *Get;* Private Carter, riding *Bushnell Boy.*

CLASS V—GREEN POLO PONIES

1st Place: Won by Captain John W. Wofford, 2d Cavalry, riding *Salome.*

The fifth monthly Regimental Horse Show was presented March 7, 1940. Again five classes were shown, including two classes open to the post. Winners in each class were as follows:

CLASS I—N.C.O. POLO PONIES
(2 period game, ponies were judged after game)

1st Place: Won by Corporal Fred Running, Troop "F" 2d Cavalry, on *Ellengiva.*

CLASS II—ENLISTED MEN'S EQUITATION

1st Place: Won by Corporal Monroe G. Winn, Special Weapons Troop, 2d Cavalry, on *Jenny.*

CLASS III—HANDICAP JUMPING ENLISTED MEN
(Open to enlisted men of Post)

1st Place: Won by Sergeant Chesshir Watson, Hq. and Serv. Troop, 2d Cavalry, on *Colonel.*

CLASS IV—GREEN JUMPERS

1st Place: Won by Sergeant Derral C. Watson, Troop "E" 2d Cavalry, on *Bunker Hill.*

CLASS V—OPEN JUMPING FOR OFFICERS
(Open to Post)

1st Place: Won by 1st Lieutenant Franklin F. Wing, Jr., 9th Cavalry on *Democrat.*

Due to inclement weather during the past two months Officers' Polo activity has been confined to Indoor Polo.

Polo for the newly joined Second Lieutenants has been organized with games twice a week. Much interest has been shown and a great deal of progress made in developing new ponies and players. Two full teams are playing regularly under the instruction of Captain John W. Wofford, 2d Cavalry. In addition, three teams of non-commissioned officers have been under instruction and playing, coached by Major Harry Knight. These teams have played regularly twice a week among themselves, and during February played a Round Robin with the 2d Lieutenants, results of which follow:

2d Squadron N.C.Os	10
M. G. Troop N.C.Os	6
2d Lieutenants	6

The Chief of Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr, arrived on the post January 29th. Troop "A" acted as Escort on his arrival, Troop "B" on his departure.

On January 17th a Recruit Horse Show was held in the East Riding Hall, limited to contestants with less than eight weeks' service. Five classes were shown. Troop "F" won all places in Class I (Seat and Hands); Class II, Jumping with Surcingle and Blanket, was won by Private E. R. Evans, M. G. Troop; Class II, Jumping with Saddle and Snaffle Bridle, was won by Private G. E. Bowen, M. G. Troop; Class IV, Shuttle Race, was won by the Advanced Group; Class V, Mounted Wrestling, was won by the Basic Group. Cash prizes were awarded the winners.

The following named officers have joined the Regiment since the 1st of the year. Major Wilkie C. Burt, as Regimental Supply Officer and Command of Provisional Squadron. 1st Lieutenant A. B. Turner, Jr., to Headquarters and Service Troop as Communications Officer.

The following named Cavalry Reserve Officers have been assigned to the Regiment since January 1st for six months' extended active duty:

2d Lt. W. B. Magner, assigned to Troop "E."
2d Lt. George W. Ridenour, assigned to Troop "B."
2d Lt. Urcel L. Bell, assigned to Troop "F."
2d Lt. Conde Hamlin, assigned to Troop "B."
2d Lt. George T. Backe, assigned to Troop "E."

First Lieutenant Emanuel S. Cepeda, (PS) upon graduation from the Cavalry School has been attached to the regiment and is on duty with Headquarters and Service Troop.

5th Cavalry—Fort Clark, Texas

COLONEL C. P. STEARNS, *Commanding*

Training during January was very similar to that of November and December. Combat problems, musketry exercises, communication exercises, Division, Brigade and Regimental tactical exercises were held.

It was during this last phase that the regiment with the rest of the division underwent a severe test. In one of the coldest periods ever experienced in that part of the state, the division conducted a three day tactical exercise. The temperature fell to 8 degrees above zero on the first afternoon and dropped to below zero during the night. It varied on ten degrees during the remainder of the exercise. Under these adverse conditions, in which the personnel of the regiment suffered hardships seldom experienced in peace-time maneuvers, the fortitude displayed by officers and men was such as to make one feel extremely proud of being a member of the Division, Brigade and Regiment. Praise by the Corps Area, Division and Brigade commanders was given without restraint.

In a memorandum to the regiment two days after the termination of the problem, the regimental commander, Colonel Stearns said:

"The Regimental Commander desires to express to all the men and officers of this regiment his appreciation of the fine spirit shown by them during the last four months of field service and especially during the last three day maneuver. No troops could have shown finer courage and fortitude than they showed during the acute discomforts and in many cases hardships of the extreme cold encountered at Dona Ana. The older men showed themselves worthy of the leadership for which their age and experience had qualified them. The Regimental Commander is grateful for the loyal support that they have given him. The younger men may rightly feel that they have won their right to be considered recruits no longer.

It is through such experiences as the one just described that the regiment is molded into a hard, fit, fighting unit; and upon which the glorious traditions of the 5th Cavalry have been established."

Movement of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, 5th and 12th Cavalry, to their home stations by trucks and rail, began February 1st. The 12th Cavalry moved from Fort Bliss to their home stations, Fort Brown and Fort Ringgold, February 1st with halts for the night at Fort D. A. Russell, Fort Clark and Fort McIntosh. The main body of the 5th Cavalry left Fort Bliss February 2nd by motor convoy to our home station, Fort Clark. A night halt was made at Fort D. A. Russell where, through the kindness of the Commanding Officer, 77th F. A., a gun shed was placed at the disposal of the regiment for sleeping quarters for the night. During the night a heavy rain fell, and it was followed by a "norther." The main body left Fort D. A. Russell at 6:00 AM, February 3rd arriving at Fort Clark at 4:30 PM, the same day.

The rear echelon which had remained at Fort Bliss to load horses of the regiment for movement by rail, left Fort Bliss Sunday morning, February 4th in scout cars and arrived at Fort Clark late in the evening of the same day. Captain A. T. Getz, VC, and a detail of enlisted men accompanied the horses to Spofford, Texas, railhead of Fort Clark, arriving there early Sunday morning. Officers and men of the main body, which had arrived at Fort Clark the evening of the 3rd, were taken to Spofford by truck to unload the horses and baggage. The baggage was loaded on the trucks and taken to Fort Clark. The horses were ridden back to the post.

Upon the completion of the movement back from Fort Bliss, training in preparation for the forthcoming Corps and Army maneuvers began. On February 12th, the regular target season opened.

Since the regiment arrived home the following Regular Army officers have been attached for temporary duty:

Captain Donald H. Nelso, Cavalry
Captain John H. Claybrook, Jr., Cavalry
Captain Lawrence G. Smith, Cavalry
1st Lt. John J. Davis, Cavalry
1st Lt. Stephen W. Holderness, Cavalry
1st Lt. Paul M. Jones, Cavalry
1st Lt. James E. Glattly, Cavalry
1st Lt. James B. Corbett, Cavalry.

In addition to the above officers and seven reserve officers that reported for one year's active duty training under the Thomason Act while the regiment was at Fort Bliss, five additional reserve officers have been assigned to the regiment. They are:

2nd Lt. Bruce W. Benedict, Cavalry-Reserve
2nd Lt. Russell C. Hantke, Cavalry-Reserve
2nd Lt. Donal W. Kaspervik, Cavalry-Reserve
2nd Lt. John R. Lane, Cavalry-Reserve
2nd Lt. Max T. Leyendecker, Cavalry-Reserve.

The eighty-fifth anniversary of the regiment fell on Sunday, March 3rd, so the regiment celebrated its birthday beginning on the afternoon of Friday, March 1st.

On that day a horseshow was held from 1:30 to 4:30 PM, at the Fort Clark Horseshow Ring. There were five classes of which Class I, Troopers Mount, was won by *Dodger,* ridden by Private Kerr, Troop "A." Class II, Jumpers, Enlisted Men, won by *Convoy,* ridden by Sergeant Woodzell, Troop "E." Class III, Fault, Disobedience and Out, was won by *Golddigger,* ridden by Sergeant Easter, Troop "E." Class IV, Handy Jumping, was won by *Abbie,* ridden by Corporal Stubbs, Troop "F." Class V, Jumping Sweepstakes, Officers, was won by *Rob Roy,* owned and ridden by Captain A. L. Fulton. Prizes in cash were awarded the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd places. F. E. I. rules governed the show.

7th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL WM. W. WEST, *Commanding*

On or about February 1st, this regiment was notified that its annual target season would have to be completed

prior to the coming maneuvers. Preliminary marksmanship was immediately started and the regiment departed for the range on February 12. Despite the high winds and other inclement weather encountered at this season of the year, the regiment expects to finish on March 8th with excellent results. Lieutenant Colonel Allen, officer in charge of firing, supervised the building of new field ranges, for the Light Machine Guns, which permitted more guns to be in operation, and which gave each firer more visibility. As a result the Light Machine Gun Platoons expect to rival the Heavy Troop in the number of qualifications.

We have, in addition to conducting our annual target practice, kept our animals in condition for the Division exercises which are to be resumed starting with an overnight problem on March 11th. This training is pointed toward acquainting the desert cavalryman with conditions to be encountered in the woods, mud, and swamps, along the Sabine River, during the IX Army Corps maneuvers.

Plans for the Regimental rifle and pistol competition, to develop and select members for the Cavalry Team, is well under way.

Lieutenants Mock and Hillsinger have joined the regiment from the Cavalry School. They expect to be with us until after the spring maneuvers. Lieutenant Oden has just reported, having recently transferred from the Infantry. Four Reserve Officers, Lieutenants Ralls, Hubbell, Pincetl and Peterson, have been assigned to the regiment for a period of six months' training.

A regimental dinner was held at the New Waterfill Gardens, Saragoza, Mexico, on February 16th. Colonel West, one of our most enthusiastic hunters, surprised and delighted everyone by providing a wild duck for each guest. A grand time was had by all.

The regimental bowling league finished with some strong competition. Troops "A" and Headquarters and Service were tied for the second half championship and in the play-off Troop "A" won. Headquarters and "A" Troops then had to play-off for the regimental championship as Headquarters Troop had won the first half. Headquarters Troop won two straight games by a small margin. This sport has created considerable interest among the old athletes and a good time is always had at the games. The officers bowling team won the first half of the Division Championship Tournament-Officers Division. The second half is nearing completion with the "Gary Owens" holding a commanding lead.

Master Sergeant Koschnicke was placed on the retired list on February 29th. Many parties have been held for "Franz" and the entire regiment wishes him many happy days during his well earned retirement.

8th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL JOS. P. ALESHIRE, *Commanding*

Training during January was made particularly memorable for two reasons. It was the last month that the 1st Brigade remained under canvas at Fort Bliss, and it was on January 18th that the regiment participated in a three day Division Field Exercise, involving two night withdrawals to carry out a delaying mission, which will live long in the memories of those who were present, both officers and enlisted men. Although El Paso, Texas is alleged to be located "Where the Sunshine Spends the Winter," on this occasion during the night of the 18th-19th, with the regiment bivouacked in Filmore Pass, between the Organ and Franklin Mountains, the mercury dipped to 5 degrees below, and the 30 mile wind combined to give all present a touch of the rigors that campaigning in Finland without proper clothing involves.

Training for rail movement was also conducted during January. Although no movement was actually made, all details were completed, kitchens set up, and a meal served prior to unloading.

A Combat Intelligence School was initiated on the 15th, and will continue to operate up to the time of departure of the regiment the latter part of April for the Sabine Area in East Texas when the regiment, as a unit of the 1st Cavalry Division will join the IX Corps in operations against the IV Corps.

Indoor gallery ranges have been completed in the attics of the three squadron barracks, and practice initially under the supervision of Captain Thomas F. Sheehan, Regimental S-4, for participation by selected troop representatives in the 2d Cavalry Brigade Pistol Competition (cal. .22) to be held April 13, 1940, to support the program of the Chief of Cavalry relative to the Cavalry Rifle and Pistol Teams for 1940. This should prove to be an interesting competition as both the Division and 2d Brigade Commanders have indicated their intention to participate personally, and several cash prizes for enlisted men are contingent on their winning scores being better than the Division Commander's score.

On January 17, 1940, for the first time in many years, the regiment was formed for a picture with the entire 1st Cavalry Division. On February 13-14 the regiment and composite troop participated in the filming of a travelogue. On the second day those members of the composite troop who participated found to their distress, while moving at rapid gaits down hill through smoke, that apparently the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service had failed to collaborate, so far as provisions of comfort and visibility are concerned, in the manufacture of these items for issue to the mounted branches.

A familiarization course in observation aviation, conducted by Flight A, 1st Observation Squadron, whose home station is at Fort Riley, Kansas, and which is now on temporary duty at Fort Bliss, was initiated on February 20th. The course, being participated in by twelve officers of the regiment has proved most interesting, and in addition to the theoretical instruction conducted by Captain Ford L. Fair, the Flight Commander, includes practical orientation work on both day and night flights for all students.

The regiment extends a hearty welcome to the follow-

ing officers who recently joined, and have been assigned to duty with the regiment:

Major John H. Irving, who decided he liked Fort Bliss and permitted the 1st Brigade to return to its home station without him. Though at present on special duty as Post Prison Officer, we hope to have him with us on maneuvers.

Captain John L. Ballantyne and 1st Lieutenant Henry T. Cherry, Jr., who are on temporary duty at present, having been assigned to the regiment following their graduation from school at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley respectively. Captain Ballantyne was assigned to the 8th upon graduation from West Point, and was again with the regiment as a 1st Lieutenant, being promoted to Captain while still assigned. Lieutenant Cherry was likewise assigned to the 8th Cavalry upon graduation from West Point, and was ordered to duty as a student at the Cavalry School last summer.

The following Reserve officers have reported for a six months' tour of duty and will accompany the regiment on maneuvers:

1st Lieut. Jack Berg, El Paso, Texas.
1st Lieut. George D. Swanson, Okmulgee, Okla.
2d Lieut. Henry M. Haas, Tucson, Arizona.

The regiment regrets the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Clinton A. Pierce, who departed on February 3d on leave prior to sailing for the Philippine Islands.

On February 28th the regiment was paraded at Retreat in honor of Sergeant Joseph O. Brown, MG. Troop and Sergeant Charlie Y. Watson, Troop B, both of whom having completed their 30 years' service with the Army, were retired on February 29th. Farewell dinners were held in the two troops that evening and on March 2d they were honored with a dinner and dance at the 8th Cavalry Non-Commissioned Officers' Club. The regiment will miss them both and regrets deeply that Sergeant Watson's retirement was to be so quickly followed by the untimely death on Sunday March 3d, of his son James O. Watson, who was likewise a soldier in Troop B at the time of his death.

On February 16th the final basketball game was won by the regiment from William Beaumont General Hospital, making the 8th Cavalry team the Fort Bliss Champions for the season 1939-40. This was the second consecutive year that our team has won this honor, making seven out of the past eight years that the regiment has won the post championship. The players were:

Sergeant E. Kelly, Forward
Sergeant R. L. Meyers, Guard
Sergeant J. Mann, Guard
Corporal J. R. Nunn, Forward
Corporal F. L. Dorsey, Forward
Corporal T. Marynick, Guard
Corporal D. D. Gregg, Center
Private J. E. Ivy, Center
Private B. W. Simpson, Guard
Private R. R. Renchler, Forward
Private L. A. Hill, Forward

Lieutenant Richards, the Athletic Officer, who has been playing himself and the entire team are to be congratulated on its accomplishments this season.

Polo in the regiment has continued under the guidance of the regimental commander and Captain Charles H. Valentine as Team Captain. On the week end of February 10-11 the team journeyed to Tucson, Arizona and defeated the University of Arizona team in two games, 9-4 and 8-5. On the week-end of February 24-25 the Arizona team visited Fort Bliss for a return match in which the Arizona team defeated the 8th Cavalry Brown team 9-4 and the Blue team 13-8.

A Regimental party was held at Saragozo, Old Mexico, on February 16th, in honor of the officers and ladies who have newly arrived at Fort Bliss and joined the Regiment. The dinners and dancing that followed were thoroughly enjoyed affording new arrivals an opportunity to meet new friends and in many cases renew former friendships.

On Saturday afternoon, February 25th following the polo game, Colonel and Mrs. Aleshire invited the officers and ladies of the 8th Cavalry to meet the members of the Arizona team at their quarters.

* * *

11th Cavalry—Presidio of Monterey, Calif.

COLONEL HOMER M. GRONINGER, *Commanding*

With some two months of maneuvers and combined training already "in the bag," officers and men of the 11th Cavalry this month (March) are well into the swing of the 3rd Division's intensive training program—which has proved so far to be a combination of three or four different jobs at once.

Pushed into its own backyard by rains and the overcrowded condition of the tent camp at Ord late in January, the regiment has been living in tents in the CMTC area at Presidio of Monterey, training almost daily with the 3rd Division a dozen miles away; and has been operating portions of the base force (administration and guard).

At the start of 3rd Division maneuvers January 15 the regiment lost its commanding officer when Colonel Homer M. Groninger was assigned to supervision of camp construction and command of the base force. A sizable portion of the troops were retained at the Presidio for guard, police and clerical force, while barracks were turned over to the visiting firemen: two companies of QM troops and division base medical personnel. Officers assigned to other than regimental duties were: Majors C. H. Gerhardt and F. C. DeLangton, S-4 and S-2, respectively, of Subsector Headquarters; Major W. B. Augur, Cavalry liaison at Coastal Frontier headquarters, and Lieutenant Colonel Porter as Base executive.

(Note: Regimental participation in the Joint Army-Navy Exercise of January 15-22 is recorded elsewhere in this issue.)

In the reshuffling of officers at the conclusion of the joint exercise Major DeLangton became Division camp Provost, Captain F. G. Trew, camp signal officer; Lieu-

tenant Donald Thackeray, assistant range officer, and Lieutenant Charles Walson, Division recruiting officer.

Troops of the regiment completed qualification in arms in February, with 530 men qualifying with rifle, pistol or machine gun; experts, 34%. Only nine men failed to qualify, seven of them with the pistol, dismounted. Combat firing was being completed by all troops prior to the practice marches to be made by the squadrons to San Luis Obispo as reinforcing elements of the 4th and 7th Infantries.

Additional assignments to the regiment since the last report include Major Alton W. Howard, who has been placed in charge of summer camp activity at the Presidio; Captain William J. Bradley, who takes position on the post staff as assistant adjutant, police and prison officer, and fire marshal; and two reserve officers (6-month tour) 2nd Lieutenants Frederick F. Thomas of Venice, California, and George I. Spies of Marshfield, Oregon. The latter have been assigned to Headquarters Troop and Machine Gun Troop, respectively.

Regimental sports are booming as the start of the 3rd Division athletic season nears. The basketball team, coached by Lieutenant Jack Dobson, has hung up an impressive string of practice victories culminating in the defeat of the 15th Infantry, March 5, at Monterey. Others to bow to the Troopers were the 76th Field Artillery, 3rd Balloon Squadron, the 10th Field Artillery and seven civilian teams.

The regimental pistol team, captained and coached by Captain Alexander George, recently placed second among 3rd Division troops and fifth among all 15 competitors in the fifth annual Service Pistol Match sponsored by the Olympic Club in San Francisco, February 22. With a score of 2,374, the Troopers were topped only by the San Diego Marines, 30th Infantry, 250th Coast Artillery and the Olympic Club. The team, which includes Major Wayland Augur, Captain Alexander George, Mr. Sergeant Howard Mathis (HQ), 1st Sergeants T. P. Farrel (E), and Michael Berasley (MG), Sergeants Paul Foster (MG), A. V. Gayne (F), Albert Hettrick (B), Victor Shantz (B), George McKinley (F), E. J. Clark (HQ), and Corporals Clyde Sullivan (B), R. W. Magill (MG), Amadeo Jacobelli (B), Orian Underwood (HQ), and Eulogio Reyes (HQ), has thrice defeated the 4th Infantry team in practice matches on the local range.

A squad of 15 boxers is working out daily under direction of Lieutenant Albert E. Harris and Sergeant Claire Snouffer and will compete against the 15th Infantry March 12. Regimental teams will be formed in softball, track, volleyball and horseshoes this month for participation in Division leagues in March, April and May.

12th Cavalry—Fort Brown, Texas

COLONEL ARTHUR E. WILBOURN, *Commanding*

During the month of January, the regiment was under training with the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas. The men were quartered in pyramidal tents with wooden floors and Sibley stoves. The training was carried on with a view of having the regiment as an integral part of a large command, all units stressing the importance of cooperation and fitting in of the individual effort toward attaining the results which would accomplish the mission of the commander of the larger force, usually the Division.

Colonel Arthur E. Wilbourn, 12th Cavalry, rejoined the regiment on January 17 and assumed command after an absence of several months due to an injury to his leg at Fort Clark, Texas, on September 20, 1939, during a brigade field exercise prior to the departure of the regiment for the 1st Cavalry Division maneuvers at Balmorhea, Texas.

During the latter part of January a heavy snow fell which made the conditions of bivouacking overnight during problems very severe.

On February 1, the regiment started its movement from Fort Bliss, Texas, for home stations, Fort Brown, Texas (12th Cavalry, less 2d Squadron) and Fort Ringgold, Texas (2d Squadron). The distance was about 900 miles overland and the regiment arrived home on February 3, 1940. Animals were shipped by train, and the personnel were transported by motor trucks, part of which were those regularly assigned to the 12th Cavalry, and the other trucks were from units stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas. The return was uneventful with the exception of a few trucks breaking down and which had to be towed. The men were especially buoyant during the return journey. As we approached nearer to the home stations of the regiment and as the men recognized more and more familiar landmarks, the grins and laughs increased. There was a constant flow of soldier witticism which only those in intimate contact with the men can fully appreciate.

A number of officers and reserve officers were attached to the regiment during the month of February for temporary duty in connection with the present plan for intensive training and for the coming Corps and Army maneuvers. Their names and organizations and stations to which assigned for duty are as follows:

Captain Frederic deL. Comfort, Hq. and Serv. Troop, Fort Brown, Texas.

Captain Thomas D. Roberts, Troop F, Fort Ringgold, Texas.

Captain Henry R. Westphalinger, MG Troop, Fort Brown, Texas.

First Lieutenant F. Clay Bridgewater, Troop A, Fort Brown, Texas.

First Lieutenant Donald O. Vars, Troop B, Fort Brown, Texas.

First Lieutenant Perry B. Griffith, Hq. and Serv. Troop, Fort Brown, Texas.

First Lieutenant Daniel E. Still, 1st Sq. 12th Cav., Fort Brown, Texas.

First Lieutenant Charles J. Hoy, 2d Sq. 12th Cav., Fort Ringgold, Texas.

First Lieutenant Raymond C. Adkisson, Troop F, Fort Ringgold, Texas.

Reserve Officers:

Second Lieutenant Sophnie E. Teaff, Troop A, Fort Brown, Texas.

Second Lieutenant Victor J. Jancewicz, Troop B, Fort Brown, Texas.

Second Lieutenant Gerald F. Towle, Troop E, Fort Ringgold, Texas.

Second Lieutenant Carol H. Thomas, Troop F, Fort Ringgold, Texas.

It is hoped that the regiment will be able to keep these officers permanently.

Every effort was made during the month of February to catch up loose ends in preparation for the coming Army maneuvers and to start target range work both preliminary and record firing. Pistol practice, mounted and dismounted, was practically completed by the end of February.

13th Cavalry—Fort Knox, Kentucky

COLONEL JACK HEARD, *Commanding*

During the past few weeks the regiment has been engaged in a varied program which has included antiaircraft firing at towed targets, reduction of road blocks, combat firing, test of night driving and signal equipment, and the regular range practice.

Four war-time Renault tanks have been obtained and put in running condition and these tanks, operated by remote control, have made possible .50 caliber firing at actual moving vehicles, at ranges from 1,000 to 600 yards from all angles.

In the road block problems, various combination of combat cars, scout cars, tricycle, side car and solo motorcycles have been used. These problems have proved most instructive and great improvement has been made by the organizations engaged in this training.

This year a new qualification course is being fired which requires the firing of the .30 caliber gun from the ground, from a stationary vehicle, and from a vehicle in motion. The .50 caliber gun is fired from a stationary vehicle at a moving target.

After considerable study, a uniform system of loading individual and vehicular equipment has been adopted for each type of vehicle in the regiment.

The problem of transporting motorcycles across extremely rough country or through heavy mud has been solved by simple hitches by which a motorcycle can be carried on the rear end of a scout car or in rear of the turret on a combat car.

In the indoor small-bore competition, Troop "A" won the Pistol and Machine Gun Trophies, while Troop "E" carried off honors with the rifle. The runners-up were Troop "B" with the pistol and rifle and Troop "E" with the machine gun. Trophies were presented to Troop Commanders and cash prizes were presented to the individual winners by the regimental commander in an appropriate ceremony on March 13th.

During the past few months 211 recruits have completed their training and have been returned to duty with their organizations.

The regiment will leave early in May as part of the Brigade for the maneuver area in the vicinity of Camp Beauregard, Louisiana.

The Sixth Infantry, which will participate in the maneuvers with the Brigade, arrived at Fort Knox on February 28th. The 13th Cavalry aided them in getting settled by drawing necessary bedding and having buildings open for their occupancy. This regiment is training drivers for one Battalion and will furnish vehicles for use in their training activities.

The Machine Gun Troop is the winner in the Regimental Basketball league and Troop F took top honors in the Regimental Bowling league and then went on to win the Post Bowling Championship.

First Lieutenant William W. Culp has been assigned to the regiment and joined, while Captains William P. Withers, William H. Nutter, Raymond W. Curtis and First Lieutenants John W. Darrah, Jr., John S. Growdon, Norman A. Loeb, Lawrence E. Schlanser, Benjamin W. Heckemeyer, Ned T. Norris and Roy W. Cole, Jr., have been attached to the regiment for duty.

Second Lieutenant Morton M. Friedman, Cavalry Reserve, has been attached for 6 months active duty.

Second Lieutenant Robert Rossow, Jr., Cavalry Reserve, a Thomason Act officer on duty with the regiment, has accepted appointment in the Foreign Service and was relieved from assignment February 29, 1940.

Major William T. Fletcher, has been relieved from his duties with the regiment for an extended period in which he will be on duty in Headquarters Second Army as Rents and Claims Officer.

14th Cavalry—Fort Des Moines, Iowa

COLONEL A. H. WILSON, *Commanding*

The events leading up to the present date, March 15, 1940, from the completion of the Corps Area Commanders Maneuvers in the latter part of January of this year are most interesting with respect to the Regiment, particularly that part of the Regiment here at Fort Des Moines, Iowa.

After successfully operating in extensive field training exercises at Camp J. T. Robinson, with and against other Cavalry and Infantry units, the Regiment finally received movement orders directing its return to its home stations effective for the 1st Squadron on February 7th, and for the remainder of the Regiment on or about February 10th. As this would cause the Regiment to split up again, it was decided that the officers should have a get-together party on Saturday, February 3rd in Little Rock, in order to prepare for our farewells of the following week to Camp Robinson and to the return of the Regiment to Fort Des Moines, and Fort Sheridan.

On March 2nd, the ROA of Iowa conducted a Military Ball at the Hotel Fort Des Moines in the city of Des Moines. The Post was well represented and the affair was

most successful. The Corps Area Commander, General Bishop, and several generals of the Iowa National Guard were present. The Post and Regimental Commander, Colonel Wilson, led the representatives from Fort Des Moines at the Ball.

On March 6th a holiday was declared and brief ceremonies took place in the Post Theatre in celebration of the day of organization of the Regiment—its thirty-ninth birthday.

The history of the Regiment was orally portrayed to the assembled troops, especially to the new enlisted members of the Regiment who constitute about 30% of the present strength of the Regiment at Fort Des Moines.

Indoor polo has been progressing quite rapidly and strongly. On March 8th, a team from the 1st Squadron arrived for a series of games. The chief rooter for the 1st Squadron was Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Hazeltine, its Commanding Officer, who came down to witness the games. On Friday evening a game was held in the Riding Hall in which our opponents, Captains Baker and Jernigan, and Lieutenant Damon succeeded in trouncing the Fort Des Moines Team, of Captains Amazeen and Yeomans, and Lieutenant Christensen to the tune of 12 to 6. After a series of parties and dances, another game was played on the following Sunday afternoon. Having learned a few lessons in the first game, the same Fort Des Moines Team successfully defeated the Fort Sheridan team in the close score of 8 to 7. The Sheridan team at this time substituted a less experienced player, Lieutenant Cramer, for Lieutenant Damon. Monday we sadly bid farewell again to Lieutenant Colonel Hazeltine and his 1st Squadron team as they departed for Fort Sheridan, hoping that we may get together again in the near future.

On March 25th, our Scout Car Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Henry R. Hansen, Cav-Res., with the Scout Cars from the 1st Squadron, will depart for Fort Benning, Georgia, to assist in radio control work during the Third Army Maneuvers. Then, of course, we are looking forward to our movement in May or June, to Fort Riley, Kansas, on a permanent change of station, after nineteen years at the Post of Fort Des Moines.

Since the last publication of events pertaining to the 14th Cavalry at Fort Des Moines, we have added to our roster of officers the following:

Major Manly F. Meador, from duty with the Kentucky National Guard, Frankfort, Kentucky.

Second Lieutenant A. T. Williams, 3rd, from duty at Randolph Field, Texas.

Second Lieutenant D. B. Douglas, Cav-Res., from civil life to six months' active training.

Second Lieutenant D. C. McWilliams, Cav-Res., from civil life to six months' active training.

The losses are as follows:

Major G. A. Moore, from Fort Des Moines, to Rutland, Vermont on D.O.L.

Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Dwan, from duty C.C.C. Fort Des Moines to Inspector General's Department, San Francisco, California.

In addition to the officers gained, we have recently received orders directing the following officers to report to the Regiment after its arrival at Fort Riley, Kansas:

Captain Harry W. Johnson, from West Point, N. Y., to 14th Cavalry about June 25, 1940.

Captain Walter Burnside, from Philippine Islands to 14th Cavalry.

* * *

103d Cavalry—Tyrone, Pennsylvania

COLONEL SAMUEL B. WOLFE, *Commanding*

The past two months have brought a number of important changes in personnel in the regiment. There have been changes in command in all echelons. These have been accomplished smoothly and the regiment is steaming right ahead on its customarily efficient way.

Our chief loss has been in the transfer of our Regimental Commander, Colonel Benjamin C. Jones, to Headquarters 22nd Cavalry Division as Chief of Staff. The regiment can hardly regret the advancement of Colonel Jones but every officer and man will feel a distinct loss at his leaving this command.

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Wolfe of Lewisburg has been promoted to colonel and has been assigned to command the regiment. This advancement is the culmination for Colonel Wolfe of over forty-one years of service in the National Guard. He enlisted in 1898 and his service has been continuous through every enlisted and commissioned grade to his present rank of colonel. Colonel Wolfe will continue to maintain regimental headquarters in Tyrone where it has been for the past three years.

Major Benjamin I. Levine of Altoona, heretofore commander of the 1st Squadron, has been promoted to lieutenant-colonel and assigned to regimental headquarters as executive. Captain William A. E. Leitzinger, of Clearfield, commanding Troop A, has been promoted to major and assigned to command of the 1st Squadron. First Lieutenant John K. Dufton of Clearfield has been promoted to captain and assigned to command Troop A.

Advancement has come to another officer without corresponding loss in the promotion of Captain Robert E. Allen, commanding Medical Department Detachment at Sunbury, to be major.

Early in January Captain George F. Seyffert of Troop K requested transfer to the inactive list. Captain Seyffert's home and business are in Pittsburgh and Troop K is in New Castle, ninety miles away. This adverse space factor finally made it impossible for Captain Seyffert to continue his command. In his place George F. Mitchell of New Castle has been appointed captain and assigned to command Troop K. Captain Mitchell is a former commander of this troop.

First Lieutenant Charles D. Coppes of Philadelphia, Medical Department Detachment, has been transferred from this regiment to Medical Department Detachment, 104th Cavalry. In his place First Lieutenant Eugene C.

Ingoldsby of Altoona, Medical Reserve Corps, has been appointed first lieutenant in the National Guard and assigned to the Medical Department Detachment, 103rd Cavalry.

Captain John H. F. Bittner, Regimental S-3, left on March 7th to attend the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and Captain Jesse C. Davis, Headquarters Troop left February 24th to attend the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. First Lieutenant Frank S. Buchanan, Headquarters Troop, left March 17th to attend Singan School at Fort Monmouth, N. J. First Lieutenant Robert E. O'Brien, who has been on the inactive list for the past year, has been returned to the active list and assigned to 2nd Squadron as adjutant. During Captain Bittner's absence Lieutenant O'Brien will function as Regimental S-3. First Lieutenant Franklyn D. Fry of Danville, Pa., formerly adjutant of the 2nd Squadron, has been transferred to Troop E to fill the vacancy caused by the death last year of First Lieutenant Edward C. Fisher.

Washington's Birthday was a day of celebration for the regiment. On February 21st a horse show was held at the armory of Headquarters Troop at Altoona under the sponsorship and direction of Headquarters Troop and of the Frankstown Hunt. It was a highly successful affair. On Thursday afternoon, February 22nd, an invitation hunt was held by the Frankstown Hunt at Altoona in which quite a number of the officers of the regiment participated. And on that evening there was held at the Penn Alto Hotel in Altoona the annual dinner-dance of the officers of the regiment. It was an altogether delightful affair for the officers and for their guests.

At the dinner Colonel Jones formally turned over to Colonel Wolfe the Regimental Standard with fitting ceremony. In turn, Colonel Wolfe presented to Colonel and Mrs. Jones a beautiful four piece Silver Service, a gift from all officers of the regiment. Mrs. Jones was also presented with a beautiful bouquet of flowers.

Speculation is rife as to our summer training activities. Tentative plans call for a regimental camp of two weeks in June at Indiantown Gap. But these plans may have to be changed in event either plans for field maneuvers for all four armies or a twenty-seven day field training period be authorized. Whatever the regiment is ordered to do, however, will be done with enthusiastic will.

106th Cavalry—Detroit, Michigan

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROY F. BIERWIRTH, *Commanding*

The organization of the 23rd Cavalry Division brought no allocation of new units to Michigan. It did create an increase of two officers in the personnel of the Michigan Cavalry.

Colonel Harry T. Weber leaves the command of the 106th Cavalry to become Chief of Staff of the 23rd Cavalry Division.

Major Roy F. Bierwirth receives a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and becomes executive officer of the Regiment and Commanding officer of the Michigan component of the 106th Cavalry.

Captain V. J. Garbarino leaves the command of Troop "K" to take command of the 3rd Squadron with a promotion to Major.

First Lieutenant M. S. Hicks as the new Captain takes command of Troop "K."

First Lieutenant C. J. Kershaw is transferred from the regiment to A.S.C. 23rd Cavalry Division.

All changes are in the officers of the 3rd Squadron and Regimental Headquarters at Detroit.

The Rifle Teams of the Michigan Troops are preparing for the annual regimental competition to be held April 6th at Detroit.

112th Cavalry—Dallas, Texas

COLONEL CLARENCE E. PARKER, *Commanding*

The annual Armory Federal Inspection took place during the period March 10th to March 19th inclusive.

Unit commanders all report that their units were in better shape for this inspection than ever before, as the increased armory and field training authorized by the War Department, during the past four months, had produced great results.

Captains Newman and Starr commanding Troops A and B who have already been put through the mill by the Corps Area Inspector are "patting their tummies" and watching the other boys work with much glee. By the way, both these troops recently received excellent reports from the Inspector General on the condition of their administration and training.

The last period of the regiment's prescribed field training was completed most satisfactorily, on January 5th, 6th and 7th.

Colonel Parker assembled the regiment in the Dallas Area for this training period and despite the hellish weather the training was of great value to all units.

Old man Weather certainly was against us. One of the worst northers in years, gathered and hit with full force on the first day in the field. This continued, with sleet and snow, during the entire period. One gunner was heard

The 112th Cavalry a la Finland

Texas maneuvers in January

to remark, as he placed his machine gun in position, in the deep snow on an outpost problem: "The Finns sure have nothing on us."

The old "Raring to Go" spirit, that is the regimental motto and has prevailed in this organization for many years, was shown to the Nth degree by all units of the regiment. Although it was plenty cold and wet, all troops chose to stay in bivouac in the field and play the game as scheduled, like soldiers, instead of returning to armories and continuing the training from there as they had a chance to.

General Pyron, the Commanding General honored us with his presence for the entire period of the maneuver.

He played the game with the rest of us and despite the rotten weather was in the field, both night and day, observing the tactical problems and terrain exercises conducted. One Lieutenant remarked after General Pyron had inspected his outpost sector at 11:00 PM at night: "By God! the old man is a real General. Who ever heard of a General out on a night like this, when he could be back in a nice warm room drinking highballs."

General Pyron was particularly pleased with the ingenuity displayed by the men, in caring for themselves under adverse weather conditions in the field.

Some of the methods employed by the men to keep themselves and their pup tents warm were eye-openers. For example, two troopers of E Troop located a large piece of corrugated tin, bent this in a semicircle around the front of their pup tent, built a roaring fire between the tin and the opening so that the heat was reflected into the tent, and slept warm as toast. Special guards were posted by all units to keep fires going all night, and as our "go getting" supply officer, Captain Henry L. Phillips, by "hook and crook," was able to keep us supplied with plenty of wood, roaring fires were maintained around every two or three pup tents.

Colonel Parker ordered each unit commander to personally inspect every man of his unit to see that he had changed to dry socks before going to bed at night. It is believed that this foresight, on the part of our regimental commander, prevented any serious sickness.

When one considers that 90% of the officers and men came right out of offices and indoor jobs and spent three days and nights in the field under as adverse weather conditions as will be experienced anywhere, without any sickness, it is a feather in the caps of the regimental surgeon Major Waldo B. Lasater, and all troop commanders, for the unceasing vigilance exercised by them in caring for their men.

Every officer and man in the regiment is bemoaning the fact that Colonel "Tommy" Atkins, Infantry, who for the past two years has been Officer in Charge of National Guard Affairs in this Corps Area, has been grabbed by the 2d Division, at Fort Sam Houston, as Chief of Staff.

Although "Tommy" Atkins was with the National Guard of Texas only a short while it is the consensus of opinion in this regiment, that he was the best ONGA any corps area ever had and accomplished worlds for the Guard.

Colonel Atkins was with us the entire period of our field training last summer where every officer and man learned to love and respect him, and the whole regiment wishes him the best of luck and worlds of success on his new detail.

Captain Bo Phillips, Commanding Troop F, was recently appointed Director of Public Safety for the State of Texas by the Governor. Captain Phillips has been an outstanding Texas Ranger for many years and one of the best peace officers the State has ever known and this promotion is well deserved. "Congratulations Bo, you are going places."

Troop A, Commanded by Captain Bub Newman, recently moved into its new armory site on Bennet Road. Great credit is due the officers and men of the troop for the many, many hours they devoted to getting the armory and stables in shape. Unable to secure any appropriations for the repair work Bub Newman and his men, not daunted, gave up many of their spare hours, and did the work themselves. This shows fine esprit. The troop is now ideally located with plenty of terrain for pasture and mounted problems.

On February 11th the regiment received forty remounts from Fort Reno. All troop commanders were just tickled to death with the remounts furnished and appreciate the fine coöperation of the Remount Service in supplying the type suitable for National Guard work. The remounts received were not only of excellent conformation for Cavalry but were exceptionally well gentled and of good dispositions, two of the most necessary requisites for National Guard mounts. They all show the result of excellent handling and care on the part of the Remount Corps before being shipped.

Colonel Parker was so pleased with the remounts furnished that he wrote a personal letter of thanks to Major E. M. Daniels, QMC, Commanding the Fort Reno Depot.

On February 8th at the Lido Club, the Headquarters Troop, Captain Madden Hill, Commanding, gave a dinner dance, that was voted by all attending as one of the best parties ever pulled off in the regiment. The Headquarters Troop was host to all the other troops in the

112th and over 400 guests attended. The girls were beautiful, the music divine, the dinner excellent and the punch had the kick of a mule. What more could a cavalryman want?

Captain Unk Beecherl, of Machine Gun Troop, was so busy bringing in oil wells the past fall that he almost failed to bag his yearly buck. However, on the last day of the season, Unk knocked a beauty at 600 yards, according to his standby Sergeant Cole, and gave his annual venison barbecue a few days later, for the officers of the regiment. This annual event is always attended by every officer in the regiment, because Unk knows how to entertain royally and his barbecued venison is the best in the world. General Pyron was the guest of honor at this year's party and the principal speaker of the evening.

Captain Harold D. Austin, of Abilene, Texas, who organized Troop K at that station last June, recently received his Federal recognition as Captain and has assumed command of Troop K. "Congratulations and welcome to the regiment Captain Austin, we feel mighty proud to have you with us."

Sergeant Jesse Cole, Machine Gun Troop, is receiving congratulations from the whole regiment on the birth of a baby daughter born February 13, 1940.

124th Cavalry—Houston, Texas

COLONEL CALVIN B. GARWOOD, *Commanding*

Located as we are tactically and strategically, the horse is far from obsolete with us, and it is gratifying to report that the remount service at Fort Reno has furnished our new Third Squadron with its allotment of mounts, as well as replacements for some of the troops of the Regiment. At this point it must be mentioned that the Commanding Officer, Major E. M. Daniels has been most helpful in his complete determination of the temperaments and training of each of the mounts furnished this Regiment. Such supererogatory attitude on the part of any officer of our army certainly adds to the lessening of the vicissitudes of the National Guard organization and makes for a happier and more efficient army as a whole. We are now busily engaged in range work. At each of our drill periods, a major portion of the schedule calls for such training as gives us better marksmanship.

The applicatory system of training prevails throughout the Regiment, for that reason our schools are developing the non-commissioned officers and in the final stages of the course, the troop, platoon, squad and so forth are turned over entirely to the noncommissioned officers. The school for the Headquarters Troop, particularly the staff platoon, has developed to such point that the non-commissioned officers plus the squadron Sergeant Majors can perform every mechanical function required of the platoon. For the first time in the writer's military career, extending over a period of twenty-seven years, the Headquarters of this Regiment has ample clerks and stenographers. To you old timers who read this, it will present a picture of a war time headquarters that earned a commendation from the Corps Commander. The signal and communication platoon has seven expert radio operators and while speaking of Headquarters Troop, we have just received a new command car beautifully equipped with radio that functions and have been informed that the Commander's car is on the way, and while we are telling you about our Regiment, we would like to say that the seven day additional field training reports have been received from the Inspectors and it is the consensus that more benefit was received from this training than any other like period since the World War. Our schedule was made up of two and three day periods of training and during the last three day period, each of the troops made night marches of from twenty to thirty miles duration following a schedule of six miles per hour. The 1st Squadron in North Texas (Fort Worth) made thirty miles in subfreezing weather, maintaining six mile schedule. The march discipline was excellent and no ill effects to the personnel or the mounts, which indicates to all who know that the Squadron's state of training is such that it would contribute effectively to a combat team in any situation on the "M" day.

It is also of interest to know that all of our officers have just equipped themselves with new field uniforms including boots, hats, wool shirts and khaki breeches, all of the identical design and material. This Regiment is maintaining the traditions and customs of the Cavalry and is doing so by an intelligent application of our training missions, hard work and with the thought that should we ever be called upon to serve, that we would like to bring credit to the Cavalry as well as to ourselves. We are enthusiastically carrying on.

61st Cavalry Division—New York City

The 61st Cavalry Division held its annual review in uniform on the evening of February 23, 1940, at Squadron "A" Armory in Manhattan, through the courtesy of that organization. Once each year the officers of the Division are assembled in uniform for a ceremony. This was a gala occasion, and a strong representation of the Division were present, some 145 officers turning out. The ladies and guests of the officers were invited, with some 200 present.

The program consisted of the officers passing in review by unit in the spacious riding hall, the Fort Jay band furnishing the music, and forming up facing the reviewing stand; the introduction of new officers with the Division, and an address of welcome by Colonel Hobart B. Brown, 302nd Cavalry, senior Reserve officer; addresses by Colonel George H. Baird, Cavalry, Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, Second Corps Area; Colonel Clarence Lininger, Cavalry, Executive Officer, 2nd Military Area, and Lieutenant Colonel Edwin O'Connor, Cavalry, senior instructor with the 61st Cavalry Division; an exhibition ride by the equitation class under Major Kent C. Lambert, Cavalry; and thereafter a reception in

the ballroom of the armory, when refreshments were served.

The Division prides itself on the high standard maintained by its officers in the matter of uniform; and this occasion was no exception. The officers presented a neat and soldierly appearance throughout.

Among the guests present was Brigadier General N. Hillyer Egleston, Commanding the 51st Cavalry Brigade, N.Y.N.G.

The Divisional training during the current year has been along tactical lines through the medium of two-sided map maneuvers involving a continuous situation, designed to give instruction and practice in tactical procedures and troop leading methods.

Considerable discussion as to the value of horse cavalry in modern warfare and the probability of hastily organized motorized forces being able to take over horse cavalry rôles led to the evolvement of such a two-sided map maneuver between the 303rd and 304th Cavalry regiments of the Division as opponents.

The General Situation was drawn around an international situation of September, 1939, in which, after the Green attacks across the Potomac against Blue, Red pushes a cavalry regiment, reinforced, across the Susquehanna during the night, hides in the Conewago Mountains the following day and as a raiding force attacks Blue installations at Dover and East Berlin late that afternoon; withdrawing and hiding in the mountains that night and the following morning attacks installations at New Oxford and Hunterstown, assembles after completion of this raid and prepares to withdraw to Red territory, raiding en route.

Upon receipt of the information that Red had crossed a regiment into Blue territory, the Blue command dispatched a Blue cavalry regiment, reinforced, from Hagerstown to East Berlin, by rail, to protect these installations mentioned, and defeat the Red cavalry regiment reported.

The Blue regiment during the movement through South Mountain lost all the horse trains by enemy bombing and received the directive to motorize itself from civilian vehicles in the Gettysburg area and carry out the mission assigned.

Phase I of the problem dealt with the plans, reconnaissance, orders and attacks of the Red cavalry in the raiding mission and the reorganization plans and orders of the Blue regiment, as a motorized unit.

Phase II covered the assembly of the Red regiment after their successful attacks, the plans for their withdrawal and the logistics of caring for their large casualties of wounded resulting from these attacks. The Blue commander was confronted with the necessity of a change of plan based on the information of the destruction of Blue installations and the apparent withdrawal of the Red force to the north which he solved by utilizing his speed to pursue by double encircling and direct pressure maneuver, interposing himself between the Red and the Susquehanna River along Bermudian Creek and the East.

This problem proved highly exciting and interesting to each side as complete written plans, S-2 reports, and Orders were required from each side prior to the play, and in the case of the Red side, each squadron commander was confronted with an excellent sketch, 6″ equals 1 mile, of each town holding an installation and defense by 1 company of infantry and 1 platoon .30 caliber MG's (as provided in the General Situation). The sketch was prepared by the senior class R.O.T.C. unit, Gettysburg College, under direction and coöperation of Lieutenant Colonel Lester L. Lampert, Infantry, P.M.S.&T.

Each squadron commander then had to solve, in detail, his reduction of the defense and destruction of the installation therein.

In the case of the Blue side, it brought out the necessity of distinguishing between speed and mobility of motorized units and the handicap such a force meets in mobility when forced to dismount in column to extend the front for an attack or defense, the difficulty of keeping its transportation close at hand and yet under cover or dispersed against artillery fire or protected against attacks cross-country by mobile horse cavalry units.

The attempt to prove anything for or against either side was not an issue, the object being, to furnish an exercise which would tax the regimental commanders and staff with estimates of the situation, staff functions and paper work and troop leading for the squadron, troop and platoon leaders in a true cavalry mission, a raid and withdrawal for one side, using dash, deception and cover; and road mobility with speed in pursuit to gain a favorable position from which to attack and carry out the mission assigned for the other.

Active duty training for the Division is scheduled for the period June 23rd to July 6th inclusive at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, for 130 officers representing all Divisional units.

62d Cavalry Division
305th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

COLONEL VINCENT A. CARROLL, *Commanding*

On January 24th, the regiment gave a dinner at the Philadelphia Art Club in honor of Colonel Frank K. Chapin, our new unit instructor. Among our guests were Colonel Bruce Palmer, Chief of Staff of the 62d Cavalry Division and Lieutenant Colonel Max Livingston who was formerly Plans and Training Officer of the 305th Cavalry. Colonel Palmer gave an exceedingly interesting talk and brought forth the point that, if the reserves are to be supplied with weapons and matériel for inactive duty training, it would first be necessary to change the basic law. Few persons have realized that under the National Defense Act of 1923, money appropriated for the reserves is limited to pay and allowances for active duty training and that none can be spent for equipment.

The 305th Cavalry is particularly fortunate in having the privileges of the First City Troop's armory and mounts and occasionally some of their equipment, however Colonel Carroll and Major Streicher have been trying to ob-

tain allotments of weapons and equipment for inactive status use, in order to improve the present training. While efforts are being made through the Reserve Officers' Association to secure the necessary legislation to effect these improvements, Colonel Chapin has taken steps which have produced immediate results. At the weekly rides, Colonel Chapin has been closely supervising the instruction and in addition he has prepared a series of map problems that hold the interest of all. Instead of the usual conference problem, each man present is assigned a theoretical command appropriate to his grade and as the situation develops, he is required to write down his actions and orders. The written papers are then read aloud and the solutions are criticized in the light of the basic principles involved. The resulting increased attendance is sufficient evidence of approval of this method of instruction.

A number of able and well informed outside speakers have contributed to the success of the Wednesday noon luncheons. A recent guest was Captain H. L. Barnett, a graduate of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, who explained the development of the new streamlined infantry organization from the squad up to the division. We were also fortunate in having Major J. V. Rowan, Q.M.C., talk on "National Defense." Major Rowan's clear and logical presentation of this subject was genuinely appreciated.

When outside speakers are not available, Colonel Chapin seems to be ever able to produce a War Department training film on short notice, thus insuring that the luncheons are never dull.

Congratulations are in order for the following officers who have recently been promoted to the grade of captain: James C. Gentle, L. Rushton Stretch, Forrest H. Riordan, Jr., Gerald S. Turner and Frank L. Howley.

For many years these men have given generously of their time and effort in behalf of the regiment and it is the unanimous opinion that these promotions are well deserved.

66th Cavalry Division—Kansas City, Missouri

Colonel Broadhurst has been on duty as coördinator of reserve activities in the Kansas City Military District for the past five years. Shortly after his arrival in Kansas City, he was faced with one particular problem, that of procuring instructors from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth for the weekly instruction periods attended by several hundred reserve officers because the school had declined to officially provide such instructors as a continuation of a program which had had some official sanction for many years previous. Through his efforts, Colonel Broadhurst was able to procure ample instructors from the school on an unofficial status. Had it not been for the affectionate regard in which he is held by his fellow regulars, this reserve instruction period would have lost its attraction for reserve components.

He also was able to enlarge and expand troop schools and schools for field officers with a marked increase in attendance, interest and hours of credit allowed reserves for duty on inactive status.

It is also noted that an impelling improvement in the volume of extension course credits has occurred because of reserve interest attracted and cultivated through Colonel Broadhurst's efforts in the district and throughout the state.

A dinner was held March 18, 1940, exclusively for cavalry regulars and reserves in honor of Colonel Broadhurst and on March 19th the Missouri Department and Kansas City Chapter, Reserve Officers' Association, joined in another dinner at which several hundred officers gave expression to their commendations for the leadership and directive efforts of Colonel Broadhurst, also combining these expressions with those of heartfelt regret that this eminent officer and leader is leaving Kansas City.

The Colonel, Mrs. Broadhurst and son, Hughie, will make their home in Andalusia, Alabama, where Colonel Broadhurst served as instructor, National Guard, some years ago.

3d Squadron, 316th Cavalry—Montpelier, Vermont

MAJOR JOHN BRAINERD, *Commanding*

The winter activities of a Reserve Squadron, if recited month by month could not help but be a constant repitition of the same facts. It is for this reason then that this squadron will make but two reports a year, one of its inactive training and one of its active training.

The 3rd Squadron 316th Cavalry has not been dormant during the winter months. Two contact camps have already been held and a third is scheduled for the spring. We are fortunate in finding a real home for the squadron at Norwich University, from which most of our eighty-nine officers graduated. At Norwich, where we hold our contact camps, we find not only the material things like horses to ride and rifles to fire but also a hearty welcome from the officials of the University and from Col. George S. Andrew the Commandant there. At our fall contact camp we had thirty-five officers as well as Lieutenant Colonel L. S. S. Berry our squadron instructor and Lieutenant Colonel Harrison Herman, instructor for the balance of the regiment, who came up from New Haven, Connecticut. Our winter contact camp, held mid the snow and cold of our Vermont winter, saw twenty officers together for a pleasant week-end which included map exercises, gallery practice and equitation in the riding hall.

Three troop schools have continued through the winter. The plan behind these schools was to lecture on successive sections of the thirty series and encourage officers to do the necessary home work so that at the end of nine months we would find a number of our lieutenants with certificates of a capacity for the grade of captain. Records indicate that more extension work has been completed by the officers of our squadron than in previous years.

We have been fortunate in the results obtained from

our interest in extended active duty and school courses. Three of our officers have been ordered to six months duty with the regular army, two have been ordered to the Cavalry School at Fort Riley and one has been ordered to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

The 316th Cavalry will go to camp as a unit in June at Fort Ethan Allen. All officers of the squadron look forward to the two weeks tour of duty and with it the friendly rivalry that will exist between our squadron from Vermont and the other squadrons from Connecticut and Rhode Island.

* * *

1st Squadron, 323d Cavalry—Oakland, Calif.

After several years of no cavalry reserve activities in the Northern California District, to which the 1st Squadron 323rd Cavalry is allocated, the true cavalry spirit is being aroused through the voluntary efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Robert O. Annin, Cavalry on duty with Headquarters Northern California Military District. The cavalry group is not a part of the Colonel's official duties.

A special Cavalry Group School is held monthly, alternating between San Francisco and Oakland, with a gradually increasing attendance at meetings. Last meeting's long distance travelers being First Lieutenant Houston S. Farris from Antioch, 40 miles and Captain George T. Urbani from Sacramento, 100 miles. Besides those assigned to the squadron, officers from the 11th, 312th and 324th Cavalry and CASC were in attendance. The caliber of instruction given by reserve officers is excellent and is no small factor in the increasing attendance and interest.

Riding is available Sundays at Stanford University through the courtesy and coöperation of Major Harry B. Allen, Field Artillery P.M.S. and T., and Second Lieutenant Joseph A. Cashin, Sergeant Instructor ROTC, with only a very nominal fee for orderly service.

The squadron objective of every officer assigned being eligible for active duty and a member of the Cavalry Association is getting under way.

Perhaps we have been the "Lost Squadron," but one thing is certain and that is we are not going to be the "Last Squadron" in accomplishments.

The regular monthly meeting of the Special Cavalry School for Reserve Officers in this area was held Friday evening, January 19, 1940 in the Post Office Building in Oakland, California.

Twenty-six officers were present and learned much about Cavalry Marches and Stable Management from the instructor for the evening Captain M. R. Fisher, commander of Troop "A," 1st Squadron, 323rd Cavalry.

Cavalry officers have shown great interest in this special school, some officers coming from forty to one hundred miles to attend these classes.

The unit's objective of having every officer qualified for summer training and to be a member of the Cavalry Association is getting well under way.

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

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

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